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ABSTRACT

KNOWLEDGE CODIFICATION, PROCESS ROUTINIZATION, AND THE
CREATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES:
Post-Acquisition Management in the US Banking Industry

Maurizio Zollo
Harbir Singh

How do firms create strategically relevant capabilities ? In this study, insights from
evolutionary economics and organizational learning theories are combined to explore the
mechanisms behind the creation o f organizational capabilities in the context of
infrequent, heterogeneous, and complex administrative tasks. More specifically, the
investigation covers the effects of both tacit and codified knowledge accumulation
mechanisms on the development o f a practice specialized in the management o f post
acquisition integration processes. Hypotheses about the performance implications of pre
acquisition resources, post-acquisition integration decisions, and knowledge
accumulation and codification processes are tested with primary data collected from a
sample o f 51 bank holding companies in the United States and Canada, for a total of 577
completed acquisitions. Results show that codification and routinization processes play a
key role in shaping the evolution o f post-acquisition integration practices, and that both
mechanisms have a positive influence on acquisition performance, within specific
limitations. The effectiveness o f tacit knowledge accumulation is constrained by the
degree of homogeneity o f past experiences, whereas knowledge codification impacts
vii
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performance only when high levels o f integration are to be achieved. Results also show
that greater level o f integration have positive implications for acquisition performance
and that decisions to replace top management affect performance negatively.
Conclusions are drawn about necessary refinements o f current theoretical approaches to
accommodate complex learning conditions, and the potential implications for the
management of acquisitions, as well as other infrequent and complex organizational
events, such as strategic alliances and internal reorganizations, are discussed.

(Keywords: organizational learning, evolutionary economics, organizational knowledge,
codification, routinization, capabilities, corporate development, corporate strategy,
strategy implementation, mergers, acquisitions, post-acquisition, integration, banking)
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1. INTRODUCTION

“E ' cosa veramente molto naturale e
ordinaria desiderare di acquistare;
e sempre quando gli uomini lo fanno
che possono, saranno laudati, o non
biasimati; ma quando non possono , e
vogliono farlo in ogni modo.
qui e ' lo errore e il biasimo ”

(The desire to acquire is a very common
and natural thing; and when a man who
is capable o f doing it makes the attempt,
he will generally be praised, or at least
not blamed; error and blame arise when
a man lacks the necessary ability and
still wants to make the attempt at all
costs)
Niccolo’ Macchiavelli, De Principatibus
Ch. Ill - De Principati Misti

During 1996, US firms invested $495 billion, or about 7% of their country’s gross
domestic product, in merger and acquisition (M&A) activities. By comparison, the total
private investment in R&D by US firms in 1996 was $185 billion. US corporations seem
to be investing more in mergers and acquisitions than they do in internal growth
activities, even before other external development channels such as joint ventures and
strategic alliances are taken into account. Moreover, the trend appears to be
strengthening; in the first six months o f 1997. deal volume increased by 37% and the
number o f deals increased by 29% in comparison with the same period o f the previous
year .
The potential impact o f mergers and acquisitions on firms’ ability to achieve,
sustain, or lose competitive advantage is important not just because o f the sheer
magnitude o f the financial commitment, but also because such ventures have immediate

1 Computations by Mergerstat.
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consequences for the quality o f resources and capabilities within the acquiring firm.
“With the stroke o f a pen,” firms not only “add billions in size, get a front-page story, and
create excitement in the markets” (Porter, 1987), but also redefine their endowments o f
resources and capabilities. Depending on the decisions made during, and the outcomes
of, the integration process, firms can transfer, leverage, recombine, and even create
strategically relevant resources. If poorly conceived or executed, however, the
integration process can result in resources being depleted, damaged, or lost to the
competition and in capabilities remaining underutilized or forgotten.
Despite the empirical relevance o f M&A events, and the importance o f the
dynamics of resources and capabilities to the field o f strategic management, surprisingly
little effort has been made to explain how acquisition performance might be influenced
by both the characteristics o f the integration process and the acquiring firm’s c a p a b ility to
devise and implement cogent integration strategies. There are, however, a number o f
sensible explanations for this gap.
First, we currently have a limited understanding o f whether and how
organizations can develop capabilities from events that are relatively infrequent, typically
unpredictable, and highly complex. Mergers and acquisitions, along with other
organizational phenomena such as joint ventures and reorganizations, constitute a
formidable challenge for organizational learning mechanisms as we know them today
(March, Sproull & Tamuz, 1991, p. 1).

Second, despite a solid tradition that has explained capabilities in the context o f
technological innovation and production activities (Schumpeter, 1934; Clark & Fujimoto,
2
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1990; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992), researchers have rarely
examined the evolution o f “softer” administrative practices, such as post-acquisition
integration processes. One reason for the implicit prioritization o f production and R&D
activities over everything else that takes place inside a firm has to do with the wellknown measurement problems connected with such phenomena. Another explanation
might be that economics, which is the prevailing theoretical lens in strategic
management, is still ill-equipped to analyze business activities that are not strictly
identified or identifiable with a production function. Clearly, however, the rewards for
progress in this area are every bit as great as the theoretical and methodological
challenges before the researcher.
Third, the M&A literature has evolved during the last three decades in a highly
segmented fashion, and only recently have scholars begun to consider the plausibility of
an integrative view o f the process, which is crucial for a capability-based explanation.
The literature was created originally by contributions from scholars in the economics and
corporate finance domains, who typically focused on explanations derived from the
characteristics o f the negotiation process. More recently, strategy scholars have
emphasized the importance o f the characteristics of the pre-acquisition resources
controlled by the two firms that are merging. The possibility o f explaining acquisition
processes, as well as the outcomes o f acquisitions, with a capability argument has
surfaced only in the last few years, advanced by scholars rooted in the behavioral
tradition. Even their efforts, however, have been hampered by the limited applicability of
organizational learning mechanisms (see discussion above) and the lack o f an integrative

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

framework combining the internal rigor o f economic analysis with the descriptive power
of behavioral models.
The objective o f this dissertation is to combine some basic insights from
evolutionary economics and organizational learning theories in an initial exploration o f
the mechanisms behind the creation o f organizational capabilities in the context of
infrequent, complex administrative processes. More specifically, the investigation covers
the effects o f both tacit and codified knowledge accumulation mechanisms on the
development o f a specialized capability in the management o f post-acquisition integration
processes. The US banking industry, the context o f the study, is a good example of an
extremely turbulent environment, as the tight coupling o f deregulation, disintermediation,
and technological evolution processes has generated an unprecedented wave o f mergers,
acquisitions, and internal reorganizations. That industry is therefore well suited for
testing whether the evolution o f a post-acquisition management capability can partially
explain the characteristics and the outcomes o f the integration process and, more broadly,
whether and how an expert acquirer can extract and defend the rents from its own
administrative wisdom.

After a review and critique o f the relevant literature in Chapter 2, the presentation
of the key theoretical arguments are set forth in Chapter 3 and the consequent modeling is
presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 describes the research design and the measurement of
the key constructs. The analysis is reported in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 discusses the results
and their implications, as well as the study’s limitations. Chapter 8 summarizes the
findings and suggests possible extensions o f the research.
4
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2 . LITERATURE R E V IE W

This chapter summarizes the theoretical objectives o f the dissertation and the
empirical results o f relevant streams o f research. It also highlights the gaps in our current
understanding, and explains the approach chosen for developing new, empirically
testable, theory.
Three streams o f scholarly work are addressed. First, the evolution of strategic
management thinking is tracked from the original resource-based approaches to the more
current refinement focusing on the dynamics of organizational knowledge. Then the
voluminous literature on mergers and acquisitions is summarized to clarify the current
understanding o f the drivers o f performance in the context o f choice. Finally, the limited
amount o f theoretical and empirical work on the post-acquisition integration process is
surveyed, as it constitutes the main support for both the theoretical framework introduced
in Chapters 3 and 4 and the interpretation of the results of the analysis.

2.1

Resources, Capabilities, and the Knowledge-based View of the Firm
Heterogeneity in the distribution o f organizational resources among a population

o f firms has long been considered a key prerequisite for firms’ attainment o f Ricardian
rents (Penrose, 1959). However, resource heterogeneity is not sufficient to guarantee the
permanence o f those rents, as changes in the environmental contexts in which firms
operate constantly affect the capacity o f resources to generate rents. Managerial activity,
5
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in the presence o f sufficient resource slack, is viewed in Penrose’s work as the
fundamental mechanism by which firms are able to adjust their internal resource
endowments to adapt to new environmental conditions, thereby securing their survival
and growth.
During the last decade, renewed interest in the conditions under which
heterogeneous resources can enable a firm to achieve and sustain competitive advantage
has resulted in a set o f fundamental contributions to the strategic management Held
(Wemerfelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1984; Barney, 1986). That body o f work, labeled as the
“resource-based view o f the firm”, shifted the attention o f strategic management scholars
from external, industry-level sources o f competitive advantage to internal, firm-level
ones. Dierickx and Cool (1989), in particular, contributed to the stream o f research by
viewing the interaction o f organizational activities and resources as flows of the former
constantly increasing or depleting the stock of the latter. O f particular interest is their
notion o f “time-compression diseconomies,” which emphasizes that the development o f
such resources is constrained by temporal and, one might add, cognitive limitations. The
latter are exemplified by the availability o f managerial time and attention, slack resources
in Penrose’s terms, in which a firm must invest to develop new resources o f strategic
relevance. More generally, however, one might argue that cognitive limitations constrain
the development o f firm resources at every level o f its organizational structure. The
mechanism underlying the creation and destruction o f firm resources, then, might be the
execution and marginal fine-tuning of day-to-day activities.
Such activities, which appear to be essential if organizations are to build rentgenerating resources and to achieve and sustain competitive advantage, have been studied
6
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in several ways and from different theoretical angles. In the first formal exploration
rooted in the non-neoclassical economics domain, Nelson and Winter (1982) spoke o f
organizational routines as stable, detailed, and predictable patterns o f quasi-automatic
behavior developed and constantly refined at the margin by firms in their ordinary
productive activities. Routines therefore differ and should be distinguished from other
types o f organizational activities, such as group problem-solving and strategic decision
making, because o f their limited cognitive content (i.e., the latter activities do not
represent a quasi-automatic response to recognizable stimuli). They also differ from
rules o f thumb and heuristics because they are relatively complex and detail-oriented
(Winter, 1995; Cohen, Burkhart, Dosi, Egidi, Marengo, Warglien and Winter, 1996).
Routines are a neutral but critical construct in that they can generate both
organizational capabilities and “rigidities'’ (Leonard Barton, 1992), depending on the
quality o f the performance feedback and o f the updating mechanisms in the particular
part o f the organization. Further, routines can be responsible for the development o f
organizational capabilities only to the extent that improvements are limited to the current
process components and to the current overall structure o f the production process. Such
incremental typically is replaced by higher order types o f learning, which have been
labeled “modular” learning at the component level (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Sanchez &
Mahoney, 1996) and “architectural” learning at the production process level (Henderson
& Clark, 1990). When the improvements occur at both the component and the
production process levels, we generally speak o f radical or revolutionary reorientations
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1986; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994).

7
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The higher orders o f learning activities are justified and defined on the basis o f a
common view o f organizational capabilities as the product o f recombinations o f current,
lower order activities. For example, modular learning recombines operational routines by
adapting them to new product components, and architectural learning recombines new
product components (and consequently the sets o f routines attached to their production)
in the redesign o f production processes for new generations o f final products. Consistent
with this view is Kogut and Zander’s (1992 p.392) statement that:
Knowledge advances by recombinations because a Arm’s capabilities cannot be separated
from how it is currently organized.

Grant (1996) reconfirms that view o f organizational capabilities as recombination,
or (in his words) “integration,” o f existing knowledge. He views them as (p. 116):
...the outcome o f knowledge integration: complex, team-based productive activities....
dependent upon the firm ’s ability to harness and integrate the knowledge o f many
individual specialists [underlining added].

Importantly, the emphasis in the “recombinatory” view o f organizational
capabilities is on the integration or harnessing o f existing knowledge, as opposed to the
creation of collective understanding o f how things are or ought to be done. One could
infer from Kogut and Zander’s (1992) quotation that the rationale for such prioritization
is based on our limited capacity to distinguish between the accumulation o f knowledge
and the organizational arrangements connected to the accumulation processes. Others
scholars, however, are more optimistic: Teece, Pisano, and Schuen (1997, p. 518), for
example, clearly distinguish between “the coordination/integration (a static concept);
learning (a dynamic process); and reconfiguration (a transformational concept)” notions
o f organizational capabilities, and join all three concepts in their definition o f dynamic

8
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capabilities. Coordinating, integrating, or “harnessing” current knowledge therefore is
distinguishable and ought to be distinguished from the creation o f new organizational
knowledge, even though the individuals or the groups who are the repository o f that
knowledge are only partially aware o f its existence, its magnitude, and its usefulness.

The current thinking in strategic management has evolved significantly from the
seminal pieces on the role o f internal resources. It has moved from a definitional
discourse focused on the conditions necessary for internal resources to create defensible
rents (Barney 1986, Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991) to a more sophisticated debate
about the mechanisms responsible for the creation of those resources or o f the rents
connected to them (Winter, 1995; Teece et al. 1997). The refinements come primarily
from theoretical arguments rooted in disciplines partially outside strategic management
field, such as organizational learning and evolutionary economics. However, several
issues are still open and must be addressed to further our understanding o f organizational
capabilities and their impact on competitive advantage:
•

Much of the discourse comes from research that builds on Schumpeter’s pioneering
work on technological innovation. Organizational knowledge has been considered
primarily production-related2, and the defined capabilities are either explicitly or
implicitly “tailored” to the technological innovation process and the corresponding
R&D/manufacturing functions. That is why we can talk o f a recombination process
as the basis o f multiple levels o f learning (from production routines, to component-

2 This is in part due to a restrictive interpretation o f Schumpeter’s work. His definition o f “development",
in fact, includes non technical components, such as the identification o f new markets and o f new
opportunities created by the formation or destruction o f monopolies (Schumpeter, 1934)
9
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based modules, to process architectures, and so on). To develop the dynamics of
capabilities as drivers o f competitive advantage, however, we must enlarge our
scope o f analysis to non-manufacturing, or administrative, types o f knowledge.
Doing so will enable us to contemplate more opportune, perhaps more
generalizable, mechanisms at the basis o f their inception and evolution.
•

Present understanding o f organizational capabilities does not facilitate the empirical
investigation o f their origins. It is not immediately apparent how one could identify
when a '‘combinative” capability might be present inside an organization, let alone
measure it. Measuring process outcomes is not an option, for doing so creates the
tautology of defining a capability as “the presence o f superior performance.” The
problem is compounded when, instead o f trying to measure only a
coordination/integration capability, one adds learning and a reconfiguration
dimensions o f the construct, as Teece et al. (1997) suggest.

•

Not surprisingly given the difficulties, we still do not have a good understanding of
how organizational capabilities are created. How does one organization learn to
recombine the knowledge o f individuals or groups more effectively than its
competitors? A deeper understanding o f the knowledge-based mechanisms
underlying the evolution o f capabilities is essential and needs to be refined, at least
in the context o f our interest: infrequent, heterogeneous, and highly complex tasks.

The various approaches to the study o f organizational capabilities summarized
above are based on the implicit assumption that the task to be mastered occurs in a
reasonably frequent and homogeneous way. Unfortunately, as March, Sproull, and
10
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Tamuz (1991) note, some o f the most important events in the life o f an organization do
not happen with the frequency (and similarity) implicitly assumed in the current theories.
Developing organizational capabilities from rare and heterogeneous events therefore
represents an ongoing challenge for both scholars and practitioners.

2.2

Research on M&A Performance
Extensive research has been done on the performance implications o f

acquisitions. Research in economics and corporate finance has focused primarily on
whether acquisitions create value on average. Scholars using event-study methodologies
to proxy acquisition performance report some level o f consensus that significant value is
created for the target firm’s shareholders, whereas the acquirer’s shareholders experience
no abnormal gains or losses (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Weston & Chung, 1983; Jarrell,
Brickley & Netter, 1988; Franks, Harris & Titman, 1991; Loderer & Martin, 1992).
Other scholars, however, have reached less optimistic conclusions on the acquirer’s
ability to earn at least normal returns: Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) computed an
average 10% value deterioration over five years in a very large sample o f acquisitions.
Using accounting measures o f performance o f about 6,000 acquisitions in the 1960 and
1970, Ravenscrafi and Scherer (1987) found that even acquired firms exhibit worsening
performance, on average, after the acquisition.
The subset o f literature specializing in bank mergers also has produced mixed
results. In his review o f 40 empirical studies, Rhoades (1 194) found no evidence of
either value creation or value destruction from bank mergers on average. Overall, a
consensus is emerging that more thorough investigation o f the conditions under such
transactions create and destroy value is needed (Pilloff & Santomero, 1997). Possibly,
11
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there are certain conditions under which acquirers are able to create value consistently.
The quest is then better defined as a search for an explanation o f the variance o f
acquisition performance rather than the assessment o f the mean o f the performance
distribution.

Since the work o f Rumelt (1974), the degree o f resource relatedness between the
divisions o f a firm has been viewed by strategic management scholars as an important
antecedent o f firm performance. The same logic applied to the M&A context implies that
acquirers should be able to generate higher value when there is a higher degree o f
relatedness between their resources and those o f their targets. A substantial amount o f
empirical work has explored that perspective in the context o f acquisitions (Chatteijee,
1986; Lubatkin, 1987; Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Shelton, 1988; Fowler & Schmidt.
1989). Later work refined and extended the earlier studies (Seth, 1990a and 1990b;
Datta, 1991; Chatteijee et al, 1992; Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992). Unfortunately, the
empirical evidence from that extensive body o f work is not unambiguous. Although
many researchers found that the degree of product/market relatedness (as a proxy for
resource relatedness) had a positive effect on acquisition performance (Singh &
Montgomery, 1987; Shelton, 1988; Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Healy, Palepu & Ruback,
1992), others found the opposite (Chatteijee, 1986) or discerned no significant impact
(Lubatkin, 1987; Seth, 1990b).
A more careful reading o f the resource relatedness hypothesis, however, takes
into account the fact that the degree o f relatedness can be priced out during negotiations,
consequently weakening its value-creation potential. Once that argument is factored into
12
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the model, the condition under which value can be created from acquisitions becomes
significantly more restrictive. In fact, value creation will arise only when the
combination between the two firms that complete the transaction results in synergies
superior to those created by the combination o f the target with any of the other bidders.
Acquirers therefore are ‘‘forced” to form a uniquely highly valued combination o f their
resources with those o f the target firm to earn positive abnormal returns (Barney, 1988).
On the basis o f that argument, Barney (1988) expects that the bidders in most related
acquisitions will not obtain higher abnormal returns than bidders in unrelated
acquisitions. The argument can be extended from the resource relatedness hypothesis to
other characteristics o f the resources within the two firms. As long as they are known
and quantifiable at the time o f the negotiation, they are likely to be included in the pricing
o f the transaction. In more general terms, the power o f performance explanations based
on the pre-acquisition characteristics o f the two firms is likely to be weaker than many
would expect.
One possible source o f value creation in acquisitions that might be less sensitive
to the preceding argument is the degree to which the acquiring firm develops a specific
ability to manage the post-acquisition integration process effectively. The rationale for
that speculation is relatively straightforward. Given the tacit and complex nature o f such
administrative capability, it will be particularly difficult for the target firm (as well as the
market) to identify its presence, articulate its characteristics, and assess the potential
impact on the performance o f the entire transaction. Organizational capabilities,
particularly the “soft” type, are subject to a high degree o f causal ambiguity (Lippman &
Rumelt, 1982), in that the relationship between firm performance and their magnitude is
13
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often obscure even to the firm itself (let alone the counterparts negotiating the acquisition
agreement or the financial analysts assessing the potential for value creation from the
transaction). To clarify the potential value o f the causal ambiguity argument, the
literature on post-acquisition management is reviewed to identify what is known about
the complexities o f post-acquisition integration processes. The two streams o f literature,
then are merged to advance an explanation of post-acquisition integration decisions and
o f acquisition performance based on our understanding o f the mechanisms for the
creation and evolution o f organizational capabilities.

2.3

Research on Post-Acquisition Management
The origins o f the post-acquisition management literature can be found in the

behavioral and HRM traditions, which generally emphasize the negative consequences o f
post-acquisition integration processes on the organizational conditions o f the two firms
(see Hogan & Overmyer-Day, 1994 or Shanley, 1998 for a good overview).
Contributions focus on the negative impact of cultural clashes (Nahavandi &
Malekzadeh, 1988; Buono & Bowditch, 1989), top management conflict (Mirvis, 1985).
top management turnover (Walsh, 1988; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991; Cannella & Hambrick,
1993), poor handling o f communication processes (Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991), and the
effects o f post-acquisition integration processes on individual attitudes and behaviors
(Astrachan, 1990; Joyce-Covin etal., 1996).
Those contributions shed significant light on the challenges firms face when they
attempt to translate their initial objectives and their post-acquisition integration strategies
into specific action steps while trying to minimize the negative consequences of
14
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organizational disruption and psychological resistance to change. However, by focusing
primarily on the negative implications o f the post-acquisition integration phase, the work
provides only a partial view o f the M&A process, stopping short of considering the
conditions that determine the potential for value creation in mergers and acquisitions.
Are all integration processes inherently destructive, or do the various forms and degrees
o f organizational disruption depend on the characteristics o f the transaction and on the
two firms involved? I f the latter is true, the negative consequences highlighted in these
studies may be the “price” firms must pay to achieve economic benefits. In any case,
studying only some aspects o f the performance equation in isolation from the others leads
to a partial and potentially biased understanding o f acquisition processes.
The so-called “process view” o f acquisitions (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986;
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Haspeslagh & Farquhar, 1994; Pablo, 1994) attempts to
bridge the gap between the two streams o f literature by highlighting the need to include
both value creation potential and implementation complexities in a sound theoretical
treatment o f acquisition processes. It thus affords a process perspective that analyzes the
alternatives and challenges in the various steps o f the process and provides particularly
useful taxonomies o f possible integration approaches, given pre-acquisition conditions in
the two firms. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) suggest a taxonomy with two dimensions:
the levels o f strategic interdependence between the firms, and the levels o f organizational
autonomy given to the acquired firm.

It considers the combinations created by varying

levels o f strategic interdependence with the varying levels o f organizational autonomy
needed to preserve the core capabilities embedded in the cultural environment o f the
acquired entity, and prescribes three possible integration approaches. From a modeling
15
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point o f view, the framework suggested can be condensed into one type o f post
acquisition decision-making variable (the type of organizational integration) and two
explanatory constructs based on the pre-acquisition characteristics o f the two firms
(degree o f strategic fit and degree o f organizational fit). Importantly, the framework
includes the quality o f the acquired firm’s resources and the (absolute and relative)
transaction size as relevant factors.
Large-scale empirical analyses o f post-acquisition decisions are rare. Datta and
Grant (1990) found a significant correlation between the degree o f resource relatedness
and the level o f integration. They also found a partial moderating role o f relatedness
between integration and acquisition performance: in unrelated acquisitions, the level of
integration hurt acquisition performance, but the impact was not statistically significant in
related transactions. Pablo (1994) examined the contextual and organizational
explanations o f the decision about the level o f integration between the firms involved in
an acquisition. She used a set o f scenarios that varied along the dimensions o f strategic
fit, organizational disruption potential, buyer’s multiculturalism, goal conflicts, and
power differentials, and evaluated their effect on the degree to which the acquiring firm
would integrate the target. Also. Pablo, Sitkin, and Jemison (1996) advanced the notion
o f the acquirer’s attitude toward risk to explain several types o f acquisition-related
decisions, including the level o f post-acquisition integration.
The degree to which the two organizations involved in the acquisition process are
integrated is only one o f the dimensions of the post-acquisition management process that
can be relevant in explaining the overall performance of the transaction. A high level of
integration between the two firms can be achieved in several ways. For example, the
16
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acquiring firm can decide to retain key resources o f the acquired firm and try to align
resource use across the two organizations through a consensus-building process.
Conversely, it can decide to substitute or dismiss part o f the acquired firm’s pre-existing
resources (human or physical) to accomplish a faster, unambiguous, and eventually more
effective level o f integration.
One variable that has received some degree o f attention in the literature as a way
to approximate the use o f consensus building is the degree o f replacement o f the top
management team o f the acquired firm. The “market for corporate control” theory, for
example, suggests that inefficient management teams will be replaced by more competent
ones in a market where teams compete for the control of productive assets (Manne, 1965;
Singh, 1975; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The strategic management literature often
contrasts that view to one in which the top managers o f the acquired entity might own
firm-specific and uniquely valuable talents and skills; the disruption o f those “managerial
rents” (Castanias and Helfat, 1991) could significantly harm the performance o f the
acquisition process. Empirically, Cannella and Hambrick (1993) showed that the
departure o f managers from the target firm has a negative impact on acquisition
performance, and that the co-optation o f the target’s managers in the acquirer’s
organization might help achieve better results. Krishnan’ Miller and Judge (1997)
reached similar conclusions, adding that the degree o f complementarity between the two
top management teams positively influences performance and should therefore be
protected, when possible.
Although that the degree o f substitution of the target firm’s top management team
appears to be important in our understanding o f M&A performance, theoretical and
17
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empirical work to explain the drivers o f the substitution decision is still at an embryonic
stage. In Cannella and Hambrick’s (1993) study, for instance, the issue was not explicitly
addressed: interestingly, however, neither the degree o f resource relatedness nor the
target’s pre-acquisition performance (objectively measured as an ROE ratio) correlated
with the degree o f executive departure (p. 147; Table 2). In the only studies specifically
dedicated to explanation o f the replacement decision, Walsh (1989) and Walsh and
Ellwood (1991) found explanations o f turnover based on characteristics of the negotiation
process and, interestingly, on the pre-acquisition profitability o f the acquirer, but none
based on the target’s pre-acquisition performance. That almost anecdotal evidence about
the importance o f the characteristics o f the acquiring firm foreshadows some o f the
premises o f the present work, which also focuses on the acquirer’s attributes and how
they influence the post-acquisition management process.
The notion of resource deployment, which is used in the most recent treatments of
acquisitions by strategy scholars (Anand & Singh, 1997; Capron et al., 1997), is related to
the resource substitution construct. Yet it is arguably less precise in that it is generally
confounded with the decision about the level o f integration. Resources can be deployed
at low levels o f integration, such as the transfer of key personnel in a LBO transaction
completed by specialized financial acquirers. In contrast, they can be retained by both
organizations in a higher level o f integration mode whereby same resources are simply
used in a similar and coordinated way.
Shanley (1994) provided the first empirical work in which the complexity o f the
post-acquisition decision-making process was examined in many o f its numerous aspects.
The study o f 51 large acquisitions factor analyzed 16 types o f decisions, reducing them to
18
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four broad categories, and found that they had different antecedents and, most
importantly, different performance consequences. Interestingly, the factor including the
replacement o f the CEO and the turnover o f the top management team was related
negatively to performance, whereas operational changes in the structure, control, and
compensation systems o f the acquired firm were associated with improved post
acquisition performance. Shanley (1994) also found a significant and positive
performance effect o f the acquirer’s acquisition experience on performance. No
elaboration was offered on the knowledge mechanisms underlying the learning process or
on the type o f acquisition experience accumulated, but the result is at least suggestive o f
the possibility o f organizational learning effects even in the context o f acquisitions.

19
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3. THEORY BUILDING

This chapter proposes to provide a theoretical answer to some o f the issues raised
in the preceding discussion o f the literature on organizational capabilities. The objective
is first to offer some definitional support for the notion o f organizational capabilities,
then to introduce the knowledge-based mechanisms that might help explain the creation
o f those capabilities. Finally, the chapter explores how such mechanisms might operate
in contexts where the task to be mastered occurs with low and generally unpredictable
frequency and with high levels o f interdependence between numerous simultaneous
tasks.

3.1

The Object of Study: Organizational Capabilities
Scholars have conceptualized organizational capabilities (or competencies) in

several ways (see section 2 .1). The approach that views them as deriving from an act o f
recombination (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996) or o f modular construction
(Henderson & Clark, 1990, Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996) o f
current knowledge is an important element o f the theory o f organizational capabilities.
Other researchers have introduced additional elements inspired by search behaviors
(March & Simon, 1958), such as the process by which firms fine-tune current routines by
using knowledge accumulated from past experiences and feedback mechanisms (Winter,
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1987; Cohen et al. 1996, i.e. “local search”), or the more radical reconfigurations o f
resources and routines (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Teece, Pisano & Schuen, 1997).
In an effort to balance the trade-off between simplicity and thoroughness, two
elements can be singled out that seem essential for conceiving o f the formation o f
organizational capabilities. Firms have to: (1) accumulate knowledge from direct
experiences related to the task in question and (2) rationalize, or make sense, o f the
accumulated knowledge, thereby transforming the raw data into actionable information
(“know-how”) or, at an even higher level o f abstraction, into awareness o f causal
relationships (“know-why”). The following definition is therefore proposed:
Definition 1. An organizational capability is the outcome o f a process o f accumulation
and rationalization o f knowledge derivedfrom past experiences.

Any reference to performance, either at the firm or at the task level, is purposely
excluded from the definition to avoid the well-known tautology o f defining a capability
as an improvement in performance. The definition is centered on knowledge-based
phenomena, which hypothetically correlate with improved quality in process and
organizational outcomes, but that association is neither necessary to the definition nor
required for theorizing on how firms build their stock of competencies. Several
convincing arguments have been made about the possible negative performance
consequences o f capability building. They include superstitious (Levitt & March, 1988)
and myopic (Levinthal & March, 1993) learning, as well as negative transfer effects o f
lessons learned in one context to a different one (Cormier & Hagman, 1987; Cohen &
Bacdayan, 1994; Haleblian, 1997).
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The definition also excludes any form o f vicarious learning, be it imitative o f
competitors or acquired through external experts (consultants, etc.)- Far from doubting
the existence o f mimetic behavior, however, the formulation is based on the observation
that the complexity o f an organizational capability cannot be accessed “as is” outside the
organizational boundaries, but has to be nurtured and developed through direct
experience. Although firms might try to copy the practices o f competitors perceived as
superior performers, the “import” o f such ideas will not translate into an organizational
capability unless it is supported by both direct experience and cognitive efforts directed
toward the adaptation, integration, and fine-tuning o f the new practice within the set o f
current routines.
With respect to Teece et al.’s (1997) definition, the focus is restricted to the
learning (i.e., the “dynamic”) element, leaving the static and transformational elements
out o f the analysis and the scope of the study.
The notion o f knowledge accumulation is derived from decades of research on
learning curves and organizational learning processes; here, however, knowledge
accumulation refers specifically to the tacit absorption o f wisdom provided by the simple
exposure to several relatively similar events. The relevance o f the construct is based on
Polanyi’s (1962, 1966) work, which shows how human beings know much more than
they are able to articulate and explain.
... knowledge is deeply ingrained in patterns o f behavior which are difficult to articulate
(and therefore to teach or transfer) even by the people w ho are depository and habitual
users o f that knowledge [Polanyi, 1962].

Examples at the individual level abound. We cannot gain much skill in driving a
car, touch-typing, or playing tennis by consulting manuals, books or experts’; direct
22
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experience is essential. Similarly, an organization or group develops a high level o f task
comprehension and implementation deftness (McGrath, MacMillan, Venkataraman,
1995) without being aware o f it or explicitly mentioning or codifying it.
The other key notion, rationalization, incorporates and builds on the tradition o f
sense-making (Weick, 1979) as a necessary (albeit not sufficient) prerequisite for the
creation o f competence. It is also somewhat related to the notion o f a capability as a
recombination of existing knowledge. Here, however, the scope o f the construct is
limited to the cognitive part; only explicit efforts to understand the causal mechanisms
behind the correct or improved execution o f a certain task are considered. Examples
include a group o f individuals tackling an unresolved issue, brainstorming on the
complex performance outcome o f a recently completed task, or drafting a new procedure
to simplify the future executions o f a certain task.
The primary goal o f definition 1 is to disentangle the “semi-automatic”
knowledge accumulation mechanism from the cognitive effort o f reflecting on and
analyzing accumulated experience to generate higher levels o f understanding of a certain
task or phenomenon. In that sense, organizational capabilities differ from routines
because they contain the cognitive element, and differ from the standard notions of
problem-solving or strategy-making activities because they can also be developed
without an explicit cognitive effort. The extent to which the two elements o f definition 1
vary in their relative impact on the creation o f a new capability is the subject o f the rest o f
this chapter.
One final point about definition 1 is worth noting. By defining a capability on the
basis o f simple knowledge accumulation and rationalization mechanisms, one can avoid
23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

function-specific lingo (i.e., “modular” capabilities) and generalize from well-studied
manufacturing or innovative processes to a more “holistic” concept o f organizational
capability, which includes both administrative and productive knowledge.

3.2

Knowledge Accumulation and Knowledge Codification
Definition 1 requires that we evaluate how knowledge accumulates in a firm, and

how it is “rationalized” by the individuals or groups operating on a certain task. Note the
fundamental difference between Arrow’s (1962b, 1974) notion o f information as a
costless, transferable, and usable public good and the type o f organizational knowledge
examined here, which emphasizes the understanding of how highly complex and
heterogeneous organizational processes should be carried forward in a timely, costeffective, and precise way. Such knowledge is difficult to observe and assess even for its
holder (Polanyi, 1962; Rogers, 1980), is “sticky” (Szulanski, 1993 and 1997), is highly
system-dependent (Winter, 1987), and is only partially codifiable (Kogut & Zander, 1992
and 1993; Zander & Kogut, 1995). Consequently, far from being a free good with no
potential for value creation, organizational knowledge might be the cornerstone o f firms'
ability to create and sustain competitive advantage.
Critical to our understanding o f knowledge accumulation is the notion o f “path
dependence,” which describes the strength o f the causal relationship between the state of
a certain system at time t and the state o f the same system at time t -1 . The relationship is
much more complex in a real organizational environment, where the actions and
decisions performed at any time are the result o f a mix o f several factors, such as: (1) the
replication o f stable patterns o f behavior, (2) the development of new ones along a
relatively well-known trajectory, and (3) the introduction o f radically new elements or
24
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patterns o f action (internally driven or imported from the external environment) resulting
from creative or problem-solving efforts. According to evolutionary economics, the last
type o f event is much more rare than generally assumed by management scholars.
The vast majority o f what happens within an organization can be explained by either
habitual execution o f well-known routines or by routinized impulse reactions to
recognized stimuli. The space o f will-driven behavior, such as strategy-making or
strategic reorientation, is much more limited than most management scholars tend to
assume [Winter, 1987; p. 163].

The assumption that past activities and decisions have a great influence on present
ones is at the foundation o f the behavioral theory o f the firm (March & Simon, 1958;
Cyert & March, 1963). It is driven by the generally accepted conditions o f bounded
rationality on the part o f decision-makers, which imply a primarily local character for
organizational search behavior. Hence, organizational knowledge can be assumed to
accumulate through relatively small, marginal additions to the current stock of
knowledge, and is most likely to be produced along a determined evolutionary trajectory
(Dosi, 1982). It is important to distinguish between the replication o f known processes
which establishes and maintains organizational routines (process routinization), and the
patterns of local search along one trajectory (path-dependent or constrained evolution).
The important characteristic that both have in common, however, is a relatively low level
o f cognitive effort; actors learn without realizing that they are doing so. The main
prerequisites for tacit knowledge accumulation are continuity o f use o f the task and
stability of the personnel who tacitly accumulate the expertise.
The following formal definition is proposed.
Definition 2. Process routinization is the degree to which knowledge from previous
experiences accumulates in tacit forms (i.e. in the minds o f human actors) and results in
quasi-automatic, uniform, response behavior to varied stimuli.
25
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According to definition 1, the other precursor o f organizational capabilities is the
explicit codification o f the wisdom extracted from previous experiences into ad-hoc tools.
Such tools can take the form o f manuals, blueprints, computer models, guidelines, and
other means o f describing what to do in a certain situation (“know-what”). If sufficiently
evolved, the tools might also provide a description o f how to do it (“know-how”) and
eventually o f why it makes sense to do it that way (“know why,” Seely Brown & Duguid,
1991). Codified tools are generally available to multiple individuals and therefore
facilitate the diffusion (and, in part, the imitation) of accumulated knowledge (Kogut &
Zander 1992; Nonaka, 1994; Zander & Kogut, 1995).
For our purposes, the salient characteristics of codified knowledge are in the use
and the diffusion o f its outputs, but in the process through which the outputs are created,
that is, the time and effort invested in analyzing the firm’s past experiences, abstracting to
some stable causal relationships, and incorporating the new wisdom in newly created or
updated tools. Thus, codification not only serves as a reference for learning, reviewing,
and spot-checking the execution o f a certain task, but also facilitates the creation o f
organizational capabilities, as the codification process itself increases the level o f
awareness o f the cause-effect relationships, thereby promoting the emergence o f
solutions and the improvement o f collective competence.
The following definition is proposed.
Definition 3. Knowledge codification is the degree to which the accumulated experience
is analyzed, abstracted, and incorporated in check-lists, manuals, blueprints, computer
programs, etc., that provide the content ( “know-what"), the methodology ( “know-how ”),
and eventually the rationale ( “know-why") fo r the execution o f a certain task.
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Process routinization and knowledge codification are clearly not orthogonal constructs,
and some degree o f correlation can be expected between the two. It is difficult to
conceive o f an organization in which only one o f the two mechanisms is active.
However, the two mechanisms are separable in their distinctive loci o f accumulation o f
knowledge (human brain in one case, paper or electronic files in the other). Studying
them on that basis seems to be correct from a theoretical point of view, and might be
particularly useful for the normative aspects o f the theory on the creation and evolution o f
organizational capabilities.

The well-known dichotomy o f tacit versus explicit forms o f knowledge can be
used to theorize on the mechanisms that might underlie the accumulation o f knowledge
and the creation o f specific capabilities inside an organization. Given a certain degree o f
tacitness or (vice-versa) o f codifiability o f the knowledge as the basis o f a certain
process, one should not expect the actual degree o f codification applied by all the firms
using the process to be uniform. Nor should one assume that all the firms will codify the
process to the maximum extent allowed by the nature o f the underlying knowledge. One
possible contribution of the present work is the demonstration that the degree o f actual
codification o f a process under study depends on both the intrinsic characteristics

01

the

process (i.e., its “codifiability”) (Winter, 1987; Kogut & Zander, 1992) and the deliberate
cognitive efforts o f firms.
The preceding arguments can be viewed as an effort to expand the traditional
evolutionary economics discourse by partially integrating the cognitive elements
necessary for a more thorough understanding o f how certain organizations become more
27
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or less proficient than others at certain tasks. Gavetti and Levinthal’s (1997) simulation
work on cognition in rugged landscapes can be viewed as promoting a similar set of
arguments if the cognitive effort to simplify the dimensional space o f a complex (highly
interdependent) multi-dimensional environment is interpreted in the creation and
development o f codified tools such as manuals, blueprints, and internal reports.

3.3

Organizational Learning Through Infrequent and Heterogeneous

Events
Two fundamental and often implicit assumptions made in both the organizational
learning and the evolutionary economics literature are that the task (1) can be
experienced with sufficiently high frequency and (2) presents itself in sufficiently
comparable ways that knowledge accumulated from previous experiences can be
transferred to the present execution in a fairly easy and semi-automatic way. At the core
o f this work is the theorization o f what might happen when those assumptions are
relaxed.
Fig. 3.1 maps the most important organizational learning mechanisms onto the
two dimensions o f interest: task frequency and com parability/

3 Frequency is defined conventionally as number o f events within a unit o f time (e.g., one year in contexts
such as acquisitions). Comparability is defined as the degree o f similarity with which the task presents
itself each time; in exploratory tasks, comparability is by definition low.
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Different forms o f vicarious learning are present in possibly every combination o f
task frequency and complexity levels. A firm can decide at any moment to solicit the
help and advice o f some specialized consulting agency or to imitate some type o f best
practice developed by a successful competitor. Until such action translates into first-hand
experience that leads to the accumulation of internally generated (and embedded)
knowledge, it will be difficult to assume that the organization has been able to develop
any capability or internalize any best practice. As defined and assumed in definition 1,
an organizational capability can be developed only through the accumulation and
rationalization o f direct experience.
Trial and error mechanisms typically are used in exploratory learning contexts
where highly frequent events can be experienced at relatively low cost per event (e.g.,
search for new chemical compounds). Such learning mechanisms are not feasible,
however, when the costs attached to the “errors” are particularly high (e.g., unsuccessful
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acquisitions, joint ventures, or reorganization processes) and the availability o f the
“trials” is low.
Learning by doing is probably the most highly studied mechanism in both
theoretical and empirical work. However, it is also the mechanism that depends most on
the two assumptions o f high frequency and comparability o f the experienced events. We
currently do not know how it performs once the two assumptions are relaxed.
When an unfamiliar task is relatively complex and highly expensive, a more
efficient way to accumulate knowledge is by execution o f a pilot project or in-depth
analysis o f a prototypical event before (March, Sproull & Tamuz, 1991) the commitment
is scaled up. Such arrangements seem to be able to combine the tacit knowledge
accumulation component necessary in even such a rare (i.e., unique) experience, and the
cognitive activity necessary to analyze and extract all possible experiential value from
that one event.
The last mechanism seems to be the most likely candidate for explaining the
mechanics o f organizational learning in the context considered here. To build
competencies under these “extreme” conditions, firms might have to rely more on the
cognitive rationalization mechanism and less on tacit knowledge accumulation
mechanisms. The difference in the effectiveness o f the two knowledge-based
mechanisms is a matter o f degree, as both co-exist within the firm at any point in time.
Fig. 3.2 illustrates the intuition:
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Fig. 3.2 - Task Frequency and Learning
Effectiveness
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At high frequency levels, we witness the world Nelson and Winter (1982)
described. In it, capabilities are created mainly through tacit knowledge accumulation
mechanisms, and codified knowledge is either non-influential, because operators do not
use the manuals or other codified supports and prefer to rely on their own experience, or
counterproductive, as it might inhibit attempts to adapt the procedures to new
requirements that have emerged through simple practice and performance feedback
loops.
At low frequency levels, however, the relationship between the two mechanisms
could be inverted with respect to their relative ability to facilitate learning and create
organizational capabilities. The rationale for this advantage o f codification processes
over tacit knowledge accumulation can be argued on three grounds. First, tacit
knowledge accumulation cannot account for the problem o f transferring past experience
to domains characterized by superficially similar but essentially different conditions; only
31
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a deliberate cognitive effort to extract the generalizable causal relationships between
conditions and performance can avoid that frequent mistake. Some very recent
contributions (Haleblian, 1997; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1997) show that negative
transfer effects can significantly impact the performance o f rare and heterogeneous
events, such as corporate acquisitions. The second acquisition experience leads to a
systematically worse performance than the first one if it is inherently different (e.g., a
different degree o f resource relatedness).
Second, many authors (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1993; Iansiti,
1995) have concluded that relying on tacit knowledge accumulation can be very risky in
turbulent environments. When low frequency and high task heterogeneity create high
barriers to knowledge accumulation, the context can be likened to a highly turbulent
environment in which the usefulness o f past experiences is significantly reduced. Again,
an explicit effort directed toward in-depth analysis o f the few available experiences, and
the consequent appreciation o f some o f the action-performance relationships, might result
in an improved way to handle the complexities o f infrequent and diverse tasks.
Third, in the attention-based view o f the firm (Ocasio, 1997 both strategic choice
and competitive advantage are explained by the allocation o f managerial attention among
a large number o f potential priorities. Knowledge codification can be a strategic variable,
as it depends partially on the willingness o f the firm to invest time and effort (i.e.
attention) to extract the most valuable lessons from its previous experiences, and
therefore can lead to higher process and organizational performance.
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4. MODELS AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
This chapter presents the formal treatment o f the arguments advanced above, and
the submission o f testable hypotheses derived from the received literature and from the
preceding theoretical. The structure o f the chapter is based on the nested nature o f the
dependent variables analyzed. As Figure 4.1 shows, the factors that explain the key
decisions being made in a post-acquisition integration scenario will be modeled and
tested first. Then the factors explaining the decisions and the decisions themselves can
be used to study the variation in the performance o f the post-acquisition integration
process and o f the overall transaction. Finally, the analysis steps up from the process
level to the firm level to determine what impact the factors studied have on the long-term
performance o f the acquiring firm.

F i g . 4.1 S t r u c t u r e o f t h e A n a l y s i s

Firm P e r f o r m a n c e
Post - Acquisition Perform ance

Post - A cquisition
D ecisions
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To introduce the theoretical perspective used and the characteristics o f the
empirical context to which it is applied, Figure 4.2 illustrates the post-acquisition
integration process in terms o f some fundamental evolutionary mechanisms.4

Fig. 4.2 - An Evolutionary View o f the
Post-Acquisition Integration Process
Finn A
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The core insight consists in applying evolutionary reasoning, traditionally
developed to analyze changes at the industry or, at best, the firm level, to an intraorganizational dimension consisting of a specific process (see also Burgelman, 1991).
Post-acquisition integration can be then viewed as a process initialized and shaped by a
set o f pre-acquisition activities (screening, evaluation, and negotiation, primarily). Those
activities act as a variation mechanism to produce the two pools o f resources and routines
(“quasi-genetical traits” in Winter, 1995) that constitute the two firms signing the

4 Zollo (1996) provides a more detailed account o f the theoretical underpinnings o f this interpretation.
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agreement to purchase or to merge. The two pools o f organizational resources and
routines are then subject to a selection process aimed at deciding which ones are to be
kept within the future (integrated) organization and which are to be disposed of. A subset
o f the resources and routines retained by the selection mechanisms is then subject to
replication mechanism that describes the transferred or shared across the two
organizations in an effort to replicate them as precisely as possible in the recipient.
Finally, the organizational traits that have been replicated across the old organizational
boundaries are subject to a retention process which, if all goes well, allows them to be
thoroughly absorbed into the new organizational context. Each evolutionary mechanism
obviously is fraught with specific complexities and risks (see Szulanski, 1993 for a sound
treatment o f the retention problem, for example). The present study, which begins
modeling part o f this comprehensive framework, only considers a subset o f them.
The following Section 4.1 will address the theoretical issues pertaining to two
important elements o f the selection mechanism described above. Section 4.2 takes then a
broader perspective in addressing the performance o f the entire process using, as
explanatory variables, elements o f the variation and selection mechanisms described
above, in conjunction with the administrative capability to manage the replication and
retention challenges.

4.1

Modeling Post-acquisition Decisions
The post-acquisition management literature shows the importance o f decisions

about both the level o f integration and the degree o f replacement o f key resources
(including, but not limited to, the top management team) for understanding acquisition
35
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processes and performance. The study of the determinants o f those decisions, however,
remains at an embryonic stage. The focus here is therefore on those two dimensions o f
the decision-making process that takes place immediately after the completion o f the
transaction. Several other dimensions o f the post-acquisition integration process, such as
the timing o f the implementation steps or the extent to which the target company is
involved in the formulation o f the integration plan, could be important elements in our
understanding o f that complex process. In addition to considerations o f parsimonious
modeling though, the two constructs have been chosen also because they are likely to
correlate strongly with the excluded dimensions o f the integration process. For example,
a high-speed implementation approach might correlate with the decision to attain a high
level o f resource replacement, whereas high involvement o f the acquired entity implies a
low level o f resource replacement. Focusing on the decisions about the degree o f
integration o f the two firms and the replacement o f current resources may capture at least
part o f the explanatory power o f important non-included decisions.
The two variables studied are defined as follows.
Definition 4. Level o f integration is the degree to which processes are linked (connected
in terms o f logistics or information flows), aligned (changed to make them similar), or
centralized across the two organizations.
Definition 5. Level o f replacement is the degree to which pre-existing processes and
resources in either one o f the two organizations involved are maintained intact, rather
than substituted or eliminated.

The definition integration level builds on Thompson’s (1967) taxonomy o f the
mechanisms for achieving organizational integration, and argues for the existence o f a
continuum encompassing the three constructs o f organizational linkage, alignment, and
centralization. The degree to which each function o f the two organizations is integrated
36

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

places the specific acquisition on the continuum between complete independence and
centralization.
The degree o f resource replacement follows a similar logic, but begs two
questions: (1) Has that particular resource been substituted or disposed o f ? (2) Has that
particular process or organizational routine been discontinued or replaced with another
transferred from the other organization ? Again, the combination o f the replacement
decisions in each function o f the merging firms determines a general degree of
replacement o f current resources implemented in a specific acquisition.
Clearly, the two key decisions are not completely independent o f each other.
Process centralization, for example, which can be considered the highest form of
integration, also implies a certain degree o f resource substitution and disposition. Still,
examples o f acquisitions with both high levels o f replacement and low levels of
integration (e.g. restructuring-driven acquisitions of failed savings and loans associations)
and high levels o f integration with low levels o f resource replacement (e.g. consensusbased integration approaches such as Banc One’s) have been frequently observed. The
two dimensions, therefore, seem to be good indicators o f the type o f post-acquisition
integration strategy adopted by the acquiring firm. A post-acquisition integration strategy
can be defined as a vector o f decisions necessary to accomplish the value creation
objectives during the integration process. Hence, a simple dichotomization of the two
decisional dimensions generates a 2 x 2 matrix that identifies four strategic approaches to
the integration process, as shown in Figure 4.3.
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Fig. 4.3 - Post-Acquisition Decisions
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The four labels used to describe the strategic approaches defined by the matrix
synthesize the result o f the combination o f the two decisions. The “preservation”
approach is characterized by a large degree o f autonomy left to the acquired firm and by
limited attempts to change the current set o f resources and processes. The “restructuring”
approach entails greater use o f the replacement lever to achieve the value creation
objectives. The restructuring strategy is exemplified by acquisitions completed by
financial buyers (e.g. Hanson Pic.), or by acquisitions when the poor profitability of the
acquired firm demands a heavy emphasis on the success o f the turnaround process before
the acquiring firm can consider any integration o f the two organizations. At higher levels
o f integration, the acquirer has the choice o f pursuing a consensus-based approach,
labeled “convergence,” whereby the two pools o f resources are substantially retained and
guided toward an aligned use through similar processes across the two organizations.
The alternative for the acquiring firm is to couple high integration with high replacement
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through a “replication” strategy where, typically, its own processes are transferred and
replicated within the acquired organization.
The preceding discussion simply describes a portfolio o f integration approaches
available for the acquirer. With respect to Haspeslagh and Jemison’s (1991) prescriptive
framework, then, it does not imply any causal relationship between pre-acquisition
resource conditions and post-acquisition decisions, or between decisions and
performance. The objective is to show how, through the use o f the two dimensions o f
choice, a set o f integration scenarios can be generated that covers a good portion o f the
strategic options available to an acquiring firm.
Let us now turn to the formal modeling of the two post-acquisition decisions.

4.1.1

The Level of Integration
As observed in section 2.3, the degree of resource relatedness between the two

organizations is expected to be positively associated with the level o f integration. Value
creation from economies o f scale and scope can take place only under the condition that
at least a certain level o f integration between the two firms is achieved. For instance,
staff functions have to be centralized, management information systems have to be
converted, and the geographic location o f facilities, salesforce, and distribution channels
has to be rationalized.
Another characteristic o f the pre-acquisition resource endowment o f the two firms
that might influence the level o f integration pursued is the overall quality o f the resources
purchased with the transaction. Two opposing effects can be hypothesized. Resourcebased arguments imply a positive impact o f resource quality on the level o f integration:
the higher the quality o f the acquired resources, the greater the incentive to integrate them
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into the acquiring organization so that their value creation potential can be leveraged over
the combined entity. However, the integration process is fraught with complexities that
might actually endanger the persistence o f those resources. Hence, the higher the quality,
the lower the probability that the acquiring firm will risk a high-integration decision,
opting instead for a relatively high degree o f autonomy (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).
The theoretical perspective taken in this study favors the latter argument, as it assumes
the acquirer recognizes the potential for the integration process to disrupt high-quality
routines in the acquired organization.
These arguments can be expressed more formally with the following hypotheses.
HI

Resource Relatedness: The higher the degree o f relatedness between the acquirer
and the target, the higher the level o f integration.

H2

Resource Quality: The higher the quality o f pre-acquisition resources in the
acquiredfirm, the lower the level o f integration

In addition to the resource-based explanations, however, the capability approach
advanced in Chapter 3 suggests a role for the degree o f routinization and o f knowledge
codification achieved by the acquirer in the management o f the integration process. The
arguments in support to that claim follow.
High levels o f integration (and o f replacement) create correspondingly high
disruption in the routines and structures o f the organizations involved, and therefore
should be associated with greater complexity in the post-acquisition phase (Amburgey,
Kelly, and Bamett, 1993; Haveman, 1992 and 1993). Such type of complexity might be
labeled “structural”, as it depends upon the existence and strength o f barriers to changes
in organizational structures.
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High levels o f integration also imply a large number o f highly interdependent
decision processes, as more parts and functions o f the organizations become involved.
Additional data must be gathered and processed to ensure informed decisions, and more
frequent and time-consuming political interaction is necessary to arrive at the required set
o f decisions. Such complexity might be labeled “decisional”, as it depends upon the
cognitive barriers to the effective completion o f interdependent decision processes.
The structural and cognitive challenges to successful integration can be addressed
through the creation o f an organizational capability that specializes in the management of
those types o f processes. According to the theory developed in Chapter 3, such capability
is created and evolves through two main mechanisms. One leverage the tacit
accumulation of knowledge from past experiences, which translates into path-dependent
and routinized decision-making behavior, and the other relies on the explicit
rationalization o f the possible cause-effect relationships between past actions and
performance outcomes, and on the consequent codification o f past experience into ad-hoc
tools. The more routinized and codified the acquirer’s practice is, then, the more likely
the acquirer will be to strive for higher levels of integration, as the degree o f competence
and o f confidence in its own ability to manage and neutralize the negative consequence of
higher integration levels, will be correspondingly high.
The preceding arguments can be expressed as formal hypotheses.

H3

Knowledge Codification: The higher the degree o f codification o f the integration
process, the higher the level o f integration.

H4

Process Routinization: The higher the degree o f routinization in the integration
process, the higher the level o f integration.
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4.1.2

The Level of Replacement o f the Top Management Team
The decision about the level replacement o f the top management team is

hypothesized to be a function o f the resource characteristics o f the acquired organization
and o f the degree o f development o f a post-acquisition integration management capability
at the acquiring organization. Specifically, the quality of the target’s current resources
and routines is suggested to be related inversely to the level o f replacement implemented
by the acquirer. The rationale for tha* conjecture is consistent with basic principles o f
rational choice: the worse the performance feedback, the higher the likelihood o f an
intervention that changes the elements on which the process operates (resources) and/or
the process itself (routines). In the context o f prior M&A research, the hypothesis
captures the essence o f the “market for corporate control” view o f such events, whereby
acquisitions are believed to be a policing mechanism that can resolve, or at least reduce,
agency problems due to imperfect incentive alignments between management and
ownership o f the target firm.
Perhaps less obvious is the effect o f resource relatedness on the decision to
replace the top management team o f the acquired firm. If we assume that the knowledge
domain o f an organization is bounded by the cognitive capabilities o f its members, then
the knowledge domains of the management teams in two highly related organizations are
likely to be redundant. If the team o f the acquiring firm is, or believes itself to be,
equally knowledgeable o f the products and markets o f the acquired firm, it has a low
incentive to retain the acquired team. The higher the degree o f relatedness, then, the
higher the probability o f replacement o f the top management team.
More formally, the preceding discussion results in the following hypotheses:
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H5

Resource Quality: The better the quality o f pre-acquisition resources in the
acquired organization, the lower the level o f replacement.

H6

Resource Relatedness: The higher the degree o f resource relatedness between the
two organizations, the higher the level o f replacement.

In addition to those “baseline” resource-based explanations, other hypotheses for
the impacts of knowledge-based mechanisms can be derived from arguments similar to
those made for the level o f integration. In this case, though, the rationale for the impact
o f knowledge accumulation mechanisms depends primarily on the increasing ability,
provided by experiential learning, to manage the level o f conflict resulting from
disruptive change introduced in the organizations involved (structural complexity). The
decisional complexity argument advanced for the level o f integration model is somewhat
weaker, and might actually work against the hypothesis (i.e. integration strategies might
be simpler to implement through resource replacement than through consensus-building
processes). In particular, that possibility might attenuate the ability o f the codification
mechanism to reduce the complexity o f both the decision-making and the implementation
phases: in essence, an organization might not need to write many manuals and computer
models to more effectively lay o ff top managers. Comparatively speaking, then, one
might expect the tacit knowledge accumulation component o f the integration
management capability to have a stronger impact than the explicit one.
These arguments lead to the following hypotheses.
H7

Knowledge Codification: The higher the degree o f knowledge codification, the
higher the level o f replacement.

H8

Process Routinization: The higher the degree o f process routinization, the higher
the level o f replacement.
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4.2

Modeling Acquisition Performance
Equipped with the notion that integration decisions are a function o f both pre

acquisition resources and the degree o f development of an integration capability within
the acquiring firm, we can now expand the analysis to consider the performance o f the
post-acquisition integration process.
Fig. 4.4 provides a summary representation o f the proposed theoretical
framework. It comprises four classes o f variables:
1) Pre-acquisition resource characteristics that influence both post-acquisition decisions
and performance.
2) Post-acquisition decisions that are both endogenously determined, as described in
section 4.1, and precursors o f acquisition performance.
3) Knowledge accumulation mechanisms responsible for the creation o f an integration
capability that are exogenously modeled to affect both post-acquisition decisions and
performance.
4) The performance o f the post-acquisition integration process, as well as that o f the
acquiring firm, endogenously determined as a function o f all o f the three preceding
factors.
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Fig. 4.4 - The Theoretical Framework
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The definition o f acquisition performance is discussed at length in Chapter 5.
which addresses methodological and operationalization issues. A working definition is
based on the degree to which the post-acquisition integration process generates the
expected levels of value creation in terms of cost rationalization and revenue
enhancement for the combined entity.

4.2.1

Performance Effects o f Pre-acquisition Resources
The strategy literature on corporate diversification and resource relatedness has

been unequivocally clear on the expected sign o f the impact o f relatedness on acquisition
performance. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the presence o f exploitable economies of scale
and scope implies stronger performance in highly related acquisitions. Therefore,
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H9

Resource Relatedness: The higher the degree o f resource similarity between the
acquired and the acquiring organizations, the higher the expected level o f
acquisition performance.

The M&A literature has been significantly less clear about the performance
implications o f resource quality. Value can in fact be created, via different mechanisms,
in instances o f both high quality and low quality resources within the acquired firm. In
the case o f high quality resources, the combined entity benefits from the transfer o f
superior routines or the sharing o f superior resources from within the acquired firm. That
mechanism has been labeled “inverse learning” (Haspesiagh & Jemison, 1991), and is
generally considered a strong challenge to the success o f the integration process, as it
requires a humble, realistic attitude on the part o f the acquirer to appreciate the benefits
o f its learning from the target firm. In the case o f low quality resources and routines
within the acquired firm, the mechanism for creating value is the opposite, consisting o f
both the redeployment o f internal resources and the replication o f routines present in the
acquiring organization within the acquired one. Recent work shows that the resource
redeployment effect is expected to be superior to the “inverse learning” one (Capron.
Dussauge, &Mitchell. 1997). Therefore:
HIO

Resource Quality: The higher the level ofpre-acquisition performance o f the
acquiredfirm, relative to its competitors, the lower the expected level o f
acquisition performance.

Both H9 and HIO indicate potential conditions for the creation of value from
acquisitions in that they rely on mechanisms (economies o f scale/scope and resource
redeployment) that are not triggered automatically by the completion o f the acquisition.
The potential for value creation to materialize from resource relatedness and resource
46
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quality is contingent upon a post-acquisition integration process that is (1) sufficiently
precise in the selection o f resources and routines to be acted on and (2) effective in the
implementation o f the transfer and replication processes. The former condition is based
on the characteristics o f the post-acquisition decision-making process (Jemison & Sitkin,
1986; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991), while the latter has to do with the development o f
the particular type o f organizational capability studied here.

4.2.2

Performance Effects of Post-Acquisition Decisions
The effects o f levels o f integration and replacement on acquisition performance

are also influenced by conflicting considerations. On the one hand, organizational inertia
arguments (Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993; Haveman, 1992, 1993) imply that if
high levels o f integration and/or replacement create high levels o f short-term disruption
in the routines and structures o f the organizations involved, they should be associated
with low acquisition performance. In addition, high levels of integration and replacement
may result in high levels o f complexity in the decision-making processes, as more parts
and functions o f the organizations become involved, additional data must be gathered and
processed, and more political maneuvering is necessary to develop the required set o f
decisions. Finally, a high integration decision may necessitate high resource
commitments (in financial and human terms) and high coordination costs during the
implementation phase.
On the other hand, strong arguments support positive performance implications
for both decisions. The level o f integration is the main channel through which economies
o f scale and scope can be manifested. Without alignment or concentration o f processes
across the two organizations, cost structures cannot be rationalized and revenue
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enhancement goals, such as cross-selling activities o f the two merging sales forces and
distribution networks, cannot materialize.
Similarly, the degree o f replacement o f the top management team o f the acquired
firm is considered, according to agency theory (Manne, 1965; Jensen & Ruback, 1983),
to be a precondition for an acquisition event to deliver the expected performance. In an
extreme version o f the argument, acquisitions are defined and studied as a policing
mechanism for replacing the target’s top management team and for redesigning and
realigning the incentive structure to reduce the impact o f agency costs and to facilitate the
pursuit o f cost efficiencies. The conclusion is that the replacement o f the top
management team will facilitate the achievement o f the acquisition goals, or at least that
the team’s retention might lower the likelihood that the acquiring firm can implement its
integration plans with sufficient speed and effectiveness.
The preceding arguments suggest competing hypotheses:
HI la Level o f Integration: Ceteris paribus, the higher the level o f integration
implemented, the lower the acquisition performance
HI lb Level o f Integration: Ceteris paribus, the higher the level o f integration
implemented, the higher the acquisition performance
HI 2a Degree o f Replacement: Ceteris paribus, the higher the degree o f replacement o f
the top management team, the lower the acquisition performance
HI 2b Degree o f Replacement: Ceteris paribus, the higher the degree o f replacement o f
the top management team, the higher the acquisition performance

4.2.3

Performance Impact of Knowledge Mechanisms
The degree to which the acquiring firm has developed a post-acquisition

integration capability should positively influence the performance outcome o f the
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acquisition process both directly and indirectly. The direct impact can be understood
with the use o f a simple microeconomic analysis that adapts a transformation curve
model to the problem o f maximizing overall acquisition performance through two value
creation mechanisms: the achievement o f cost efficiencies and the enhancement of
revenue generation capacity. That stylized problem is assumed to be subject to the
constraint o f a capability building function (defined by the magnitude o f tacit and
codified experience accumulated by the acquiring firm) which determines the boundaries
to the effectiveness o f the two mechanisms, and the types o f trade-off between them. The
reason for expecting a trade-off between cost efficiency and revenue enhancement for a
given level o f integration is that during the downsizing process, the employees o f the
acquired firm will spend more time searching for new employment than they will
generating new business. In contrast, an approach based on creating value by achieving
strong sales growth (through cross-selling, new product generation, multiple distribution
channels, etc.) will require correspondingly strong investments in training, incentives,
morale building and other initiatives, which will hinder the achievement o f cost
efficiencies. One way to relax the constraint,5 and thus pursue a higher levels o f both
cost efficiency and revenue enhancement, is to develop a task-specific capability by
accumulating and rationalizing past acquisition integration experiences. Fig. 4.5 provides
a graphical representation o f that organizational learning process.

5 Under the stylized conditions defined above, organizational learning is actually the only way to relax the
constraint imposed by the capability-building function.
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Fig. 4.5 - Capability Building and Value
Creation Mechanisms
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Further, the path-dependent nature o f the evolution o f organizational capabilities suggests
that firms might tend to specialize in the pursuit o f one o f the two drivers for value
creation. For instance, acquirers might see themselves as following a certain approach
that prioritizes either cost efficiency or revenue enhancement as value creation
mechanisms, and therefore might proceed for some time along a trajectory o f capability
building based on that mechanism. Recent experience suggests that it is much easier for
firms to learn how to achieve cost efficiencies (through downsizing, re-engineering, etc.)
than it is for them to develop new avenues of revenue growth. Hence, as confirmed by
field observations (reported in section 6.1), firms would develop their integration
capability through an evolutionary pattern that first relies on the achievement o f cost
efficiencies (the “low-hanging fruits”). Once the easier paths for value creation are fully
exploited, the acquirer would develop its integration capability by prioritizing the
creation o f value through revenue enhancement (the “higher fruits”). Fig. 4.6 traces that
evolutionary pattern.
50

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Fig. 4.6 - Evolution o f a Post-Acquisition
Integration Capability
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The extent to which acquiring firms are capable o f developing a post-acquisition
integration capability yielding value creation advantages based on both mechanisms,
rather than just one, can be considered a function o f the strength o f the path dependence
underlying the evolution o f the organizational capability.6 When the tie between current
and past decision-making activity is strong, acquirers are more likely to pursue
improvements along the same type o f value creation mechanisms, discounting the other
tool as a lower priority or as an approach inconsistent with the firm’s integration
“policy”. At the extreme, exceedingly strong path dependencies will not allow the firm
to shift priorities and will impose the development of either a cost-efficiency- or a
revenue-enhancement-driven integration capability. In such cases, one must consider two
separate, mutually exclusive capabilities that organizations can develop through their
knowledge accumulation and rationalization activities.
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Fig. 4.7 - Capability Building under Strong
Path Dependence Assumptions
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So far, only the direct impact of knowledge accumulation and codification
mechanisms on acquisition performance has been subject to theoretical scrutiny.
Knowledge might also influence performance indirectly, however, by interacting with the
types o f post-acquisition integration decisions made by the acquiring firm. First, a more
evolved integration capability, whether tacitly or explicitly accumulated, implies that the
acquiring firm should be able to manage the integration process in a way that minimizes
resistance to change (structural complexity) in both organizations. In addition, the degree
of routinization o f the post-acquisition integration process implies, almost by definition, a
reduction in the level o f complexity o f the decision-making process (decisional
complexity). At the extreme, routinization means the avoidance o f detailed decision
making processes through the selection and execution o f the appropriate routine. The

6 Atkinson & Stiglitz (1969) applied a similar theoretical argum ent to technical change that is highly
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development o f an integration capability, then, enhances the value creation potential o f
the integration decisions by reducing their negative effects (structural and decisional
complexity) and by allowing the positive ones (economies o f scale and scope, operational
enhancements, etc.) to be fully exploited.
However, counter-arguments can be made about the capability-complexity effect on
acquisition performance. First, acquirers with low levels o f expertise and routinization
can use several alternative mechanisms to avoid or reduce the negative consequences o f
high integration and replacement levels. They could rely on vicarious learning
mechanisms, for example, by hiring management consultants, or they could increase the
levels o f control and reactivity to problematic situations by keeping senior managers
involved throughout the implementation phase. In general, however, the degree o f
complexity and the heterogeneity o f the task are so high that such mechanisms can hardly
substitute for direct experience, especially if it is well documented and studied.
A second argument can be advanced against an entirely positive view o f
capability building at high process complexity levels. What happens when complexity
levels are kept low by design ? For example, what if post-acquisition integration is
maintained at a low level while the acquirer develops its highly codified and routinized
integration practice ? At some point the integration process might become excessively
codified and routinized, or “bureaucratic,” and the acquirer could incur diminishing
returns to the further development o f its integration practice.

localized around the current knowledge domain.
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In terms o f testable hypotheses, the preceding discussion can be reduced to the
theorization o f two groups o f performance effects. One group incorporates the direct
performance effect o f the capability argument and leads to the following hypothesis:
HI 3

Process Routinization: The higher the degree o f routinization o f the post
acquisition integration process, the higher the acquisition performance.

H14

Knowledge Codification: The higher the degree o f codification o f the post
acquisition integration process, the higher the acquisition performance.
The other group can be represented by postulating an interaction effect between

the capability-building process and the degree of complexity o f the integration process.
The following hypothesis reflects both the upside and the downside potential o f the
combination o f explanatory factors.

HIS

Codification and Integration (interaction effect). The higher the level o f
codification in the context o f a high level o f integration, the higher the economic
performance o f the acquisition. However, the higher the level o f codification in
the context o f a low level o f integration, the lower the economic performance o f
the acquisition.
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5. RESEARCH D E S IG N AND MEASURES

This chapter describes the design used to test the models and hypotheses, the
responses received from the institutions surveyed, the operationalization o f the key
constructs, and a set o f analyses related to construct validity issues.

5.1

Research Design
The study o f acquisitions in the commercial banking industry was carried out

under the supervision o f the Wharton Financial Institutions Center (WFIC) with the
financial support o f the Sloan Foundation. It was possibly the first large-scale analysis o f
post-acquisition integration practices in any industry. Consequently, little empirical
literature was available to guide the measurement efforts. Further, our desire to gain a
grounded understanding o f the phenomenon under study produced a research design
characterized by long fieldwork, which took about a year to complete and required the
help o f a group o f nine banks (see Fig. 5.1 for the project timeline). Those institutions
responded to an invitation made to 15 banks by the WFIC in July 1994. Their acquisition
experience ranged from medium to very high, and their size ranged from $4.5 to over 200
Billion. The nine banks were (in order o f size): Chase/Chemical, Bank One, PNC Bank,
Norwest, First Fidelity, First Bank Systems, First Empire State, Old National, and
Associated Bancorp. In the case o f Chemical and First Fidelity, the contact and meetings
took place when the banks were still independent, and the data gathering was completed
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after their mergers. Additional fieldwork was done with the collaboration o f
Nationsbank, First Union, Southern National/BB&T, and CoreStates. It included
participant observation o f one systems conversion process at PNC Bank and o f top
management decision-making processes during the integration o f a recent acquisition by
Southern National/BB&T. Thirty-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with
individuals involved in various phases o f the acquisition process. The individuals
responsible for coordinating the post-acquisition integration process were interviewed in
all the cases when such function was created (6 out o f 13 cases). When this
responsibility was not explicitly allocated, the interviews were conducted with the key
M&A executive (four cases), the CFO (two cases), or the CEO (one case). The
additional interviews were conducted with staff and line representatives who were
involved, either on a project or on a stable basis, in specific parts of the post-acquisition
integration process. In four institutions, interviews were done with at least one
representative in each o f the key sub-processes: the integration o f human resources, the
conversion o f information systems, and the restructuring o f the retail-banking network.
The objective o f the first part of the research was twofold:
1) To understand the mechanics o f the post-acquisition integration o f a bank, including
the options available for each decision or implementation problem, the possible
indicators o f an organizational capability, and the performance metrics available.
2) To obtain expert assistance in the design, fine-tuning, and pre-testing o f the survey
instrument. Because o f the novelty o f the effects explored, most of the survey had to
be designed ex novo. General guidelines were obtained from the few survey-based
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studies reported in the post-acquisition literature (Datta & Grant, 1990; Datta, 1991,
Shanley, 1994).

Fig. 5.1 - Project Timeline
1st W orkshop
for Participants
Phase 2
Survey
Confirm atory
Field Study
Phase I
Survey
Exploratory
Field Study

Sum m er
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S um m er
1995

Sum m er
1996

3 / 1 4 /1 9 9 7

S um m er
1997

The results o f the fieldwork were in many ways surprising (see section 6.1 for a
summary). The discussions proceeded from general conversations on value creation
mechanisms and post-acquisition integration approaches, to in-depth probing o f decision
making and implementation issues, to the analysis o f the large number of codified tools
that some o f the acquirers produce and regularly update. At some point, however, the
knowledge accumulated from the questioning became redundant and the interaction
shifted toward the survey-building exercise. That activity involved much more frequent
contacts by telephone and fax with a group o f five highly committed banks among the
original nine. After most o f the Phase 1 data gathering (see below) was completed and
preliminary results were elaborated, a round o f visits to the other four highly experienced
acquirers was initiated. The purpose o f the second round was to validate the responses
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received and cross check the interpretations o f the preliminary analyses (the confirmatory
fieldwork in Fig. 5.1).
Finally, a mini-conference for all the participating banks was held on March 14,
1997 to share the results o f the bulk o f the analyses and to receive feedback on the final
rounds o f Phase 1 results.

The large-scale data gathering part o f the study consisted o f the administration of
a two-phase questionnaire survey o f the 250 largest bank holding companies in the
United States. As in any survey-based research, a key challenge was the management of
the trade-off between breadth and depth o f the observations gathered. It was not obvious
how to build a data set that would have enough observations to ensure sufficient
generalizability and statistical power, and would also provide the kind of measures
needed to test the models. Out o f the four classes o f variables in the theoretical
framework (pre-acquisition resources, post-acquisition decisions, knowledge
accumulation mechanisms, and post-acquisition performance), only the first (resource
relatedness and quality) could be measured somewhat accurately with either secondary
data or relatively well known survey scales. All other constructs, particularly the
knowledge-based ones, had seldom, if ever, been assessed through a survey instrument,
and an extensive effort was necessary to generate a sufficient number o f alternative
approximations.
The compromise solution was to design a two-phase survey. The first phase
provided breadth o f observations by sacrificing depth in the measurement o f the key
constructs. The second phase focused on a subset o f the observations recorded with the
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first instrument, and provided a wealth o f measures that could ensure a check o f the
reliability and robustness o f the results obtained with the large-scale data set.
Phase I- (Level o f Analysis: The Acquiring Bank)
Every participant bank was asked to complete the following instruments:
•

One Acquisition History Profile, a spreadsheet-like list o f all the bank acquisitions
completed since foundation, with basic information on each o f them. The information
included asset size, transaction price, name o f the coordinator o f the post-acquisition
integration process, degree o f geographic overlap o f the two branch networks7,
quality of the acquired institution, levels o f organizational integration and o f
replacement o f the top management team, and qualitative assessments of the
performance o f the information systems conversion, the human resources affiliation,
and the overall integration process (see Exhibit A).

•

One Acquiring Bank Questionnaire describing the characteristics o f the acquisition
process put in place by the acquiring institution. The characteristics included the
degree and quality o f knowledge codification, the division o f responsibilities for each
stage of the process, the strategic priorities in implementing the integration, and some
basic process and performance measures (see Exhibit B).

Phase2 (Level o f Analysis: The Acquisition)
A sample of the acquisitions completed by the responding banks was selected from those
included in the Acquisition History Profile. The selection was done by the author, in
consultation with the key contact at the responding bank, according to criteria o f
feasibility o f measures and o f representativeness o f the entire Acquisition History Profile

7 Whether the acquisition in considered “ in-market” or “out-market”, see also section 5.3.4
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in terms o f performance outcomes. In terms o f feasibility, acquisitions that were either
too old (subject to institutional memory decay) or too new (not enough performance data
were available) were discarded. To avoid performance biases in the sample, special care
was taken to include one or two o f the best and one or two o f the worst acquisition
experiences, as well as some “average performance” ones, as indicated on the
respondent’s performance assessment recorded in the History Profile.
For each acquisition, the following questionnaires were completed:
•

One questionnaire (labeled “General Part”) to be completed by the coordinator o f the
post-acquisition phase (eight pages, see Exhibit C);

•

Three Special Parts to be completed by one representative each from the retail
banking division, the DP systems department, and the human resources department
who was involved in the post-acquisition phase (five pages each)
The general structure of the questionnaires followed a logical progression. They

started with a description o f some ex-ante characteristics of the acquired bank (often
measured in comparison with similar features o f the acquirer) or characteristics specific
to the transaction. They then gathered data about the type of actions executed by the
acquirer (due diligence, planning, integration decisions, implementation, etc.), and ended
with a set o f performance measures, which included process-specific quantitative and
qualitative data, as well as subjective performance assessments.
The data gathering process required that the key contact person (1) identify the
best available respondents for each o f the four questionnaires for each o f the acquisitions
analyzed, (2) distribute the questionnaires, explaining to each individual the objectives o f

60

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the exercise and the key criteria for its completion, and (3) solicit completion and return
the completed questionnaires to the researcher.

Secondary data were also gathered and utilized for a variety o f purposes. A
database of financial performance measures (mainly ROA, ROE and efficiency ratios)
was built for the largest 330 bank holding companies between 1985 and 1996. It was the
result o f search and cross-referencing work based on three different electronic databases
(Compustat, Compact Disclosure, and M oody’s), and provided an accurate benchmark
for the measurement o f relative performance data (see the section 5.3.1 on performance
measurement). The database for the bank holding companies effectively represents the
entire commercial banking industry; the remaining 700 institutions account for less than
3% o f the industry assets and are not recorded in any o f the above mentioned public
databases.
Also, an electronic M&A database (Datastar), that includes all the deals
announced in the United States since 1985 was used. It helped in reconstructing the
acquisition history o f non-respondents and o f the entire industry. It was compared with
several similar sources in both paper form (Mergerstat and M&A Handbook) and in
electronic form (IDD database) and is considered to be the most reliable and thorough
source o f secondary data.

5.2

Sample Characteristics
O f the 250 bank holding companies invited, 70 did not have any acquisition

experience after 1985 and 16 were acquired during the invitation period. Fifty-one o f the
164 institutions that formed the relevant universe agreed to participate, for a 31.1%
61

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

response rate and coverage o f 44.6% o f the industry’s assets. The asset size o f the
smallest invited institution was about $400 million, which implies very rare acquisition
activity and very small transaction sizes (usually one or two branches). Further
extensions o f the sample to smaller institutions were likely to have resulted in very few
responses, because o f the scarcity o f acquisitive events, and in significant loss o f
comparability between the transactions analyzed.
The experience base o f the banks participating in the study ranged from very low
(5 o f them have only one acquisition experience) to very high, with 10 o f the 12 largest
and most active acquirers in the industry represented in the sample. The total number o f
acquisitions completed by the 51 banks was 577, a sample large enough to ensure that
routinization o f the acquisition process was possible at least for a subset o f the firms. In
relation to the original population o f the 250 largest institutions, the sample o f
respondents was biased with respect to their asset size (participants were significantly
larger than non-participants, p < .05). but the differences in the means o f ROA, ROE, and
efficiency ratios are not statistically significant.
Great care was taken to single out the best available respondent in each
participant organization, particularly for the Phase 1 survey. For the large banks, that
was a difficult task, as roles and functions were often idiosyncratic to these firms’
internal organizational arrangements. In some cases, the survey completed by one
individual (responsible, for example, for the M&A group) was double-checked by a peer
colleague who had been involved in post-acquisition integration processes. The problem
was compounded by the fact that the search for the best respondent was typically brought
to a senior executive who, though generally intrigued by the research project, had a long
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list o f priorities to which he/she had to allocate scarce available time and attention.
Nonetheless, Phase 1 documents were completed by highly competent individuals.
Typically, the coordinator o f the post-acquisition integration processes (such a function
was present in 14 of the firms surveyed) or the manager responsible for the corporate
development unit or for the M&A group (26 cases) filled out the survey. In the smaller
and less experienced organizations, the survey was completed by the CFO or controller
(nine cases), or the CEO him self (three cases), who typically spearhead the M&A process
when such events occur.
The price paid for the “tailored” survey approach, based on very frequent rounds
o f telephone contacts to check on both the status (pre-) and on the quality (post-) of
survey completion was correspondingly high. It took one year, from summer 1995 to
summer 1996, to complete Phase 1 and another year to complete Phase 2. Also, the
response rate for Phase 2 was significantly lower than that for Phase 1, as only 30
institutions completed the much more intense and time-consuming exercise of gathering
detailed data on several acquisitions from four different organizational functions.
Another explanation for this drop in participation is the long time frame necessary both to
gather reliable and detailed data and to return the expected benefits (i.e. valuable insights
about the post-acquisition process) to the participant organizations.
Other causes include the bank being acquired or becoming involved in a merger
o f equals (three cases). In four other cases the Phase 1 contact left and there was no clear
substitute who could coordinate the completion o f Phase 2. Another four banks are still
declaring an interest in completing Phase 2, but have not yet delivered on their
commitment.
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Table 5.1 summarizes the results of T-tests for differences in the means between
the Phase 1 and Phase 2 samples computed on all the key variables. The analysis affords
both a direct and an indirect test. First, it tests for the presence o f biases between the two
steps o f the research process. In addition, it can be interpreted as an indirect test o f the
representativeness o f the entire industry, as banks declining to participate in Phase 2 may
have been less interested in the study and therefore may be sim ilar in profile to non
respondents. As the table shows, the two samples are not statistically different on any of
the dimensions.

Table 5.1 - Tests for mean differences among Phase 1 and Phase 2 samples
Variable
ROA 1996
ROA change 87-96
ROA average 85-96
ROA ch. 2 yrs after acq vs. I yr before
ROA ch. 3 yrs after acq vs. 1 yr before
Resource quality
Resource relatedness
Integration
Replacement
Codification
Experience in good banks
Experience in bad banks
Experience in-mkt
Experience out-mkt
Size buyer yr-1 ($ in billion)
Size o f acquisition (% o f buyer’s assets)

5.3

Phase 1
sample
-.0098
.0675
.0378
-.0257
-.0137
-.0642
.5975
2.693
2.147
7.000
8.471
2.882
7.471
3.941
26.41
8.120

Phase 2
Sample
-.0367
-.0761
-.0034
-.0570
-.0478
-.1785
.6516
2.544
2.143
5.931
7.222
2.852
6.321
4.071
13.42
8.891

T statistic
T statistic (non(equal variance) equal variance)
-.324
-.277
-.912
-.735
-.571
-.533
-.294
-.321
-.255
-.225
-.484
-.473
.523
.528
-.943
-.853
-.017
-.016
-1.122
-1.126
-.456
-.443
-.031
-.033
-.492
-.468
.077
.083
-1.573
-1.431
.219
.226

Operationalization of Key Constructs
The theoretical framework presented in Chapter 4 highlights the relationships

between pre-acquisition resource characteristics (relatedness and quality), post
acquisition decision-making (integration and replacement), knowledge accumulation
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processes (routinization and codification), and performance outcomes, at both the level o f
the integration process and the firm level. These constructs were operationalized on the
basis o f the data gathered in the Phase 1 survey.

Table 5.2 - Descriptive statistics of phase 1 variables
V ariable
P erform ance
ROA ch. 2 yrs after acq vs. I yr before
ROA ch. 3 yrs after acq vs. 1 yr before
Conversion o f information systems
Integration o f human resources
Overall integration process
Resource C h aracteristics
Resource quality
Resource reiatedness
Post-acquisition Decisions
Integration
Replacement
Integration C apability
Codification
General experience
Experience in good banks
Experience in bad banks
Experience in-mkt
Experience out-mkt

5.3.1

Mean

S td. Dev.

M in

N

Max

.0045
.0028
.8307
.8069
.6591

.6683
.7255
.8777
.9882
.9460

-2.81
-2.91
-2.00
-2.00
-2.00

2.46
2.49
2.00
2.00
2.00

371
291
449
435
443

-.0035
.620

1.08
.48

-2.00
.00

2.00
1.00

466
488

2.639
1.77

.6974
1.27

.00
.00

3.00
3.00

487
475

.6712
11.20
8.580
2.383
5.955
4.996

.4207
10.17
8.728
2.976
6.802
5.571

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

1.00
44.00
35.00
11.00
34.00
25.00

516
574
493
493
512
506

Performance
Measuring the performance of acquisition processes is a very complex endeavor.

The optimal measure probably would be based on a consistent set of pre- and post
acquisition accounting data for both firms. However, even if issues o f confidentiality
could be overcome, post-acquisition accounting data for the acquired entity are typically
available ordy when they “matter” less (i.e. when the level o f integration is so low that
the acquired unit retains not only its autonomy, but also its identity from an accounting
standpoint). When banks acquire other banks, the level o f integration o f the acquired unit
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is typically quite high, and it becomes very difficult for the acquirer to keep track o f the
unit’s performance, particularly after the conversion o f the information systems.
A good second-best measure is the pre- versus post-acquisition change in
accounting returns for the acquiring firm. It was obtained through the use o f several
archival sources (see above) and the computation o f the two most important and widely
used performance ratios in the banking industry: the return on (average) assets (ROA)
and the efficiency ratio8. To control for both industry-level profitability and local
competitive factors, a performance measure was constructed according to the following
formula:
ROAj.t = (ROAj.t+3 - ROAa.t+3) - (ROAi.n - ROAa.,.,)

where:
ROAi is the return on average assets o f the acquiring firm i
ROAa is the average of the return on average assets of all the bank holding
companies in the same geographic area as the acquiring bank, and
t is the year when the acquisition was announced
An identical formula was used to compute the performance measure based on the
efficiency ratio. Seven geographic areas in United States (New England, North Atlantic,
South Atlantic, Mid-west, South, Rocky Mountains, and Pacific) and one for Canada
were used to benchmark the performance ratios. The selection o f multi-state regions to
benchmark the change in performance o f responding banks was an attempt to strike a
balance between a necessary level of detail (national averages might be too coarse) and

8 The efficiency ratio is similar to what a manufacturing firm would term the ratio between SG&A and
sales. In banking, the numerator is “non-interest expenses” and the denominator is the sum o f “net interest
income” and “non-interest income”.
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the difficulty o f constructing a reasonable benchmark for both local community and
“super-regional” banks.
In addition to the accounting measures, the Phase 1 survey collected three
assessments o f the performance o f the acquisition, in comparison with the performance o f
all other acquisitions completed by the same acquirer. The assessments pertained to the
performance o f (I) the information systems conversion process, (2) the human resources
affiliation (or integration) process, and (3) the overall post-acquisition integration
process, as measured by a Likert-type scale with the following anchors: “-2” (“Many
problems”), “-1” (Some problems), “0” (“Average”), “+1” (“OK”), “+2” (“Great”).

5.3.2

Level of Integration

The first type o f post-acquisition integration decision was measured by assessing the
extent to which the information systems, the operating procedures, and the product lines
o f the two firms were aligned or centralized. The scale ranged from “0” (“few or no
features were integrated”), to “3” (“all systems, procedures and products were completely
integrated”). The frequency o f observ ations loaded on the highest value, as 71.8% of the
acquisitions were classified as complete integration. That result was expected given the
focus on horizontal and market extension acquisitions chosen by design. However, the
aggregation o f the decision along longitudinal patterns reveals a more complex and
somewhat unexpected evolutionary process (see section 6.1).

5.3.3

Level of Replacement

The other decision was measured by assessing o f “the extent to which the executive
leadership o f the acquired bank has been changed after the acquisition”. The scale
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ranged from “0” (“no substantial change”) to “3” (“virtually all the top management
team was replaced”). The frequency distribution o f this decision variable resembles a
bimodal distribution where about 40% o f the observations are loaded on each o f the two
extreme values, and very little density remained on the intermediate replacement levels.

5.3.4

Resource Relatedness

The research project was designed to limit the extent o f variation along the resource
relatedness dimension. The sample o f acquisitions studied included either perfectly
horizontal (i.e. buying a competitor located in the same geographic area) or market
extension types o f transactions, in which the variation is essentially provided by the
degree of geographical overlap between the two branch networks. The banking industry
has developed a clear and universally applied distinction between “in-market”
(horizontal) and “out-m arkef ’ (market extension) acquisitions, which the survey used by
probing for the categorization o f each transaction listed in the acquisition history profile
into one of the two classes. The measure assesses the degree o f market relatedness
between the two firms. However, a broader interpretation o f the concept o f resources
assigns a critical competitive role to the geographic location o f the network o f branches,
in that it constitutes the firm-specific endowment of office locations and influences the
coverage o f the potential customer base. In commercial banking, as well as in all other
retail industries, geographic location is considered a fundamental source o f firm-specific
advantage; consequently, the degree o f geographic market relatedness can be interpreted
as a possible proxy for the broader concept o f resource relatedness.
That issue is discussed further in section 5.4, Exhibit D and section 7.4. Here,
limited to the approximation made in the Phase 1 survey, the resource relatedness
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construct was operationalized as the degree o f overlap o f the two networks of branch
offices. It was coded as “ 1” if the acquisition was “in-market”, and as “0” if it was “outmarket”. The frequency distribution is about two thirds “in-market” and one third “outmarket” acquisitions.

5.3.5

Resource Quality

The pre-acquisition quality o f the resource endowment o f the acquired firm was
measured by assessing the performance level o f the target bank prior to the acquisition.
As shown in Appendix A, the Acquisition History Profile asked the respondent to enter,
under the column “Bank”, an assessment o f the pre-acquisition profitability of the target.
The scale anchors were:“-2” (the acquired institution was in a bankrupt situation), “-1” (it
was a poor performer), “0” (it was an average performer), “+1” (it was a good performer)
and “+2” (it was an outstanding performer). The observations distribute in a roughly
normal way with a mean o f -0.035 and a standard deviation o f 1.08.

5.3.6

Process Routinization
The degree of process routinization was approximated by three sets of measures:

•

The level o f general acquisition experience, a simple count o f the number o f
acquisitions completed by the same acquirer before the one considered, was the most
superficial approximation o f the routinization construct. The variable (probably)
represents a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the creation o f a post
acquisition integration routine. In other words, the level o f experience testifies only
to the longitudinal accumulation o f knowledge in the acquiring firms, but not
necessarily to the persistence o f practices (Helfat, 1994).
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•

The specific type o f acquisition experience was a more refined concept, as it
incorporated the specific evolutionary path followed by the bank in its acquisition
trajectory. It measured the number o f a specific type o f acquisitions completed before
the one considered. The criteria used were (I) degree o f relatedness (number o f “in
market” and “out-market” acquisitions) and (2) quality o f resources o f the target
(number o f “bad” and “good” institutions purchased). To construct the experience
trajectories related to the quality o f acquired assets, previous acquisitions were coded
and counted as “bad asset quality banks” if they had a score o f either “-2” or “-1”, and
as “good asset quality banks” otherwise.

•

The same decision made three acquisitions before. Whereas the first two measures
approximated the routinization construct with a measure o f experience accumulation,
this variable attempted to get directly at the core concept of routinization (i.e., the
replication o f a certain type o f decisions across time and under relatively different
contextual conditions). Routinization is, in other words, a special case o f path
dependency in which current decisions are not only dependent on past ones, but are
actually similar in kind. Using a decision made in a randomly selected previous
acquisition affords a more precise approximation o f the routinization effect.

5.3.7

Knowledge Codification
The degree o f knowledge codification was measured by counting the number of

manuals and models developed by the acquirer in the year o f the acquisition and dividing
it by the number available today. The measure approximates the stage in the codification
o f the integration practice reached by the acquiring bank in the year o f the acquisition.
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The documents for which data were gathered are listed in Table 6.1. The Acquiring Bank
questionnaire provided the year in which the acquiring firm developed each tool. The list
o f the types o f manuals and computer support tools developed in the banking industry can
be considered essentially complete, as only one o f the participants mentioned a non-listed
tool under “other manuals and models”.

5.4

Construct Validity
Data from the Phase 2 survey o f 57 acquisitions were used to provide a validity

check on key constructs (resource relatedness and quality, integration, replacement, and
performance assessments). The Phase 2 measures were derived from some o f the
questions in the General Part questionnaire aimed at measuring the same constructs with
a larger array o f related items (see Exhibit C). Construct validity was assessed through
three types o f analysis:

1) Cronbach’s alphas were used to assess whether the Phase 2 items were strongly inter
correlated and hence could be considered indicators o f the same theoretical construct.
2) The correlation between the Phase 1 measure and an index o f the Phase 2 items was
provided by summing their standardized (z-scored) transformations (Nunnally, 1978).
3) The correlation was calculated between the Phase 1 measure and the main factor on
which all the Phase 2 items consistently loaded, extracted with a linear regression
method from a factor analysis o f the Phase 2 items, without rotation.
Table 5.3 summarizes the results o f the analyses. Details of the binary
correlations and the factor loadings among the Phase 2 indicators are provided in Exhibit
D. The first encouraging indication was that all the Phase 2 measures connected to a
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given theoretical construct were highly correlated among themselves, as the Cronbach
alpha levels were consistently high.9 That finding was confirmed by the fact that all the
items loaded consistently on the main factor extracted with a principal component
analysis without rotation (see tables in Exhibit D).
Further support for the Phase I items’ representativeness o f the multiple
indicators measured in Phase 2 was found in the Pearson’s correlation statistics with the
two types o f indexes constructed. All the correlations were statistically significant at the
.01 level, with the notable exception o f the resource relatedness construct. In the case o f
relatedness, the Phase 1 measure results were an indication mainly o f the “external”
elements o f the two organizations (i.e., the geographic location and the type of customer
segments served). The internal types o f resources, though loading on the same main
relatedness factor (eigenvalue = 3.46), did not correlate with the indication o f whether the
acquisition was considered “in-market” or “out-market”. In fact, as reported in section 2
o f Exhibit D, the distinction between internal and external resources created a second
factor (eigenvalue = 1.29).
For the post-acquisition integration decisions, Phase 1 items for both the level o f
integration and replacement o f the top management team correlated well with the indexes
constructed on the basis o f the Phase 2 indicators. The level o f integration was probed in
the Phase 2 questionnaire with two separate questions, one on the degree to which
functions were centralized and one on the degree to which selected processes were
aligned (see definition 3 in Chapter 4). The factor analysis showed, however, that the

9 The exception here was represented by the performance indicators o f the systems conversion process;
however, the correlational evidence with the Phase 2 indexes indicated that the Phase I item was a good
representation o f the performance construct.
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Phase 1 proxy for the level o f integration correlated better with the centralization
construct than with the alignment one.
The three performance indicators collected during the Phase I survey also
exhibited strong correlational ties with similar Phase 2 indicators. They correlated in a
significant way both with the main factor extracted from related performance assessments
in the Phase 2 survey, and with the sum o f z-scores computed on the Phase 2 items (Table
5.3, 3rd and 7th column). The analysis identified five Phase 2 items corresponding to the
performance o f the information systems conversion process and eight items relating to
the human resources affiliation process. The third Phase 1 measure, meant to capture the
performance o f the entire integration process, was correlated with the 24 Phase 2
performance indicators. The indicators include 13 benchmarks relative to pre-acquisition
expectations for the transaction considered and 11 benchmarks comparing the current
transaction with all other acquisition experiences o f the acquiring firm (see the two
questions on page 8 of Exhibit C and Tables D.5 and D.6 in Exhibit D).
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Cronbach
Alpha of
Phase 2
Items

Correlation
with Sum of
Ph. 2 Items’
z-scores

#of
Phase 2
Items

#of
Factors
Extracted

% of
Variance of
Main Factor

Correlation
with Main
Factor

Target's Resource Features
Resource quality
Relatedness/all Ph. 2 Items
Relatedness/extemal factors

.853
.786
.631

.463***
.116
.520***

11
8
2

2
2
1

42.1
43.2
73.4

.482***
.038
.520***

Post-acquisition Decisions
Replacement of TMT
Integration as centralization
Integration as alignment
Level of integration overall

.826
.931
.968
.950

.606***
.589***
.382***
.521***

9
7
8
15

2
1
1
3

64.5
74.3
83.3
61.8

.549***
.612***
.377***
.542***

Post-acq. Performance
Conversion of D.P. systems
Affiliation o f human resources
Overall integration process

.516 (ns)
.739
.857

.406***
.450***
.618***

5
8
24

2
3
8

40.6
40.1
29.0

.455***
.518***
.626***

Phase 1 Measure

Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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Table 5.3 - Construct Validity of Phase 1 Measures

6. ANALYSIS AN D RESULTS

This chapter describes the set o f analyses performed to empirically test the
hypotheses submitted in chapter 4. After an initial qualitative report on the major
findings from the field study conducted with the help o f a pilot group o f acquirers, the
study o f post-acquisition integration decisions is discussed. The results o f the analysis of
the performance o f post-acquisition integration processes are then reported, and the
performance o f the acquiring firm, in both the short-term (up to three years after the
acquisition) and in the long-term is addressed in detail. The final section summarizes the
key findings o f the study.

6.1

Lessons from the Field: Post-acquisition Management in the Banking

Industry
Several patterns were uncovered during the clinical study o f post-acquisition
integration practices. The most intriguing ones are described to facilitate the evaluation of
both the theoretical intuition and the measurement aspects o f the research.

6.1.1

Evolution of Post-acquisition Decisions

The interviews revealed a clear and somewhat surprising pattern o f evolution in the
management o f the post-acquisition integration process. M ost acquisitions completed
before 1989-1990 were managed in a low replacement and low integration mode.
Acquired banks typically were not integrated, information systems were not converted,
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the top management team was rarely replaced, and product lines were not standardized.
With the S&L crisis and the consequent spate o f acquisitions o f failed institutions from
RTC- or FDIC-led auctions (1989-1992), a different acquisition management mode
emerged. A higher level o f replacement o f target management was accompanied by a

low to medium level o f integration (at least in the first phases o f the post-acquisition
process). The higher levels o f integration, along with higher degrees ofreplacement,
which one would expect given the context (i.e. horizontal transactions), have become the
norm only during the last few years. A senior executive in a highly acquisitive bank that
was part o f the pilot group lamented that when he was hired as a controller (in 1991), 32
different management information systems were used simultaneously in the various
divisions and geographic areas controlled by the bank! The bank was at that time in the
process o f increasing the level o f integration to address the incompatibility across
previously acquired but scarcely integrated institutions. Other banks reported a similar, if
less dramatic, situation at some point in time during their acquisition history. Apparently,
the acquiring institutions in the industry went through a rapid change in their approach to
the management o f their acquisitions. Fig 6.1 shows the evolution of the decision about
the degree to which the acquired bank would be integrated within the acquiring
organization. It is based on answers to the question posed on page 4 o f the Acquiring
Bank questionnaire (Exhibit B).
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Fig. 6.1 - Evolution of Integration Decisions
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Respondents selected one o f five scenarios describing the decisions characterizing
the degrees o f integration with which the acquisitions were managed at three points in
time. The proportion of respondents managing bank acquisitions with either no or a
minimal level o f integration dropped from 40% to 5%, whereas the proportion o f those
integrating their acquisitions either extensively or completely increased from 42% to 78%
o f the sample.

6.1.2

Firm Effects.
In addition to the longitudinal effect, wide dispersion o f the cross-sectional

distribution o f post-acquisition integration practices was evident from the interviews.
There seemed to be a firm effect in the choice o f post-acquisition management
approaches. In other words, on a case basis, some banks clearly managed very
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comparable transactions in very different ways. Some particularly striking examples o f
firms with comparable levels o f acquisition expertise follow:

Banc One created a highly sophisticated, routinized, and codified integration
process. Information systems were converted (but not centralized) and human resources
were '‘affiliated” (extensively trained and socialized), but product lines were not
standardized. In addition, a large degree o f decisional autonomy was left to the top
management team o f the acquired entity, which was never replaced and was often “co
opted” to key roles at the corporate level o f the acquiring organization. As o f 1995, Banc
One’s organization chart listed 81 CEOs, and the corporate-wide product line included
about 400 different deposit products (20 is considered a reasonable number). Banc One’s
process can be characterized as low replacement and medium-level integration.10

Norwest, in contrast, had an equally routinized and codified process that enabled
it to achieve a higher level o f integration, with the data processing systems centralized
and the product line standardized. The top management team o f the target was typically
kept in place and actively contributed to the integration process, which was coordinated
at the local level with limited supervision from the corporate development team.
Norwest’s approach can be characterized as a high level o f integration and a low to
medium level o f replacement o f key resources.

NationsBank aimed at similarly high degrees o f centralization o f information
systems and standardization o f product lines, but was more aggressive in terms o f
substituting top managers and keeping a tight control o f the integration process from the
10 Since 1995, Banc One has undertaken an extensive reorganization process to reach a much higher level
o f integration among all its affiliated banks, centralizing information systems and decision-making
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corporate headquarters, with limited decision input from the target’s managers. Also, a
specialized post-acquisition integration group was permanently placed at corporate
headquarters and endowed with high visibility and institutional power. It coordinates all
the simultaneous and multi-divisional post-acquisition integration tasks. NationsBank
implemented a post-acquisition integration decision characterized by high levels o f both
integration and replacement o f current resources.
One possible explanation for the persistence o f varied and idiosyncratic
approaches to the management o f integration processes lies in the presence o f strong path
dependencies, w hich force the routinized replication o f decisions almost independently
from the variation in contexts. Far from being associated with poor performance,
however, routinized behavior is characteristic o f the way acquirers with smooth,
seemingly highly effective processes operate.

6.1.3

Codification of Post-acquisition Integration Practices

Coupled with strong longitudinal and cross-sectional variation in post-acquisition
integration decisions was a similarly strong variation in the extent to which acquiring
banks developed specific tools to facilitate the completion o f the various simultaneous
tasks making up the post-acquisition integration process. A strikingly high level o f
sophistication was achieved by some o f the acquiring firms in their handling o f complex
tasks, such as the conversion o f information systems, the standardization o f product lines,
and the training and socialization o f the workforce. Equally striking, however, was the
relatively limited diffusion o f those tools even in cases o f high acquisition experience.

authority while trying to maintain a strong market presence. The most recent acquisitions have been
managed in a significantly different way, according to the new guidelines.
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Many relatively experienced acquirers did not develop the most “advanced” manuals and
models, and the ones that did develop them waited many years after the first acquisition
experiences to do so, and invested heavily with time, money, and energy. One highly
experienced participant bank created increasingly complex manuals and computerized
tools, over the course o f the three years o f the study. From the first tools specific to the
management o f the information systems conversion phase, it developed specialized
systems for the management o f the human resources affiliation process (monitoring the
fate o f the acquired workforce on a daily basis). More recently the same acquirer was
involved in an attempt to measure and consistently monitor the customer impact o f the
integration process. Table 6.1 summarizes the diffusion patterns o f the acquisition tools
in the sample studied with the Phase 1 survey.

Table 6.1 Evolution of the Acquisition Tools
ACQUISITION TOOL
Selection/Negotiation Process
Financial evaluation spreadsheets
Due Diligence check-list
Due Diligence manual
Conversion o f Info. Systems
Info systems conversion manual
Info systems training manual
Human Resources Integration
Affiliation/integration manual
Branch staffing models
Training/ Self-training packages
Sales/Product Integration
Products training manual
Product mapping models
Project management packages

Diffusion in Year of 1"
Sample
Creation in
Any Bank

Avg. Yrs from
Creation of Fin.
Evaluation Tool

89.6%
91.7%
39.6%

1975
1976
1986

0.00
0.72
0.85

54.2%
45.8%

1982
1982

0.74
0.37

41.7%
50.0%
41.7%

1986
1985
1985

1.53
2.05
2.29

54.2%
52.1%

1980
1982

0.71
1.27

50.0%

1976

2.00
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The columns report the frequency o f observation o f the tools in the sample, the year in
which each tool was created for the first time by a bank in the sample, and the average
number o f years between the creation o f financial evaluation models (typically the most
basic M&A tool) and the creation o f each integration tool. Acquirers in the banking
industry appear to have evolved their post-acquisition integration practices by developing
increasingly complex tools. From simple due diligence check-lists, some acquirers
created due diligence and post-acquisition integration manuals (for the conversion of
information systems, the affiliation o f human resources, and various training purposes).
From basic evaluation spreadsheets, some acquirers developed entire information systems
that enable them to make informed decisions on product standardization and branch
staffing, and to closely m onitor their implementation. Particularly striking is the
difference in the diffusion rate o f due diligence support tools: whereas 91.7% of acquirers
developed due diligence check lists (codifying the "know-what”), only 39.6% evolved
into a higher level o f codification by developing due diligence manuals (incorporating the
“know-how”).
With respect to the evolutionary dynamics o f the post-acquisition integration
capability, section 4.2.3 advanced a model that calls for development o f practices to
achieve cost efficiency (the “low-hanging fruits”), and then practices to achieve revenue
enhancement goals. Preliminary support for the hypothesized evolutionary pattern is
shown in Table 6.1, where the sales/product integration tools and the human resources
integration tools, which protect and enhance the generation o f new business, are typically
created after the systems conversion tools, which are chiefly intended to achieve cost
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efficiencies by eliminating the data processing support structure and part o f the backoffice.
The preliminary observations suggest that explanations based on the
characteristics o f the transaction, such as the degree o f relatedness between the two
organizations and the quality o f the resources o f the acquired bank, cannot address the
observed patterns. Managerial approaches to essentially the same type o f task
(integrating an acquired bank) varied widely across periods and seemed to maintain
stable cross-sectional differences among acquirers. The deregulation process, so relevant
in many aspects o f the banking industry, cannot shed light on that phenomenon, as
regulatory authorities limit their role to the authorization o f the acquisitive event and do
not have any say in post-acquisition management decisions. The liberalization o f
interstate banking and the greater relevance o f "out-market” as opposed to “in-market”
acquisitions might have led to lower rather than higher predicted levels o f integration
because o f the lower degree o f resource relatedness.
Another important observation is that the longitudinal process o f codification was
only partially related to the accumulation o f tacit experiential knowledge. As shown in
Figure 6.2, firms with comparable levels o f acquisition experience reached significantly
different degrees o f codification, and some firms with only a few acquisition experiences
produced manuals and other support tools comparable to those o f firms with several
times the number o f experienced events. Though statistically significant (Pearson’s
correlation = .305, p < 5%), the correlation between codification and accumulated
acquisition experience is less strong than expected.
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Fig. 6.2 - Codification & Acquisition Experience
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6.2

Post-Acquisition Decisions
Hypotheses HI trough H8 were tested with two logistic regressions. The two

dependent variables, level o f replacement and degree o f integration, have very skewed
distributions. The former follows a bimodal distribution with more than 80% of the
frequency on the extreme values (either complete or no replacement o f the top
management team). The latter loads heavily on the higher values as the target was either
highly or completely integrated within the acquiring institution in 75% o f the acquisitions
recorded.
As a result of the skewness of the dependent variables, regressions could be run
with the complete scale (acknowledging the possible effects o f skewness) or the
dependent variables could be dichotomized and logistic regressions run without a
significant loss o f information. The logistic regressions, which are appropriate when the
dependent variable is dichotomous, are reported, although the substantive results do not
change when the full scales for replacement and integration are used and OLS regressions
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are run. The original four-category definition o f the degree o f replacement and of the
level o f integration was converted into a dummy variable where the value 1 was assigned
“complete replacement” and “complete integration”, and the value 0 was assigned in all
other cases.
The means, standard deviations, and binary correlations o f the variables used in
the logistic regression models are reported in Table 6.2. The controls used are relatively
self-explanatory and the measures refer to the guidelines provided in Chapter 5.
A five-stage model is reported for each o f the two equations. Whereas stage 1
presents the control variables forming a “baseline” explanation, stage 2 introduces the
two resource-based variables. Stage 3 then adds the degree o f codification o f the
integration process, and Stage 4 includes the generalized and the two specialized
experience trajectories built from the count o f out-market and “bad-bank” acquisitions
completed by the same acquirer. Finally, Stage 5 introduces the more direct proxy for
routinization o f the decision process provided by the decision score (non-dichotomized)
registered for the third acquisition preceding the one analyzed. The number o f previous
acquisitions considered in constructing the measure is random; analyses replicating this
proxy that use the fifth and the first acquisitions before the current one yield no
significant differences in the magnitude and sign o f the coefficients reported. Valuer in
parentheses are a measure o f the explanatory power o f the single covariate, whereas the
reported chi-square test measures the statistical significance o f the variation in fit
obtained by adding the new group o f factors to the preceding stage.
The logistic regression model for the level o f integration (Table 6.3) provides
evidence in favor o f both the resource-based and the knowledge-based explanations.
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Models 2, 3 ,4 , and 5 significantly improve the fit with respect to the block o f control
variables and the preceding nested models. In particular, the degree o f resource
relatedness is associated positively with the probability o f high integration, as predicted
in H I, whereas the quality o f resources is tied significantly and negatively to the level o f
integration (H2). The higher the degree o f relatedness and the lower the quality o f the
resource endowment o f the target firm, the higher the probability that the acquiring firm
will decide to integrate the acquisition completely.
The impact o f the development o f a codified practice (the level o f knowledge
codification, H3) on the decision to integrate the acquired firm is positive and statistically
significant. In addition, the rough but explicit approximation of the degree o f knowledge
accumulation provides a significant improvement in the fit o f the model with the data (x2
= 10.05 with 1 d.f.) and an improvement in its predictive capacity (from 81.16% to 83.7%
correct predictions).
The degree o f tacit routinization o f the integration practice seems to be at least as
important as the resource characteristics and the codified knowledge accumulation
mechanisms in explaining the variation in the decision to integrate. The generalized
experience trajectory and one o f the two specialized ones (the number o f out-market
acquisitions previously completed) significantly affect the level of integration, but the
routinized replication o f past decisions has the strongest explanatory power o f all the
predictors included in the model (R = 0.27, p < .000). Past experiences, therefore, matter
not only because they change future behavior (i.e. more experienced banks integrate
more, banks with more out-market acquisitions integrate less), but also because once a
certain decisional approach is chosen, the same decision tends to be repeated even in
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contexts reasonably different from the original one. H4 is therefore strongly supported
both for the more general operationalization based on path-dependent roles o f experience
trajectories and for the more specific measurement based on the degree o f replication o f
past decisions.

The logistic regression model for the degree o f replacement o f the top
management team (Table 6.4) also shows very good fit with the data at every step of the
analysis. The effect o f the quality o f pre-acquisition resources in the acquired
organization is strongly significant and related negatively to the replacement decision, as
expected (H5). Interestingly, the degree o f relatedness is also strongly and positively
correlated with the replacement o f the top management team (H6). Consistent with
Cannella and Hambrick’s (1993) findings, top management teams in highly related
acquisitions are replaced with higher probability. Both the resource relatedness and the
resource quality effects hold true irrespective o f the inclusion o f knowledge-based
explanations.
The effects o f the knowledge-accumulation mechanisms, however, are
remarkably strong and equally important. The introduction o f those variables improves
the fit with the data and the predictive power o f the model (from 76.8% to 83.0% correct
predictions). More specifically, the degree o f codification plays an important role in
predicting a higher probability o f replacement, supporting H7. The tacit knowledge
accumulation mechanisms, however, result in even greater explanatory power (H8).
Interestingly, the replication effect cancels the impact o f the experience trajectories, and
is the single strongest predictor o f the decision to replace the top management team (R =
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.38). Its introduction in the logistic regression model not only increases the fit (x2 =
45.17, 1 d.f.), but also improves the predictive power of the model by four full percentage
points (from 79.7% to 84.0%).
Thus, in both decisions analyzed, the magnitude and the type o f knowledge
accumulated from previous acquisition experiences appear to be important predictors o f
the post-acquisition integration strategy selected by the acquiring firm. In particular, the
tacit knowledge accumulation patterns are related more to the replication o f past
decisions (routinization) than to the type o f acquisition experiences o f the acquiring firm
(path-dependence).
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Table 6.2 -CORRELATION MATRIX-

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Acquirer’s
size
Acquirer’s
ROA
Acquirer’s
eff. Ratio
Post
deregulation
Resource
relatedness
Resource
quality
Knowledge
codification
Total N of
acquisitions
N o f outmarket acq.
N o f “Bad
banks” acq.
Integration 3
acq. Before
Replacement
3 acq. Before

Avg

Std

1

2

3

4

5

.718

.450

.448

.498

.372

3.%
E+2
2.16
E+4
.912

4.49
E+3
4.07
E+5
.374

.028

-.049

.020

-.051

-.005

-.211
***

-.139

.019

.046

44.2

8.31

.202
♦**

-.061

-.010

-.046

-.129

.671

.470

.229
**♦

.096
**

.042

.026

.071

.423
***

.62

.48

.421
♦♦♦

.352

-.014

.035

-.148
***

.221
***

.211
***

-3.5
E-2
.671

1.08

-.253
♦**

-.290
*♦*

-.042

.098
**

.351

-.016

-.031

-.207
***

.421

.183

.0%
•*

.065

.035

.282
***

.124
*+

.671

***

.049

.126
***

1.02
E+l
5.57

.135

.053

-.017

.120
♦♦♦

*.238
**

.145

.303
***

.167
***

.037

***

.391
***

-.175
***

-.021

.264
***

-.065

.104
**

-.036

.050

.222

-.032

-.033

.201
***

.207

*.495
**

.213
***

-.074

-.089
*

.235
***

.174

.201

-.062

-.042

-.084
*

.202
*»»

6

7

8

9

10

II

12

13

14

00

11.2
4.99
2.38
2.56
1.68

2.97
.84
1.30

-.148
♦♦♦

.011

.275
***

.179

.475
♦**

.116
*♦

.026

.258
***

.258

Oil

.022
.045

00

***

***

Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level

.152
***

.446
***

.622
***

.252
***

.216

.103
**

-.196
***

.240

.017

-.142
***

.291
***

***

-.130
**

.714
***

.181
***

***

.319
***
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1

VARIABLE
S
Level o f
integration
Degree o f
replacement
Rel. acq. size

Table 6.3 -LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS-

Controls
Relative acquisition size
Acquirer’s size
Acquirer’s ROA
Acquirer’s efficiency ratio
Post-deregulation year
Degree of replacement

MODEL 1

MODEL 2

MODEL 3

-.06(-.09)**
4.36E-07
-1.83(-.14)***
.12(.20)***
.01
1.99(.29)***

-.05(.07)*
4.14E-07
-1.28(-.09)**
.09(.15)***
.05
1.30(.19)***

1.20(.19)***
-.41(.l 1)*

Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness
Resource quality
Knowledge Codification

MODEL 4

MODEL 5

-.06(.08)*
4.00E-7
-1.73(-.13)**
.09(. 14)***
-.63
1.14(16)***

-.11(-.24)***
-9.9E-8
-1.63(-.l)**
.03
-1.23(-.06)*
.84(.08)*

-.11 (-.24)***
1.53E-8
-1.15
.03
-.66
1.25(.15)**

l.32(.21)***
-.51(-.15)***

1.08(.13)**
-.56(-.16)***

.96(.l 1)**
-.62(-.18)***

1.94(.19)***

2.13(.20)***

1.66(.14)**

Experience Trajectories
Total N o f acquisitions
N o f Out-mkt acquisitions
N o f “Bad banks” acq.
Routinization
Integration 3 acq. Before
Chi-square Improvement
% Correct
N

. 18(.

18)***
-.33(-.27)***
. 19(.07)*

.13(11)**
-.25(-.19)***
.18(.04)
1.04(.27)***

76.73***
80.43
276

15.96***
81.16
276

10.05***
83.70
276

39.15***
86.96
276

Beta coefficients (R in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level

18.62***
88.41
276
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Dependent Variable: LEVEL OF INTEGRATION

Table 6.4 -LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELSDependent Variable: DEGREE OF REPLACEMENT
MODEL 2

MODEL 3

MODEL 4

-.02
-9.9E-5
-.23
-.13(-.24)***
.85(.05)*
2.25(.24)***

-.0005
-8.5E-5
.41
-. 16(-.31)***
.87(.05)*
2.04(.22)***

-.0016
-9.6E-5
.18
-.17(-.33)***
.42
1.9(.21)***

-.01
-.0001
-.19
-.15(-.25)***
-.06
1.71(.20)***

-.03
-1.0E-6
-.35
-.15(-.22)***
-.43
1.91(.23)***

1.59(.23)***
-.46(-.15)***

1.65(.25)***
-.60(-.19)***

1.59(.23)***
-.54(-.17)***

1.9(.26)***
-.65(-.18)***

1.33(.l 1)**

1.24(.09)**

1.32(.08)**

-.04
. 11 (.08)**
.15(08)**

-.0002
.07
.03

Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness
Resource quality
Knowledge Codification
Experience Trajectories
Total N o f acquisitions
N of Out-mkt acquisitions
N o f “Failed” acquisitions
Routinization
Replacement 3 acq. Before
Chi-square Improvement
% Correct
N

MODEL 5

99( 38)***
89.64***
72.10
276

30.25***
76.81
276

5.60**
77.17
276

9.22**
79.71
276

Beta coefficients (R in parentheses). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level

45.17***
82.97
276
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Controls
Relative acquisition size
Acquirer’s size
Acquirer’s ROA
Acquirer’s efficiency ratio
Post-deregulation year
Level o f integration

MODEL 1

6.3

Acquisition Performance
Having explored the effect of resource-based and knowledge-based explanations

on the type o f post-acquisition decision-making behavior exhibited by the acquiring firm
in the sample studied, we can proceed with the analysis o f the performance o f acquisition
processes. Table 6.5 summarizes the hypotheses from section 4.2 and the theoretical
rationale behind each o f them.

Table 6.5 - Hypotheses and Theoretical Arguments
EXPLANATIONS
Resource-Based
Resource relatedness
Resource quality
Post-Acq. Decisions
Integration

Replacement o f TMT

Knowledge-Based
Knowledge
Codification
Tacit Experience
Accumulation (local)
Codification x
Integration

THEORY

Hp.

Expected Sign

Related diversification
Resource deployment

H9
H10

+
+

S true filial inertia, complexity
Cost efficiencies and revenue
enhancements
Structural inertia
Agency theory

HI la
HI lb

+

H l2a
H12b

+

Learning and cognition

H13

+

Tacit learning

H14

+

Learning and cognition with
high structural complexity

H15

+

The set o f analyses proposed was more complex than that performed for the
integration decisions for several reasons.
1) The models estimated were inherently more complex in that they included the effect
o f the integration decisions as determinants o f the performance level. O f particular
interest was the appraisal o f whether and how those decisions interact with the
knowledge-based capability construct to influence the performance outcomes.
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2) The dependent variable, acquisition performance, assumes different meanings and is
subject to different measurements depending on what part o f the acquisition process
is considered. In the study, performance assessments o f the post-acquisition
integration phase were treated separately from the accounting measures that
incorporated information on the entire scope o f the acquisition process. The analysis
of the former performance construct is described in section 6.3.1, the analysis o f the
latter is described in section 6.3.2.
3) The robustness o f the results obtained had to be addressed by replicating the analysis
under different conditions. The main variations, for which results are reported and
discussed were:
a) Aggregation o f multiple observations in the same year (section 6.3.2.2) to
improve the consistency between the measurement of the explanatory variables,
which vary for each acquisition, and the accounting measure o f the dependent
variable, which varies only for each year.
b) Aggregation o f the observations to the firm level o f analysis (section 6.4) to
control for the firm effects observed in the field study. Consistency o f results at
different levels o f analysis would be evidence that they are not driven by a
systematic bias in the characteristic o f the acquiring firm.
c) Adoption o f a different time lag in the measurement of the dependent variable
(change in ROA two years or three years after the acquisition vs. the year before)
to provide additional support for the stability o f the results.
The discussion o f the results is therefore divided into several parts. The first addresses
the performance o f the post-acquisition integration process, subjectively assessed with
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the use o f three process indicators (section 6.3.1). Then, the performance o f the entire
acquisition process is examined by considering the change in the acquiring firm ’s
accounting measures o f performance (section 6.3.2). Finally, a set o f variations around
the basic analysis o f acquisition performance is presented to address some o f its
quantitative weaknesses and to attempt to satisfy the demands for robustness (sections
6.3.2.2 and 6.4).

6.3.1

The Performance of the Post-acquisition Integration Process
The means, standard deviations, and Pearson’s correlations o f the variables used

in analyzing the performance o f the post-acquisition integration process and the overall
acquisition are presented in Table 6.6. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 give the results o f an OLS
regression analysis o f the performance o f the post-acquisition integration process
measured in two different ways. The first used a linear combination o f the three
performance indicators measured with the Phase 1 survey (for the performance o f the
human resources affiliation, the information systems conversion, and the overall
integration process; see Exhibit A and section 5.3.1) extracted with a factor analysis. The
second performance measure was simply the performance assessment o f the overall
integration process, which was one o f the three indicators used in the factor analysis.
The three performance indicators load on a single factor, extracted with a linear
regression method and no rotation (eigenvalue = 1.75, loadings varying from .72 to .79),
accounting for 58.4% o f the variance. As the performance indicators were measured by
benchmarking the assessments with respect to all other acquisitions completed by the
same acquirer, the quality o f the assessment is only as good as the magnitude o f
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experience accumulated by the respondent. Observations by acquirers with fewer than
four acquisition experiences therefore were not included in the analysis.
Five variations o f the basic model are reported, in which the acquisition
experience variable assumes the value o f (1) generalized experience (total number o f
acquisitions completed before the one under consideration), (2) specialized experience in
in-market (highly related, or horizontal) transactions, (3) specialized experience in outmarket transactions, (4) specialized experience in good asset quality banks and (5)
specialized experience in bad asset quality banks.
The baseline model, which includes the control variables, against which the
results o f the analyses should be judged, provides the following results.

VARIABLE
Acquirer’s size
Transaction size (% o f buyer’s assets)
# o f M&As in year 0

Performance =
Factor score
.0014(.003)
.0095(.005)**
-.0033(.025)

Performance =
Single indicator
.0020(.002)
.0144(.004)***
,0163(.018)

1.532
.005
321

4.317***
.027
357

F-test
Adjusted R-squared
d.f. residual

Beta coefficients (std dev in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (*** i and 0.05(**) level

The two models in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 improve the fit with respect to the control
factors. The adjusted R2 statistic rises to around 9% in the factor scores specification and
to 6.4% in the single indicator model. In terms o f the explanatory power of the individual
variables, the two sets o f analyses assign a primary explanatory role to the post
acquisition integration decisions adopted by the acquiring firm. In particular, the
performance of the integration process measured with the linear combination o f the three
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indicators is associated positively with the level o f integration and negatively with the
degree o f replacement o f the top management team. The resource variables’ effect on
integration performance is much weaker; neither resource relatedness nor resource
quality has statistically significant coefficients. The relative explanatory power o f preand post-acquisition conditions partially changes with the single indicator specification o f
integration performance. The coefficient o f the level o f integration loses its statistical
significance, whereas the degree o f resource relatedness assumes a positive and
significant role in determining the performance assessment o f the overall integration
process.
The knowledge variables have a positive impact in their codified version,
particularly with the single indicator performance measure. The tacit accumulation o f
experience, however, does not seem to have any significant impact in any o f its
generalized and specialized specifications.
Those regression results are especially interesting when examined in light o f the
binomial correlation analysis in Table 6.6. The quality o f pre-acquisition resources in the
target company appears to be correlated with higher performance if we do not take into
account the effect o f post-acquisition replacement decisions. The reason higher quality
targets might appear to turn into more profitable acquisitions is that they tend to be
managed with a lower level o f replacement of key resources. This is a good example of
how deceiving our conclusions can be if we do not consider carefully the role, of post
acquisition integration decisions.
Another important observation can be made by comparing the correlation
coefficients between the post-acquisition integration performance measures and the
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independent variables with those o f the acquisition performance accounting measure, as
shown in Table 6.6 (columns 1 to 4). First, the performance o f the post-acquisition
integration process seems to be correlated only weakly with the performance o f the entire
acquisition process. O f the three performance indicators, only the one related to the
human resources affiliation process is correlated significantly with overall accounting
performance (p < .05). In addition, the resource-based and knowledge-based explanatory
factors show a much stronger association with overall performance than the one found
with the analysis o f post-acquisition integration performance. The quality o f the target’s
resources, in particular, has an opposite (i.e. negative) and significant effect on overall
performance.
The following points can be made from the analysis:
1.

Subjective assessment o f the performance o f post-acquisition integration
processes, though indicative o f broad trends in the types o f explanations offered
(e.g. post-acquisition decisions vs. pre-acquisition resources), must be evaluated
in the context o f its inherent limitations:
a)

It provides only a relative assessment of the performance o f the integration
process, as compared with all the other experiences o f the same acquirer.
Therefore, it should not be expected to correlate strongly with an absolute
measure o f performance, such as one based on accounting measures.

b)

In particular, acquisition experience effects are weakened by the necessary
exclusion o f inexperienced acquirers and should be re-examined with an
absolute performance measure, as reported in the next section.
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c)

The analysis is highly dependent on the quality o f the respondents’
awareness o f the consequence o f their integration processes. The answers
to the Acquiring Bank questionnaire (page 5, Exhibit B) suggest that the
degree to which acquirers in the data set monitored the performance o f
their integration process, though probably higher than in most other
industries, was lower than one might expect. The percentage o f acquirers
that consistently monitored process performance is around 35% and does
not exceed 50% even for the most basic financial performance metrics.

2.

The “soft” parts o f the integration process, involving the integration of human
resources and the management o f eventual cultural clashes, are the most sensitive
elements o f the performance o f the integration process, as shown by the
magnitude o f the correlation with the accounting measure. That finding contrasts
with the weak association between the “harder” sub-processes o f the post
acquisition integration phase, such as the conversion o f information systems, and
might be viewed as a relatively surprising result because o f the emphasis given to
the conversion o f information systems by the acquirers in the banking industry.

3.

Post-acquisition integration decisions are crucial to our understanding o f the
performance o f post-acquisition integration processes. In particular, the potential
for the exploitation o f economies o f scale and scope seems to be a stronger
(positive) effect than the (negative) effects o f structural inertia and decisional
complexity, lending support to HI lb as opposed to HI la. Conversely, structural
inertia seems to be a stronger (negative) predictor o f performance than arguments
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derived from agency theory regarding the benefits o f substituting the top
management team would predict (supporting HI2a, as opposed to H I2b).

The analysis in the next session verifies those preliminary indications with the
benefit o f a performance measure that not only incorporates the effects o f all phases o f
the acquisition process, but also provides an absolute criterion applicable to observations
across different acquiring firms.
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3
4
5
6
7
8

Integration

Avg
.0284

Table 6.6 - CORRELATION MATRIX -ACQUISITION PERFORM ANCEStd
1
2
4
7
3
5
6
8
9
10
.725

0.000

1.00

Replacement

13

.321
***
.744
***
.769
**+

.813

14

.107

.659

.946

.050

.721
***

.807

.988

.160
*♦

.831

.878

-.023

.789
♦*«
.782

.355
»**

.334

.461

.033

-.124

M*

.62

.48

.168

-.015

-.0354
2.639

1.08
.697

1.77

1.27

-.III
♦

.135
***

.119

.238

.019

.002

-.229

.016

*♦

***
*♦

.172
*• *

.083
*

-.207

-.083
*

.065

.398

-.018

-.217

-.119

-.310

***

M

M*

-.052
.671
.139
-.015 .026
.421
Stage of manuals
**
development
.011
.093
-.075
10.16 .036
11.20
II
General M&A
*
experience
-.055 .054
-.118
5.955 6.802 .453
12 Experience in in**
* **
mkt M&A
.056
-.046
5.571
-.097 .033
4.996
13 Experience outmkt M&A
-.018 .069
-.088
8.580 8.728 .158
14 Exp. in good asset
*
*♦
quality banks
.047
-.059
.015
2.976 .315
2.383
15 Experience in bad
asset quality banks
Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*)
10

12

*

»**

9

II

.036

***

-.221

*♦*

***

.357
♦M
.049

-.318

.415

***

***

.126

.161

.050

.116

-.053

** *

.050

.167

.037

**

.024

.257

-.021

***

.076
.053
.040

-.036
.107
*♦
.213
***

level

.192

***

.013

.401

.811

***

***

-.114

.222

.714

**

* **

* **

-.151
***
.152
***

.319
*•«
.446
***

.888
***
.622
***

***

.050

-074

.037

.050

-.074

.199
»**

.391

* •*

.252

***

.457
* **
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1
2

VARIABLES
Acquisition Perf.
Ch. In ROA (3 yrs)
Post-acq. Integral
Perf. (factor sc.)
Performance of
integration process
Performance of
HR affiliation
Perf. of systems
conversion
Res. Relatedness .
(In-market acq.)
Resource quality

VARIABLE
Controls
Relative acquisition size
Acquirer’s size
# ofM & A s in yearO

Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness
Resource quality
Post-acquisition Decisions
Level o f integration
Degree o f Replacement
Integration Capabilities
Knowledge Codification
Experience Trajectories

.13(.01)**
.05
-.11 (.03)*

.13(.01)**
.05
-.06(.03)

.13(.01)**
.05
-.12(.03)*

.12(.01)**
.05
-.10(.03)*

.12(.01)**
.05
-.17(.03)**

,06(.14)
.07(.05)

.07(. 14)
.08(.05)

.06(.14)
.07(.05)

.06(. 14)
.07(.05)

.06(. 14)
.07(.05)

.23(.12)***
-.27(.06)***

.23(.12)***
-.26(.06)***

.23(.12)***
-.28(.06)***

.23(.12)***
-.27(.06)***

.23(.12)***
-.31(.06)***

.11(.02)*
-.02(.01)

.12(.02)*
-.08(.01)

.1(02)*
.02(.01)

.12(.02)*
-.04(.01)

.08(.02)
.1(.02)

4.098***
3.986***
3.986***
4.025***
F test
.090
.087
.087
.088
Adjusted R-squared
281
281
281
281
d.f. residual
Beta coefficients (std dev in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**)or 0.10 (*) level

4.180***
.092
281
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Table 6.7 >OLS REGRESSION Dependent Variable: INTEGRATION PERFORMANCE (Factor Score)
GENERAL
Specialized By Geography
Specialized by Asset Quality
EXPERIENCE
In-Market
Out-Market
Good Quality
Bad Quality
MODEL 1
MODEL 2
MODEL 3
MODEL 4
MODEL 5

GENERAL
EXPERIENCE
MODEL 1

Specialized By Geography
In-Market
Out-Market
MODEL 2
MODEL 3

Specialized by Asset Quality
Good Quality
Bad Quality
MODEL 4
MODEL 5

.21(.01)***
.04
-.13(.02)*

.20(.01 )***
.05
-.06(.03)

.21(.01)***
.05
-.10(.02>*

.21(.01)***
.05
-.13(.02)*

.20(.01 )***
.05
-.11 (.02)

.13(.12)**
,01(.05)

.13(12)**
.01 (..05)

.13(.12)**
.01 (.05)

.13(.12)**
.01(.05)

. 13(. 12)**

Post-acquisition Decisions
Level o f integration
Degree o f Replacement

,09(.08)
-.17(.05)***

.08(.08)
-.16(.05)**

.09(.08)
-.17(.05)***

.09(.09)
-.17(.05)***

.08(.08)
-.17(.05)**

Integration Capabilities
Knowledge Codification
Experience Trajectories

.16(.02)***
.05(.01)

. 18(.02)***
-.06(.01)

.16(.02)***
.04(.01)

.017(02)***
.04(.01)

.17(.02)***
.01 (.02)

VARIABLE
Controls
Relative acquisition size
Acquirer’s size
#ofM & A s in yearO
Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness
Resource quality

3.369***
3.376***
3.392***
F test
3.373***
.064
.064
.064
.064
Adjusted R-squared
314
314
314
314
d.f. residual
Beta coefficients (std dev in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level

.01 (.05)

3.33***
.063
314
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Table 6.8 - OLS REGRESSION Dependent Variable; INTEGRATION PERFORMANCE (single indicator)

6 3 .2

Acquisition Performance
In this section the performance model was tested by considering the entire

acquisition process, rather than the post-acquisition integration phase only. The main
difference consists in adopting, as measure o f performance, the change in ROA o f the
acquiring firm between the year before the acquisition and three years after the year o f
the acquisition. That four-year time span is normally considered to be large enough to
incorporate all relevant effects o f the post-acquisition phase, and small enough to avoid
excessive dilution o f the main effects by exogenous events. Performance variations o f
the entire acquiring firm offer also the advantage to incorporate eventual dilutive effects
consequent to excessive deviations between the purchase price and the accounting value
o f the acquired assets. Finally, as described in Chapter 5, the measure o f acquisition
performance controlled for both industry-level and local-level variations in ROA.
The main analysis (section 6.3.2.1), performed at the transaction level o f analysis,
was replicated by aggregating the multiple observations from the same year (section
6.3.2.2) and then again aggregating all observations for the same acquiring firm (section
6.4). In the process, the robustness o f the model was tested with different specifications
o f both the dependent variable and the explanatory ones.

6.3.2.1 Transaction Level o f Analysis
A. Standard Model - Table 6.9 reports the results o f an OLS regression analysis, which
was analogous to the one done for the performance o f the post-acquisition integration
process. Again the five models differed in terms o f the specification o f the acquisition
experience trajectory.
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Table 6.9 - OLS REGRESSION - (Acquisition Level of Analysis)
Dependent Variable: CHANGE IN ROA (3 years post- vs. 1 year pre-acquisition)

VARIABLE
Controls
Relative acquisition size
Acquirer’s size
#ofM & A s in yearO

GENERAL
EXPERIENCE
MODEL 1

Specialized By Geography
In-Market
Out-Market
MODEL 2
MODEL 3

Specialized by Asset Quality
Good Quality
Bad Quality
MODEL 4
MODEL 5

.143(.004)***
-.236(.000)***
.465(.023)***

.142(.004)***
-. 18(.000)***
.371(.025)***

.127(.004)**
-.179(.000)**
.487(.023)***

.145(.004)***
-.244(.000)***
.465(.023)***

.135(.004)**
-.206(.000)***
.473(.024)***

Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness
Resource quality

,072(.095)
-.127(.037)**

.053(.093)
-.108(.036)*

.083(.095)
-.137(.037)**

.070(.095)
-.130(.037)**

.077(.095)
-.127(.038)**

Post-acquisition Decisions
Level o f integration
Degree o f Replacement

.20(.079)***
-.295(.04)***

.198(.077)***
-.306(.039)***

.181 (.080)***
-.279(.040)***

.203(.079)***
-.292(.04)***

.192(.079)***
-.291(.04)***

.085(.014)
.076(.006)

.035(.014)
.224(.011)***

.116(.013)*
-.066(.009)

.086(.0l3)
.089(.006)

.094(.014)
.035(.023)

22.256***
22.256***
20.414***
20.521***
F test
.497
.497
.473
.474
Adjusted R-squared
194
194
195
195
d.f. residual
Beta coefficients (std dev in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level

20.198***
.470
195

Integration Capability
Knowledge Codification
Experience Trajectories

In addition to using the overall magnitude o f the adjusted R2 and the F-test
statistics, the model fits can be assessed by comparing them with a “baseline'’ model
comprising only the control variables, which provides the following results.

CONTROL VARIABLE
Acquirer’s size
Transaction size (% o f buyer’s assets)
# of M&As in year 0
F-test
Adjusted R-squared
d.f. residual

OLS Regression of
Change in ROA
.0031(.002)*
.0033(.004)
.139(.017)***
30.168***
26.1%
245

Beta coefficients (std dev in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***) and 0 .10(*) level

The F-statistics in Table 6.9 remain at highly significant levels, while the adjusted
R2 rises from 26% to values ranging from 47% to 49.7% for the complete models.
In terms o f the impact o f the individual variables on acquisition performance, the
most striking similarity with the analysis o f the post-acquisition integration process is in
the coefficients o f the integration decisions, which are replicated in both their sign and
their (statistically significant) magnitude. The level o f integration remains a positive
factor in determining the performance o f the overall acquisition process, whereas the
degree to which the top management team is replaced is associated negatively with
acquisition performance.
The effect o f the pre-acquisition resources is somewhat stronger than that found in
the previous analysis, but is still probably weaker than expected, particularly in
comparison with the relevance o f the post-acquisition decisions. The degree o f resource
relatedness, though showing the expected positive sign, is not associated significantly
with performance, failing to support H9. The quality o f the assets o f the acquired bank is
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associated negatively and significantly with performance, providing empirical support for
the superiority o f the resource deployment value creation mechanism as opposed to the
“inverse learning” one (i.e., H10 is supported).
The effect o f the knowledge-based measures approximating the integration
capability construct is less straightforward. Knowledge codification, which was weakly
but significantly correlated with the performance of the integration process, is now a non
significant but still positive factor, failing to support H I3. In contrast, experience
trajectory specialized in highly related (horizontal) acquisitions shows a very strong
positive effect on acquisition performance, supporting H I4. Hence, acquirers seem to
learn by tacitly accumulating the wisdom generated by being exposed to a large number
o f transactions, but only if those transactions are highly related to each other. Consistent
with the work o f Haleblian (1997; Haleblian & Flinkelstein, 1997), knowledge from
previous acquisition experiences applied to unrelated domains is subject to strong transfer
costs. Additional support for that point might be found in the negative (though non
significant), coefficient o f the accumulation o f out-market acquisition experience.

B. Interaction Effects - To probe these results further, the interaction effects between the
integration decisions and the knowledge accumulation mechanisms were introduced into
the standard model. The standardized proxies (z-scores) o f the post-acquisition decisions
and the knowledge measures were used to model the interaction effects so that
multicollinearity problems could be avoided. With that adjustment, the variance inflation
factor for all variables in the models was held below 3.5 (values up to 10 are typically
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considered highly satisfactory). In addition, the tolerance factor was never below 30%,
indicating that every variable entered into the model was non-redundant.
The results are reported in Tables 6.10, 6.11, and 6.12. The consequences o f the
refinement are surprisingly strong. The impact o f the main effects, in terms o f pre
acquisition resources, post-acquisition decisions, and knowledge accumulation, does not
vary substantively from that in the standard model but the introduction o f the interaction
variables results in a better overall fit o f the model with the data and a much more
relevant and varied role for the knowledge accumulation mechanisms.
In terms o f overall fit, the adjusted R2 statistics rise above 50% (up to 58.5% in
the case o f in-market acquisition experience) with the introduction o f the new set o f
explanatory variables. Because of the type and magnitude of their effects, the four
interaction terms warrant closer scrutiny.
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VARIABLE
Controls
Relative acquisition size
Acquirer’s size
#ofM & A s in yearO
Resource-Based Factors
Resource relatedness
Resource quality
Post-acquisition Decisions
Level o f integration
Degree o f Replacement
Integration Capability
Knowledge Codification
Acquisition Experience
Interaction Effects
Codification X Integration
Codification X Replacement
Experience X Replacement
Experience X Integration

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

.143(.004)***
-.236(.000)***
.465(.023)***

.004(.004)
-.001 (.002)
.141(.025)***

.005(.004)
-.002(.002)
.128(.026)***

.072(.095)
-.127(.037)**

.106(.094)
-.095(.036)***

.101(.094)
-.101(.036)***

.20(.079)***
-.295(.04)***

.356(.080)***
-.133(.042)***

.377(.083)***
-.142(.042)***
O

.085(.014)
.076(.006)

.0630103)
.007(.006)
.200(.058)***
-.1260050)***
-.1190057)**
.1110075)

.207(.061)***
-.121(.050)**
-.1410058)**
.U4(.078)

20.414***
19.014***
F test
16.319***
.473
.505
.507
Adjusted R-squared
194
195
d.f. residual
194
Beta coefficients (std. deviation in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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Table 6.10 - GENERAL ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE -

Table 6.11 - SPECIALIZED EXPERIENCE by Geographic Relatedness

Relative acquisition size
Acquirer's size
# ofM&As in year 0

IN-MARKET ACQ. EXPERIENCE
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

OUT-MARKET ACQ. EXPERIENCE
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

.I42(.004)**»
-.18(.000)*»*
,37l(.025)***

.003(.004)
.000(.002)
.094( .028)♦ **

.005(.004)
-,003(.002)
,063(.028)**

.127(004)**
-. I79(.000)**
.487(.023)***

.006(.004)
-.00l(.002)
.I66(.025)***

.005(.004)
-.000(.003)
.I6I(.025)***

.053(.093)
-.I08(.036)*

.093(.089)
-,09l(.034)***

.050(.086)
-.085(.033)***

.083(.095)
-,I37(,037)**

.071 (.096)
-089(.036)**

075(.096)
-.093(.037)***

,I98(.077)***
-,306(.039)***

,332(.079)***
-.I72(.040)***

.I8l(.080)***
-.279(.040)***

•309(,083)***
-. I08(.0I4)***

.265(.088)***
-.111(.041)***

Resource-Based Factors

Resource relatedness
Resource quality
Post-acquisition Decisions

Level of integration
Degree of Replacement

,303(.076)***
-. 191(.039)***

Integration Capability

Knowledge Codification
Acquisition Experience

.035(.0I4)
,224(.0II)***

-.00l(.095)
.043(.0I I)***

o

. 116(.013)*
-,066(.009)

.089(. 102)
-.0I0(.007)

Interaction Effects

Codification X Integration
Codification X Replacement
Experience X Replacement
Experience X Integration
F test
Adjusted R-squared
d.f. residual

22.256***
.497
194

. 187(.058)***
-,054(.050)
-,298(.062)***
,080(.09l)

.212(057)***
-,058(,049)
-.279(.060)**»
-.024(.093)

22.468***
.576
193

21.917***
.585
193

22.256***
.497
194

00

.2I5(.053)***
-. 150(.049)***
.030(.049)
.007(.072)

.190(056)***
-.I44(.049)***
.026(.050)
.023(.074)

18.237***
.4%
193

15.656***
.497
193

Beta coefficients (std. deviation in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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VARIABLE
Controls

Table 6.12 - SPECIALIZED EXPERIENCE by Asset Quality of Targets
Dependent Variable: CHANGE IN ROA (3 years post- vs. 1 year pre-acquisition!

Relative acquisition size
Acquirer's size
#ofM&As in yearO

GOOD ASSET QUALITY ACQ. EXP.
Model 2
Model 1
Model 3

BAD ASSET QUALITY ACQ. EXPERIENCE
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

,I45(.004)***
-.244(.000)***
.465(.023)*»*

,003(.004)
-.001 (.002)
.I37(.025)***

.004(,004)
-,00l(.002)
,I28(.026)***

,I35(.004)**
-.206(.000)***
.473(.024)***

.005(.004)
.000(.002)
.133(.025)***

.005(.004)
-.000(.002)
•I09(.026)***

.070(.095)
-,I30(.037)**

.093(.094)
-.095(.036)***

.089(.094)
-.102(.036)***

,077(.095)
-.I27(.038)**

.083(.09l)
-.I05(.035)***

.050(.090)
-.09l(.035)***

.203(079)* ♦*
-,292(.04)***

,335(.079)***
124(.040)***

.345(.083)***
-. 129(,041 )**

.I92(.079)***
-,29l(.04)***

.30l(.083)***
-. I57(.042)***

.250(.083)***
-. I8I(.042)***

.078(. 101)
.004(.O06)

.094(.0I4)
.035(.023)

Resource-Based Factors

Resource relatedness
Resource quality
Post-acquisition Decisions

Level of integration
Degree of Replacement
Integration Capability

Knowledge Codification
Acquisition Experience

.086(013)
,089(.006)

.004(.098)
.072(.024)***

Interaction Effects

Codification X Integration
Codification X Replacement
Experience X Replacement
Experience X Integration
F test
Adjusted R-squared
d.f. residual

20.521***
.474
195

,I84(,055)***
131(.049)***
-.I2I(.056)**
.I65(.076)**

. 183(.058)***
-.125(.049)***
-. I34(.058)**
.I73(.078)**

19.251***
.509
194

16.366***
.507
194

20.198***
.47
195

.249(.056)***
-.087(.05l)*
-,202(.063)***
-.081 (.094)

.282(.057)***
-.088(.050)*
-.224(.063)***
-.212(. 104)**

20.657***
.527
194

19.048* ♦*
.547
194

Beta coefficients (std. deviation in parenthesis). Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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VARIABLE
Controls

The interaction between the degree of codification and the level o f integration is
probably the strongest, m ost unequivocal finding. Under all the specifications provided
by the different experience trajectories, the effect is highly significant and related
positively to the dependent variable. When coupled with high integration decisions, a
cognitive effort aimed at extracting and codifying the knowledge tacitly accumulated is
associated with a systematically improved ROA o f the acquiring firm. However, if either
o f the two covariates assume lower values, acquisition performance declines.
The combination o f a high level o f integration with tacit knowledge accumulation
is typically not relevant in its performance implications. The only exception is provided
by the experience trajectory that is specialized in the ‘‘good asset quality” type of
acquisition, which positively influences the performance outcome. In the case of the
accumulation o f acquisition experience in poor-quality targets, the interaction term is
surprisingly negative and significant, but that finding must be evaluated on the margin o f
a positive and significant coefficient o f the main effect o f that experience trajectory.
The interaction terms pertaining to replacement o f the top management team
negatively affect acquisition performance in all the acquisition experience scenarios,
independently of the type o f knowledge mechanisms accompanying them. Routinizing
and codifying those types o f decisions appears to be hazardous in spite o f the possible
learning effects. The replacement o f such a sensitive strategic resource as the leadership
team is detrimental to performance, and the negative effects on performance are
compounded when they are associated with a highly routinized and codified process.
In spite o f the statistical significance of these results, some words o f caution are in
order. First, the discrepancies in the frequency of observation o f the (accounting-based)
110
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dependent variable and o f the (transaction-based) explanatory variables are o f concern.
Acquisitions, particularly in the banking industry, are relatively frequent events, which
often occur at various times within one year. All acquisitions completed in the same
year, however, will have the same measure o f the dependent variable (change in ROA).
One way to reduce that problem is to aggregate the acquisitions announced by the same
firm in the same year, so that both dependent and independent variables vary with the
same “clock.” Far from being a perfect remedy, however, this “solution,” presented in
section 6.3.2.2, merely shifts the issue to the explanatory side o f the equation. In fact, one
must register the loss o f measurement precision caused by the averaging o f the resource
characteristics and the post-acquisition integration decisions across different acquisitions
announced in the same year.
Second, unobserved heterogeneity and firm effects may be highly relevant.
Another potential problem with the preceding analysis is the possibility that firm effects
are influencing the results without being captured in the explanatory variables. For
example, Banc One might have a distinctive trait that explains its success with
acquisitions but is not captured in the firm-level variables introduced in the model (i.e.,
the capability proxies). That problem is serious because firm effects are at the core o f our
theoretical analysis o f acquisition-specific organizational capabilities, and therefore
cannot simply be “controlled for” with rough techniques such as firm-level dummies.
The route chosen was to test the same set o f hypotheses at the firm level of analysis,
where any idiosyncratic feature o f certain acquirers w ould be reduced in its magnitude
(one observation) and in its possibility o f systematically affecting the results. The
replication o f the results obtained at the transaction level with the data aggregated at the

ill
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firm level would provide, in addition to an obvious robustness test, partial protection
from the presence o f unobserved heterogeneity in the traits o f the acquiring firms. See
section 6.4 for a discussion o f the results o f the firm-level analysis performance.
Finally, robustness is a problem. The issues described above indirectly address
robustness issues, at least in the proposed “remedies.” The baseline model was in fact
replicated with two increasing degrees o f aggregation o f the data (sections 6.3.2.2 and
6.4). In addition, the analysis in this section implies several variations in the
specification o f the tacit knowledge accumulation measure and the crucial introduction o f
a set o f interaction effects. One additional way o f testing the robustness o f the main
results is by varying the specification o f the dependent variable. For example, a threeyear rather than a four-year lag could be considered in computing the change in ROA.
Alternatively, the model was tested with two additional specifications o f the firm-level
accounting performance: the long-term (12-year) change in ROA and the current (1996)
levels of the same measure.

6.3.2.2 Firm/Year Level o f Analysis
An analysis was done which replicated the one described in the preceding section
with a dataset that aggregated the observations at the firm/year level. All acquisitions
completed by the same acquirer during the same year were collapsed into a single
observation. The goal o f that transformation was to enhance the consistency between the
frequency o f observation o f the dependent variable (annual) and that of the set o f
independent variables, which typically vary for every transaction observed.
The two resource-based measures (relatedness and quality) were replaced with the
percentage o f assets acquired through in-market transactions and through the acquisition
112

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

o f poor-quality banks, respectively, during the particular year. The post-acquisition
decisions were averaged to yield an approximation of the integration and replacement
approach followed by the acquiring bank in that year. In the controls, the relative
acquisition size was the sum o f the relative sizes of all the transactions completed in the
same year.
The analysis incorporated the lessons learned in the preceding section and
involved the four interaction terms between the post-acquisition decisions and the
knowledge-based variables, as well as the same kind o f model specifications along the
five types o f acquisition experience trajectories. A weighted least squares multiple
regression method was used, where the weights were assigned by the number o f
transactions completed during a given year.
The results reported in Table 6.13 essentially confirm the findings obtained with
the complete dataset1*. The fit with the data remains strong and actually improves for
the general experience and for the good asset quality specialized experience by seven to
eight percentage points to reach 57.5% and 58.6%, respectively. What explains the
improvement in the fit o f those two models is the stronger positive effect o f the tacit
knowledge accumulation mechanism, which was not significant in the previous
specification. The interaction effects replicate the results described above, with a
consistently significant and positive effect o f the interaction term between knowledge
codification and level o f integration on performance, and a negative effect o f the
interaction term between tacit routinization and degree of replacement.

11 Note that the sign o f the coefficient for resource quality is positive and opposite to the one shown in all
the previous analyses because o f the inverse specification o f the measure. The quality o f the acquired
assets hurts acquisition performance.
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Along the same lines, the post-acquisition decisions preserve intact both the sign
and the magnitude o f their performance effects. The resource characteristics, in contrast,
lose more explanatory power with respect to the previous results. Resource quality,
generally significant in the previous models, is now only marginally relevant, whereas
resource relatedness remains positive but non-significant in its performance implications.
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Specialized By Geography
In-Market
Out-Market
MODEL 2
MODEL 3

Specialized by Asset Quality
Good Quality Bad Quality
MODEL 4
MODEL 5
-.458***
.062

.048
.061

.003
.127

-.015
.120

.069
.257

.006
.150*

.024
.156*

.291***
-.286***

.238**
-.258**

.315***
-.422***

.257***

.293***
-.401***

-.015
.310***

-.043
.229**

.072
.080

-.001
.305***

-.015
.181

.282***

.221**
-.053
-.336***
.108

.309***
-.242**
-.301
.242

.270***
-.167*
-.621***
.270**

.284***
-.028
-.318***
.017

-.523***
.200*

!00
*

-.190
.070

l

-.032
.054

©

-.411***
.070

I

VARIABLE
Controls
Acquirer's size
Relative acquisition size
Resource-Based Factors
% of assets in-mkt
% o f assets in bad banks
Post-acquisition Decisions
Level o f integration
Degree o f Replacement
Integration Capability
Knowledge Codification
Cumulative Acq Experience
Interaction Effects
Codification X Integration
Codification X Replacement
Experience X Replacement
Experience X Integration

GENERAL
EXPERIENCE
MODEL 1

11.844***
6.652***
12.375***
12.319***
F test
.590
.575
.417
.586
Adjusted R-squared
95
96
95
d.f. residual
96
Standardized beta coefficients. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level

8.993***
.500
96

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 6.13 - WLS REGRESSIONS - Acquisition Performance (firm/year level of analysis)
Weight = N of aca. in the same year. Deo. Variable: CHANGE IN ROA 13 years post- vs. 1 year pre-acquisition!

6.4

Organizational Performance
The claim was made in Chapters 3 and 4 that the creation o f organizational

capabilities can be studied by measuring both the way in which and the extent to which
firms accumulate knowledge from previous experiences. If that were the case, we should
expect organizational performance to improve in a stable way once those capabilities are
developed and utilized.
The robustness o f the findings obtained from the analysis o f the acquisition
performance models was then evaluated by testing a similar model with the data
aggregated at the firm level. Such replication provided some protection against the
possibility that strong firm-level effects undetected in the specification o f the model may
eventually influence the relationship between the dependent and the measured
independent variables.
The approach adopted to aggregate the transaction-level measures to the firm
level was identical to the one used in the firm/year-level analysis. However, the
aggregation process was brought to the extreme end, where only one observation per
acquiring bank was recorded.
Because o f the scarcity o f degrees o f freedom, it was necessary to select a
parsimonious model by eliminating some o f the independent variables used in the
previous versions. The first “cut” was made to the control variables (i.e., the size o f the
acquiring firm and the relative size o f the transaction(s)). It was not likely to hurt the
quality o f the analysis because o f the marginal relevance of the coefficients o f those
variables in the previous analyses (see Tables 6.10 through 6.13). The selection o f the
knowledge-based variables was more delicate. The criterion chosen was to select the
116
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measures that best fit the data in the previous analyses: the accumulation o f in-market
acquisition experience for the tacit capability-building component, and the interaction
between knowledge codification and the level o f integration. Several other specifications
o f the model, with or without interaction terms and with different proxies o f the
knowledge codification construct, were performed with either similar or worse results.
Notable among the results o f the alternative specifications are the positive and significant
correlation shown in Table 6.15 between the percentage o f assets purchased with high
degrees o f codification (more than six o f the 11 tools) and the short-term firm
performance measures.
Table 6.14 reports the results o f four OLS regression analyses o f the
“parsimonious” model defined above and Table 6.15 reports the means, standard
deviations, and Pearson correlations o f the variables used in the analysis, as well as some
o f the most important alternative covariates. The variation among the four models
proposed is now provided by the definition o f the dependent variable. The first two
models used the average o f the short-term change in ROA between the year before and
years two and three after the acquisition. The other two models regressed a longer-term
performance measure: the 10-year change in ROA (1987/96) and the most current
performance levels (1996 ROA). The coefficients are reported in their standardized form
to facilitate the comparison among different measurements of the dependent variable.
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Table 6.14 - OLS REGRESSION - Organizational Performance
Dependent Variables: Short-term and long-term change of ROA
VARIABLE
Resource-based Factors
% o f assets in bad banks
% o f assets in-mkt
Post-acq. Decisions
Replacement
Integration
Integration Capability
Acq. experience (local)
Codification X integration
F test
Adjusted R-squared
d.f. residual

ROA Ch.
+3 vs. -1

ROA Ch.
+2 vs. -1

ROACh
1987-96

ROA 1996

.316*
.147

.243
.059

.031
.432***

.010
.280*

-.173
.275

-.141
.304*

-.256
.424**

-.552***
.747***

.421**
.040

.414**
.128

.327**
.489**

.192
.501***

2.992**
.278
31

3.012**
.280

4.216***
.343
37

5.971***
.460
35

I1

..

Standardized Beta coefficients. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level
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Avg
-.0445

Std
.2986

-.0347

.4027

.935
♦* ♦

3

-.026

.2662

4

ROA change 87-96

-.0231

.5146

.702
**•
.668

5

% assets invested in
“bad" banks acq
% assets invested in
in-market acq
Replacement

.315

.346

.5%9

.3349

1
2

6
7

.324
*

.702
***
.724
♦♦♦
.326
*

.693
*♦*
.080

.084

.094

-.063

.252

-.004

2.1441

.8067

-.052

-.281
*

-.138

.206

.381
**

.350
♦*

.385
**

.163

-.153

.065

.123

8

Integration

2.600

.5669

9

General acquisition
experience
Experience in in
market acq.
Experience in outmarkct acq.
Experience in
“good" banks acq.
Experience in “bad"
banks acq.
Codification
(# of tools)
% of assets bought
with > 6 tools

13.02

12.31

.206

.131

.245

.180

-.024

-.357
**

-.439

***

.179

6.756

7.538

.464
♦♦♦
-.013

.493
*♦*
-.114

-.130

-.244

.197

.743

5.408

.470
**♦
.006

-.082

4.022

.529
***
.048

-.133

8.756

.332
**

.322
**

2.977

.246

.207

.296
*
.194

-.175

2.863

.369
♦*
.352
**

-.601
»»*
-.587
***
.012

-.133

7.704

-.535
♦**
-.340
♦♦
-.240

.481
***
.746
***
.550

6.340

3.185

.014

.09

.001

.007

-.106

-.282
♦

-.211

.104

28.74

39.83

.229

.362
♦♦

.163

.164

.067

-.398
**

-.285
*

.060

11
12
13
14
15

12

13

14

.010
.101
.391
*♦

10

11

.057

ON

.018
.157

***
.262
.784
***
.723
***

.758
***
.245

.305
*»

.275

.368
*+

.389
***

.281
*

.353
**

.301

.296
*

.380
**

.213

.432
***

.671
***
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TABLE 6.15 - CORRELATION MATRIX - FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES
1
3
4
7
2
5
6
8
9
10

VARIABLES
ROA change
(+ 2 vs. -1 years)
ROA change
(+3 vs. -1 years)
ROA 19%

The results o f each o f the four regression models broadly confirm the signs o f the
performance effects obtained in the previous analysis. Their magnitude and statistical
power, however, vary both with respect to the previous results and among the four
models reported.
The short-term performance models confirm the primary role o f localized, tacit
knowledge accumulation mechanisms, whereas the codification process fails to affect
organizational performance significantly even when interacting with the level o f
integration. The post-acquisition integration decisions maintain the sign o f their
performance effects, but their magnitude is only marginally significant for the level o f
integration (with the two-year ROA lag) and not significant for the degree o f
replacement. The degree o f relatedness also is not statistically significant, but on
performance o f resource quality the negative influence is confirmed. One explanation for
the weaker fit is the lack o f degrees o f freedom due to the aggregated data and missing
data for some o f the respondents. The impression is confirmed by the fact that the
adjusted R2 statistic is still around 28%, and that the addition o f only six degrees o f
freedom to the long-term performance models significantly improves the statistical
significance o f the individual variables and the fit of the entire model.
The long-term performance models provide a much clearer picture o f the
relevance o f the acquisition-based explanations for the success o f the competitive
interaction in this industry context. First, the overall model fits the data much better, with
F-tests rising from around 3 to 4.2 and 6.0, and adjusted R2 increasing to 34.3% for the
10-year change in performance and 46% for the 1996 performance. The individual
variables also have generally stronger t-statistics, with the exception o f resource quality
120
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and, surprisingly, tacit acquisition experience. The latter remains significantly associated
with the 10-year change in ROA, but does not influence current performance in a
statistically significant way. In both long-term performance models, the knowledgebased measure that reflects the crucial role o f capability building is the interaction
between knowledge codification and level o f integration. The standardized coefficient o f
that measure is the largest in the 10-year change in performance model (.489). and is
even larger (.501) in the current performance model.
The two post-acquisition decisions have large, significant coefficients in the
current performance model. The positive effects o f the level of integration account for a
change o f .747 standard deviations from the mean o f ROA in 1996, and the negative
effect o f the replacement o f top managers decreases ROA .552 standard deviations, for an
increase o f 1 standard deviation in the explanatory variable. The influence o f the
resource-based factors on the long-term performance of the acquiring firm is somewhat
surprising given the type o f results obtained at the acquisition level o f analysis. Resource
quality becomes almost irrelevant, whereas the degree o f relatedness turns out to be a
significant explanation, particularly in the case o f the 10-year change in ROA. Possibly
the acquiring firms that concentrated on in-market acquisitions rather than market
extension ones had the worst performance levels in the 1980s, but achieved the best
performance improvements over time because o f the superior learning dynamics afforded
by that type o f acquisition. Conversely, out-market acquisitions might have been
completed more frequently by well-performing acquirers, and the potential for
performance improvement over the years was therefore correspondingly lower.
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Two main conclusions can be drawn from the results o f the analysis. The first is
that the key findings obtained at the acquisition level o f analysis are essentially
replicated, which demonstrates their robustness to changes in model specification and to
the presence o f unobserved heterogeneity. Second, the accumulation o f wisdom from
previous acquisition experiences seems to be a crucial element for both short-term and
long-term performance in the banking industry. That observation supports the conjecture
advanced in Chapter 3 that the accumulation o f knowledge in both tacit and codified form
can explain the creation and evolution o f organizational capabilities. It also supports the
claim that the study o f those knowledge accumulation processes is crucial for gaining an
improved understanding o f the roots of competitive advantage.

6.5

Putting It All Together
A summary outline o f the analyses performed and the key findings derived from

them follows.
1.

The explanation o f the type of post-acquisition decisions adopted by acquiring
firms supports the theoretical modeling:
1.1.

The degree o f resource relatedness, proxied by the geographic overlap of
the network o f branches, positively influences the level o f integration and
the degree o f replacement o f the top management team.

1.2.

The quality o f target’s resources, proxied by its prior performance,
negatively influences the same integration decisions.

1.3.

The codification o f acquisition experience raises the probability of a high
level o f integration and o f high replacement o f top managers.
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1.4.

For the tacit knowledge accumulation mechanisms, a distinction was made
between path-dependence and routinization effects:
1.4.1. Path-dependence effects are relevant in explaining the level of
integration. A high level o f generalized acquisition experience
positively affects integration, whereas a high level o f experience in
non-local (market expansion) acquisitions actually reduces the
probability o f a high integration decision, ceteris paribus.
1.4.2. Routinization effects are the strongest predictors o f both
integration decisions. The decision taken in the context o f an
acquisition completed at any time before the current one strongly
predicts the current one, ceteris paribus.

The type o f post-acquisition decisions adopted by the acquiring firm chiefly
determines the performance o f the post-acquisition integration process, measured
with ex-post qualitative assessments o f different sub-processes:
2.1.

The degree to which the acquired firm is integrated with the acquirer’s
organization enhances performance.

2.2.

The replacement o f the top management team o f the acquired firm hinders
performance.

2.3.

Pre-acquisition resource characteristics have no statistically significant
effect on the linear combination of the three performance assessments,
whereas the degree o f relatedness positively influences the perception of
performance o f the overall integration process (single indicator).
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2.4.

Knowledge codification is associated positively but weakly with post
acquisition performance. No effect o f tacit experience trajectories on
qualitative performance assessments was detected in the data.

3.

The subjective performance assessments, however, are weakly related to the
performance o f the overall acquisition process, as measured by the variation in
accounting performance o f the acquiring firm. O f the three assessments, only the
performance o f the human resources affiliation process has a statistically
significant correlation with the accounting measure.

4.

Once the performance o f the entire acquisition process is taken into consideration
through the use o f accounting measures, results change substantially:
4.1.

The quality o f resources is associated negatively with performance. The
degree o f relatedness maintains a positive but non-significant effect.

4.2.

The post-acquisition decisions confirm the strong influences identified
above (see 2.1 and 2.2).

4.3.

Tacit knowledge accumulation positively affects acquisition and firm
performance, but only if highly localized (i.e., experience in in-market
acquisitions). Transferring tacit knowledge to unrelated domains implies
the assumption o f risks o f incorrect generalization (transfer costs).

4.4.

Knowledge codification does not affect acquisition performance with the
standard model specification (i.e., with only the main effects).

5.

The introduction o f interaction terms among integration decisions and knowledge
accumulation mechanisms improves the fit o f the model with the data and reveals
several significant effects:
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5.1.

The interaction term between the degree o f knowledge codification and
the level o f integration systematically improves acquisition performance
under all the acquisition experience scenarios. The cognitive effort
produced to make sense o f the lessons learned in previous acquisition
experiences and to incorporate them into ad-hoc tools seems to be
associated with stronger performance, but only if the effort is associated
with high integration decisions. When associated with a low integration
approach, the codification effort might produce unnecessary levels of
bureaucratization o f the integration process in its decision-making and/or
its implementation stages.

5.2.

The interaction term between the replacement o f the top management team
and the accumulation o f acquisition experience negatively influences
performance. The routinization o f that decision is therefore hazardous in
spite o f its potential for organizational learning effects, and might actually
worsen performance levels, ceteris paribus.

6.

The model seems to be robust to different specifications:
6.1.

Aggregating observations in the same year to gain consistency between
the measures o f the independent variable and the accounting numbers;

6.2.

Aggregating observations to the firm level o f analysis to reduce the
exposure to firm effects not included in the treatment o f acquisitionspecific organizational capabilities;
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6.3.

Adopting a different time lag in the measurement of the dependent
variable (change in ROA two years or three years after the acquisition vs.
the year before)

7.

At the firm level o f analysis, the long-term performance o f the acquiring firm is
strongly influenced by the type o f integration decision adopted in its acquisition
activity, and by the accumulation of acquisition experience in both tacit and
explicit form. The limitations to the effectiveness o f the two knowledge
accumulation mechanisms (see 4.3 and 5.1) apply also to the explanation o f long
term firm performance, both in its static (current level) and dynamic (10-year
variation) specification.

8.

The data analyzed, then, support the claim that knowledge accumulation
mechanisms translate into the creation o f organizational capabilities useful for the
improvement o f process outcomes and o f short- and long-term firm performance.
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7. DISCUSSION
What do the study findings mean for the underlying theories? How might they
improve our theoretical understanding o f the ways firms develop capabilities from
heterogeneous and infrequent events? How might they advance the discourse on whether
and how firms can create value through M&A activity? How could the results affect the
way managers ought to think about undertaking such endeavors?
This chapter assesses the potential contributions o f the study to the emerging
“knowledge-based view” o f the firm (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant 1996). It first
highlights how the findings might further the debate on the underlying theories
(evolutionary economics and organizational learning), then applies the newly derived
wisdom to the issue o f whether and how value is created from acquisition processes.
Further, because o f the relevance o f the M&A phenomenon in the corporate world, some
observations are made about the lessons practitioners might derive from the study results.
The chapter concludes by providing some words o f caution on the limitations inherent in
the research design adopted and the results obtained.

7.1

Implications for the Knowledge-Based View of the Firm
This dissertation represents perhaps the first empirical test of Nelson and Winter’s

ideas on process routinization to be performed at the process level of analysis. Further,
the test was conducted in a context in which the theory is least likely to be applicable,
where low task frequency and low task homogeneity heavily tax the power o f routinebased explanations. In such extreme settings, the theory must be amended in some
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important respects, but it proves to be a strong and robust explanation for both
organizational decision-making and performance outcomes.

7.1.1

The Virtues o f Codification

The first adjustment pertained to the role o f knowledge codification in the development
o f organizational capabilities. Under “normal” circumstances, the creation o f written
tools embodying the collective understanding o f what is supposed to be done under what
conditions does not necessarily provide any material benefit to the performance outcomes
o f the process under analysis. A key finding o f the study is that, under conditions o f low
frequency and homogeneity o f the task, knowledge codification can actually be
particularly helpful. It can help explain how firms make decisions and, most importantly,
aid our attempts to explain the performance o f those processes. In particular, the results
on the performance implications o f codification under the condition o f high complexity,
namely that codification does not affect performance directly but through its interaction
with the level of integration, are inherently interesting. Higher levels o f integration o f
acquired firms imply higher degrees o f complexity in the implementation o f post
acquisition processes, which would then enable the codification mechanisms to show
their positive effects on performance through the development o f an ad-hoc integration
capability. As outlined in Chapter 3, the rationale for that result depends less on the
protection codified tools provide against the decay o f organizational memory than on the
processes by which the codes are created. Those processes entail the production o f a
collective, coordinated cognitive effort, which constitutes a crucial element in our
understanding of how organizational capabilities are created.
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The introduction o f the cognitive element into the standard evolutionary
economics discourse, which has been built on tacit knowledge accumulation mechanisms,
is itself an important refinement o f the theory. Such emphasis is consistent with Gavetti
and Levinthal's (1997) simulation work on cognition in rugged landscapes, which models
the cognitive element as the reduction o f the number o f dimensions by decision-makers
during a search process in complex (i.e., where firm attributes are highly interdependent)
environments. In the context studied, the creation o f a post-acquisition integration
manual or a computer-based staffing model assumes a similar role: it simplifies the
reality o f a multidimensional decisional space and thereby facilitates the decision-making
and eventually the implementation process. It is intriguing to observe that, far from
swinging the agent away from the optimal decisional path, that process might actually
enhance the probability o f its success in search tasks, as well as in post-acquisition
integration processes.

7.1.2

The Limits o f Codification

The data analyzed in the study show some clear limitations to the effectiveness o f the
knowledge codification process. The degree o f knowledge codification directly affects
neither acquisition nor firm performance. Its influence on both dependent variables
comes in two forms; (I) through the effect on the type o f post-acquisition integration
decisions selected by the acquiring firm and (2) through the performance implication of
its interaction with the level o f integration. The interpretation that could be given to
those results is that the degree of knowledge codification translates into a positive force
for task and organizational performance only under the condition o f high levels o f
activity or use of the underlying knowledge. In other words, codifying an integration
129
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process characterized by a low level o f integration is not only futile, but can actually
harm the performance o f the process itself, perhaps because o f the excessive bureaucratic
load put on the acquiring organization. At low levels o f integration, a group of expert but
“non-codified” integration managers may well perform better than an equally expert
group that invests in and relies on a large set o f manuals and electronic support tools.

7.1.3

Limits to Tacit Knowledge Accumulation
As reported in Chapter 6 (Tables 6.9 through 6.12), acquiring firms appear to

benefit from the tacit accumulation o f knowledge from previous acquisition experiences.
Two findings are particularly relevant for evaluating the limitations o f tacit knowledge
accumulation in the context studied:
1) Tacit knowledge accumulation is highly “local.” Experience from previous
acquisitions completed in dissimilar contexts does not accumulate in an effective way
(i.e., it does not contribute to the construction o f an organizational capability). Only
the accumulation o f experience in homogeneous contexts, such as acquisitions in
similar geographic areas, can enable the firm to improve on previous performance
without the support o f a full-blown cognitive effort and independently o f how much
the tacitly developed practices have been codified.
2) Tacit knowledge accumulation is detrimental to performance when applied to
particularly sensitive decisions. The data show that in addition to having a negative
main effect on performance, the replacement of the top management team is
associated significantly with lower quality o f outcomes when it occurs with high
levels o f tacit experience. Although the interaction effect between codification and
replacement is also negative, its smaller magnitude (see Table 6.13) indicates that the
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cognitive processes underlying the degree o f codification afford some protection from
the errors associated with applying routinized behaviors where deliberate cognition is
necessary.
The last point introduces another important amendment to our current understanding o f
routinization and codification processes. There might be a set o f decisions that ought to
be considered neither routinizable nor codifiable. Many decisions, such as the degree of
integration, must be supported by a high level o f codification and routinization to
overcome the inherently negative effects o f structural and decisional complexity (see
section 4.1.1). Other decisions, the replacement o f the top management team might be an
example in point, should be driven primarily by deliberate considerations based on the
characteristics of pre-acquisition resources. When routinized, such decisions tend to have
a negative effect on performance. The difference between the first and second types o f
decisions is not at all clear and is beyond the scope of the study but the finding shows the
relevance o f the question and highlights it as warranting further exploration.

7.1.4

Routines and Capabilities

As a partial consequence o f that line o f reasoning, one could use the empirical evidence
uncovered in the study to speculate and attempt to pinpoint more firmly the relationship
between organizational routines and organizational capabilities. In dynamic contexts,
routines are to be seen as constituting both a positive and a negative determinant o f the
process o f creating organizational capabilities in dynamic environments. The elements
that determine which sign can be assigned to the causal relationship can be summarized
with the following list o f preconditions (Figure 7.1 is a diagram o f the arguments):
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Fig. 7.1 - From Routines to Capabilities
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Stability of personnel. The first element pertains to facilitating the tacit accumulation of
knowledge in the minds o f the individuals involved. To the extent that the group o f
individuals operating the routine is relatively stable in its composition for a sufficient
amount o f time, experiences from past executions can accumulate in the individuals’
memories and be shared with the other group members. The sharing fosters a common
understanding and expertise in the execution of the routines.
Monitoring In the more explicit forms o f knowledge accumulation, effective feedback
mechanisms are the first prerequisite for the group o f individuals operating the routine to
become aware o f either the absolute or relative (compared to relevant competitors)
quality o f their routine. The degree to which monitoring mechanisms are developed and
consistently used within an organization is a second necessary (Sabel, 1994), albeit not
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sufficient, condition for routinized behavior to turn into organizational capabilities, as it
supports the correct functioning of the following two mechanisms.
Cognition. It consists o f a collective effort to examine the performance feedback from
past experiences and to generalize abstract causal mechanisms correlating decisions and
implementation actions with the quality o f the performance feedback. The aim is then to
at least partially reduce the level of causal ambiguity (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982) and to
facilitate the generalization from heterogeneous experiences by an in-depth study o f the
little empirical evidence available. It also identifies the necessary modifications to the
current routines that are supposed to correct or improve the expected performance levels
in future experiences. The cognitive activity is manifested, for example, in post-event
debriefing sessions where the decisions made and the implementation steps taken are
recalled, and the performance outcomes are identified and discussed. It is bounded by the
natural limitations o f human rationality and by the necessary degree of speculation and
conjecture about the types and magnitudes o f cause-effect relationships. However, the
presence and the effectiveness o f these collective learning mechanisms should afford a
material advantage for organizations that are attempting to turn current routines into
organizational capabilities, subject to the existence and effectiveness o f performance
monitoring systems.
Codification In many cases, the cognitive activity needs to be enhanced and supported
by the explicit codification o f the newly generated wisdom. That process entails the
development o f new manuals, blueprints, or specialized support systems, or the updating
o f current ones. In addition, to the extent that the post-event debriefing efforts described
above generate written documentation o f the decisions and performance implications o f
133
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the experience; one can consider that output a form o f codified knowledge. Codification
can facilitate the transformation o f routines in capabilities as the process through which
the codes are created and updated force the organization to make a fuller use o f the
performance monitoring systems and to produce a deeper cognitive effort to penetrate the
causal ambiguity tying actions with performance during experienced events.

7.1.5

Codification and Codifiability

One final lesson from the data pertains to the relationship between process codification
and knowledge codifiability. Given a certain degree o f codifiability (Winter, 1987;
Kogut & Zander, 1992) o f the knowledge underlying a certain process, the study shows
that firms typically do not codify their process to the full extent possible. Some firms
codify more than others that have comparable levels o f experience (see Table 6.1 and
Figure 6.2) because they are willing to allocate more time and effort to the codification
process. In the model on long-term organizational performance, the statistical
significance o f the interaction term between codification and integration assigns strategic
relevance to die decision to invest time, effort, and resources to generate the desired level
o f codification. That strategic aspect of knowledge codification, and its likely
consequences for the creation o f organizational capabilities, might constitute one more
crucial link between the organizational learning and strategic management literatures, and
may provide fertile ground for future research. Further, it might indicate the existence o f
an “optimal” degree o f codification o f a certain practice, given a certain degree of
codifiability o f its underlying knowledge, where the location of the optimum is
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influenced by task features such as its complexity (number and interdependence o f its
sub-tasks, causal ambiguity etc.).

7.2

Implications for the M&A Theory
The first question that anyone, scholar or practitioner, asks about mergers and

acquisitions is whether firms consistently create value from them. The predominant
evidence from studies o f stock price reactions shows no creation o f abnormal returns, on

average, from the perspective o f the acquiring company’s shareholders (Jensen &
Ruback, 1983; Franks, Harris & Titman, 1991; Loderer & Martin, 1992). Some studies
actually show a systematic value destruction from acquisition activities, which Agrawal,
Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) quantify as 10% o f the acquirer’s market value over five
years.
The data gathered in the study are not exceptions to that empirical regularity.
Table 7.1 summarizes the means and the two-tailed t-tests o f the various performance
measures available at both the acquisition and the firm levels o f analysis.
Table 7.1 - Tests for the deviation from 0 of the mean of performance distributions
MEASURE
Acquisition Level
Ch. in ROA (3 yrs after)
Ch. in ROA (2 yrs after)
Ch. in ROA (1 year after)
Firm Level
Ch. in ROA (3 yrs after)
Ch. in ROA (2 yrs after)
Ch. in ROA (1 year after)
Ch. in ROA 1987-1996
Avg. ROA 1991-1996
ROA 1996

tstatistic

Pvalue

291
371
448

.669
1.298
-.861

.504
.195
.390

39
40
44
46
46
44

-.538
-.942
-1.531
-.304
.630
-.655

.594
.352
.133
.763
.532
.516

Mean

Std
Dev

N

.0284
.0450
-.0175

.7255
.6683
.4300

-.0347
-.0445
-.0545
-.0231
.0170
-.0263

.4027
.2986
.2361
.5146
.1826
.2662
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Though the signs vary with the level o f analysis and the particular time horizon
adopted, none o f the means shown is statistically distinguishable from zero. One
observation o f note involves the comparison o f the means o f the short-term changes in
ROA (two and three years after the acquisition) at the two levels o f analysis. The means
for the acquisition level are positive in sign, whereas those at the firm level, resulting
from the aggregation o f all the observations per firm, are negative. The explanation is
that the frequency o f M&A experience, which is irrelevant in the aggregated case where
every acquirer accounts for only one observation, improves the acquirer’s ROA and
therefore produces a higher (and positive) average at the acquisition level o f analysis.
The finding can be viewed as partial evidence that experience matters when firms
conduct acquisition activity.
Another hint from the economics and finance literature comes from some of the
most recent studies which have taken a longitudinal view o f the problem o f the location
of the mean o f the performance distribution. Schleifer and Vishny (1994), for example,
found a significant difference in the value-creation record between mergers in the 1960s
and those in the 1980s, with the latter seeming to outperform the former. Along similar
lines, Loderer and Martin (1992) found that “negative performance in the second and
third year after the acquisition is most prominent in the 1960s, and to a lesser extent in
the 1970s, but not in the 1980s” (p. 70). The explanation for acquisition under
performance, then, may not be some inherent value-destruction quality o f mergers and
acquisitions, as implicitly suggested by the literature, but instead a general lack o f
capability to manage those activities, a capability that has been developing slowly at the
population level over the decades.
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This study seems to provide initial support for that learning-based explanation o f
acquisitive behavior and performance. Shifting the attention from the average to the

variance o f the distribution o f acquisition performance, it focuses first on explanatory
variables related to the characteristics o f the two firms involved in the acquisitions. The
theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.3) then adds a second class of
explanations, the types o f decisions made by the acquiring firm after completion o f the
acquisition (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Shanley, 1994). The analyses show that
certain types of integration decisions systematically outperform others. An integration
strategy formed by the combination o f a high level o f integration and a low degree o f
replacement o f the key resources o f the target firm, or convergence (see Figures 4.2 and
7.2), should outperform all other approaches. One way to verify that effect in concrete
terms is by using the coefficients o f one o f the models estimated and computing the
variation o f the dependent variable for the various permutations offered by the two post
acquisition integration decisions studied. Figure 7.2 reports the results o f such
computations in the case o f the coefficients estimated with the model showing the best fit
with the data, the one using the accumulation o f in-market acquisition experience (Table
6.11; the other experience trajectories yield qualitatively similar results). The value
codings for the explanatory variables follow.
•

Integration was coded 3 (complete) for high and 2 (partial) for low.

•

Replacement was coded 3 (complete) for high and 0 (all retained) for low.

•

All the other variables were entered at their mean values
The dependent variable was measured in terms of the difference between the

ROA three years after the acquisition and the ROA one year before. Also, the two values
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were computed as the difference between the acquirer’s ROA and the average ROA in its
geographic area. The entries in the table are the acquirer’s change in net earnings levels
(the product o f ROA with total assets) over four years, minus that o f its key competitors.

Fig. 7.2 - Value Creation and
Post-Acquisition Strategies

High

Restructuring

Degree of
Replacement

Replication
$ -5 .8

$-85.8
Preservation
$65.5

Convergence
$145.4

Low
Low

High

Level of Integration

The use o f a convergence strategy by the average bank in the sample, with $26.4
billion in assets and managing the “average” acquisition ($2.14 billion in assets, see
Table 5.1), improves the bank’s net earnings by $145.4 million more than its competitors.
This translates into a creation o f competitive value totaling 58.9% o f the average
purchase price o f $ 246.7 million over the three year period. At the opposite extreme.
managing an acquisition by using a restructuring approach (total replacement and
incomplete integration) results in a $85.8 million loss, compared with the earnings
variation o f competitors.
Finally, as a third explanation for the variance o f acquisition performance, the
framework introduces the notion o f a specific integration capability that the acquiring
firm might develop. That proposal represents the core argument of the study, and appears
(38

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to be generally supported by the analysis o f the data gathered. Acquiring firms seem able
to fine-tune their integration practices progressively, thereby developing idiosyncratic
(tacit) routines and codified support tools which, under the conditions specified above,
generate systematically superior results. In a scenario analysis similar to the one
described above, an average acquirer will lose an average $40.7 million at its first
attempt, whereas an acquirer with 10 in-market acquisitions already completed will earn
$73.5 million more than its competitors during the next three years, all others conditions
being equal. Importantly, the selection o f adequate strategies and the development of
superior practices appear to afford both short-term and long-term performance benefits.

The issue o f systematic value creation, however critical, is not the only one
addressed in the research that ought to be o f core interest to M&A and corporate strategy
scholars in general. The data allowed a comparative assessment o f the explanatory power
o f the three classes of exogenous variables identified in the performance framework.
From the analyses reported in Chapter 6 (see section 6.5 for a summary o f the main
results), hypotheses involving the resource-based primitives o f performance, which are
frequently invoked by strategy scholars and are so far the only ones subject to large-scale
empirical testing, generated only limited support. The leading role, in terms o f the
magnitude o f the effect on performance, is taken instead by the two post-acquisition
integration decisions in a strong and complex partnership with the measures
approximating the two knowledge accumulation mechanisms.
Moving from classes o f explanations to the specific effects o f the individual
variables, the analyses suggest the importance o f the particular contribution o f each of the
139
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two resource-based and the two integration decision constructs introduced in the models.
The degree o f relatedness, even with all the methodological caveats necessary (see the
discussion below in section 7.4), hardly ever shows significant magnitude. In contrast, the
quality of the resources in the acquired unit shows relatively consistent and significant
effects on performance, with a negative sign that might seem surprising. The negative
influence o f resource quality on performance essentially suggests that firms should not
try to search for the best performers from which to eventually import and absorb best
practices. Rather, the best way to create value in acquisitions is to deploy current
resources and capabilities from the acquirer to the target (Capron, Doussage & Mitchell,
1997). There might be a capability explanation for that result, too, however, according to
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). They suggest that the creation o f value from inverse
learning is much more complex, and presumably empirically rare, as it requires a
complete revision o f the typical conquering attitude that m ost acquirers have when
approaching the integration process. Another explanation, equally plausible, is that
pricing dynamics eliminate value creation potential to a greater extent in the case o f highquality targets, than in the case o f low-quality ones. In that view, buyers consistently
overpay for their acquisitions o f high-quality targets, overestimating their ability to
recuperate the high premia paid in the absence of sufficient room for generating synergies
from cost efficiency and restructuring processes (Sirower, 1997).
The last result seems to lend empirical support to the “ market for corporate
control” view o f M&As, whereby top management teams act as a policing device in their
search for under-performing concerns by replacing the inept managers, realigning the
incentive systems, and generating “quick” and copious value. That view, however, is not
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consistent with the other core result o f the analyses, the one concerning the negative
performance implications o f the replacement o f the acquired unit top management team
(confirming the result o f Cannella & Hambrick, 1993). How does one reconcile the two
contrasting results? One possibility is to move away from the market metaphor and
consider mergers and acquisitions as essentially internal investment activities. In that
view, the potential for value creation is given by the characteristics o f the investment,
including the price and the features o f the assets purchased, but the concrete realization
o f the value potential is determined entirely by the acquirer’s post-investment managerial
decisions and implementation capabilities. Though the quality o f the purchased assets is
a key determinant o f the value creation potential, the substitution o f key resources within
the target firm is part o f the value capture process, which, according to the data analyzed,
might end up disrupting more than the acquirer intends to fix. The challenge, then, seems
to be to extract the value potential from the combination of the two organizations without
yielding to the “superiority complex” that the market-for-corporate-control metaphor
evokes.
The other “high intervention” post-acquisition decision, related to the level of
integration, has diametrically opposite effects. Not only does it directly and positively
influence performance, but it also further enhances the creation o f value from acquisition
processes when coupled with high levels o f knowledge codification. The negative
implications due to structural inertia and process complexity considerations are
apparently compensated for by the benefits the acquiring firm derives from cost
efficiencies and, eventually, revenue enhancement opportunities consequent to the
achievement of higher degrees o f integration. The finding lends support, then, to some
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preliminary evidence unearthed in the strategic management literature (Datta & Grant,
1990; Shanley, 1994), and appears to redefine the negative performance implications
discovered in the human resources and organizational behavior literature (Buono &
Bowditch, 1989; Atrachan, 1990; Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991; Joyce-Covin et al. 1996) as
necessary costs suffered on the way to the achievement o f the benefits from
organizational integration.
Overall, the analysis o f the data gathered in the study points to the advantages o f
the simultaneous consideration o f diverse classes o f explanations corresponding to
different phases o f the process and to longitudinal evolutionary processes related to
organizational learning mechanisms. The measurement challenges are proportionately
large, however, and a thorough test o f the theoretical framework will necessitate much
more work.

7.3

Managerial Implications
Some o f the conclusions obtained from the data analysis are relevant not only to

scholarly debates in the field o f management, but also to the evolution o f the quality of
decision-making and implementation processes among managers and management
consultants. This section is a brief overview of some o f the study’s possible implications
for the management o f acquisition processes. The presentation is divided into three parts,
following the groups o f primitives considered in the performance framework (Figure
4.2): pre-acquisition characteristics o f resources, post-acquisition integration decisions,
and the creation o f an integration capability.
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7.3.1

Target Selection
One broad indication from the study results is that the issue of selecting the

'“right” target should receive a different type of emphasis. In terms of the magnitude o f
effect on acquisition performance, the characteristics o f the target firm are less relevant
than the type o f integration decisions made after the completion o f the transaction, and
not as critical as the development o f a capability specialized in the management o f the
transition phase. That is not to say the issue should not receive an adequate degree o f
managerial attention, but the attention should be distributed wisely among all three
drivers o f acquisition performance.
In terms o f what characteristics to prioritize in the target selection process,
another perhaps counterintuitive finding is that the quality of the resources might be a
more relevant issue than the degree o f similarity of the target’s resources to the
acquirer’s. Relatedness, though an important antecedent o f the potential for exploitation
o f economies o f scale and scope, comes at a price that might have been underestimated in
past treatments o f the problem. It raises the stakes for the integration phase, as a large
portion o f the value creation potential might be paid out at the negotiation table, and the
remaining part has to be ““deserved” by the acquiring firm through superior performance
in the integration process.
A more important screening criterion seems to be the room for improvement of
the target’s current performance, as most o f the gains acquirers typically are willing and
able to achieve come from the pursuit o f cost efficiencies within the acquired
organization. The acquisition o f superior performers requires the creation o f value over
and above the higher premium paid, which seems to be possible only through the
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effective use o f the opposite mechanism for value creation (i.e., the transfer o f superior
practices from the target to the acquirer, or '‘inverse learning”). According to the data
gathered, however, that condition is rarely satisfied, as the acquisition o f high-performing
targets is associated with lower levels o f performance after control for all the other
conditions measured in the study.
The lesson, then, might be that acquiring firms systematically overestimate their
own willingness and/or ability to leverage the resources and capabilities within the
acquired organizations to create value from the improvement o f their own performance.
It also confirms some o f the qualitative impressions from the field study: most o f the
acquirers interviewed would not consider changing their own systems or products or
practices when they acquired a target with objectively superior features.

7.3.2

Post-acquisition Integration
Identifying the type o f integration approach to follow after completion o f the

transaction is a crucial step toward achievement o f performance objectives in both
theoretical and managerial terms. The study provides additional empirical evidence for
that argument. As reported in section 7.2, the selection of one particular combination of
the two decisional dimensions studied can signify the difference between creating and
destroying a substantial amount o f wealth.
The approach that dominates the menu of integration strategies identified in
section 4.1 is characterized by a high level o f organizational integration and a low degree
o f replacement o f the top management team. Figure 7.2 reports some quantifiable
measures, based on the tested models, o f the performance implications o f that consensusbased approach.
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From a managerial standpoint, however, the key challenge seems to be to
combine the set o f indications with the selection criteria summarized above. Managing
the acquisition o f a poor, or even average, performer without automatically taking the
shortcut o f replacing the top management team might not be a trivial feat. One possibility
would be to avoid the conundrum and stick to a non-replacement approach, which could
become part o f a routinized integration practice. However, such approach might turn into
a hazardous simplification because routinizing or codifying this particular type o f
decision compounds its negative impact on performance.
That dilemma offers a good example o f how the three classes o f explanation are
interdependent: low quality targets should be managed with a high replacement approach,
which does not, however, need to be routinized. There is no simple solution. A careful,
deliberate assessment o f the personal qualities o f the top managers for each one of the
acquisitions considered seems to be an unavoidable necessity.

7.3.3

Integration Capability
The most important piece of learning that the research offers for managers,

however, stems from its core motivation. The goal o f the study was to explore and
possibly explain how firms can create and develop organizational capabilities specialized
in the management o f post-acquisition integration processes. That task is very complex
from both theoretical and empirical standpoints, but accomplishing it is crucially
important for managers and their advisers.
First, the analysis supports the claim that such capabilities can actually be
constructed through the tacit accumulation o f direct experience in the management of
integration processes. Yet, it also suggests that such experience usually is not sufficient
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and must be combined with a cognitive effort entailing the explicit rationalization and
codification o f the lessons learned from the (generally) few experiences. Firms can learn
how to manage highly infrequent, complex, and heterogeneous tasks only by investing
time, energy, and resources in their efforts to understand the scarce evidence. The
creation o f support tools in either paper or electronic form is also useful for the protection
such tools provide against the loss o f institutional memory and for the diffusion of the
crystallized wisdom.
The second important lesson from the data is that, however useful for the
construction o f institutional capabilities, knowledge routinization and codification are
double-edged swords that should be used with discretion by managers who are fully
aware o f their limitations. Certain decisions, for example, should not be made subject to
routinization processes, as the benefits from easing the cognitive load might be
outweighed by the detrimental effects of applying lessons tacitly absorbed in certain
domains to inherently different contexts. Rationalizing and codifying on the basis o f too
small a sample or with insufficient managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997) entails the risk o f
accumulating “superstitious” learning (Levitt & March, 1988), risk that is compounded
by the presence o f strong path dependencies in those types o f decisional processes.
One final normative indication from the results is that firms should develop a
portfolio of integration routines from which the discriminating acquirer can select the
most opportune one according to the specific characteristics o f the M&A context
considered. Some o f the banks that participated in the survey were working toward a
similar goal by developing, for example, distinct integration routines for smaller as
opposed to larger bank acquisitions, and for non-bank versus bank targets. That approach
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appears to combine the benefits o f a routinized implementation process with those o f a
cognitive effort in the development o f the codified routines, as well as the deliberate
decision-making process influencing the selection o f what routine to trigger, based on the
specifics o f the acquisition context.

7.4

Limitations o f the Study
The study had two main limitations to the generalizability o f its results. First, the

research design restricted the types o f events studied to either horizontal or market
extension types o f M&A, therefore allowing only a limited variation o f the resource
relatedness construct. Hence, the study did not incorporate the full explanatory power o f
the relatedness hypothesis. However, the dimension along which the construct operated
in the study, essentially the geographic overlap o f the network o f facilities, provided
sufficient variability for the underlying value creation mechanism (the exploitation o f
economies o f scale) to operate. In-market acquisitions are driven, in theory as well as
practice, by the opportunity to cut the cost structure o f the acquired firm and thus realize
the “synergies” that are supposed to justify the premiums paid. Out-market (market
extension) acquisitions are forced to rely, at least in part, on other (i.e., "softer”) value
creation mechanisms, typically considered more weakly correlated with performance.
Therefore, the problem with the relatedness measure in the study is not so much lack o f
consideration o f diversified acquisitions, but the limited degree o f correlation with the
other measures o f similarity gathered through the Phase 2 survey. The degree o f market
relatedness, in terms o f geographic overlap as well as customer segments served, does not
correlate well with the internal measures o f resource relatedness deduced from the degree
of similarity in information systems, human resources practices, operating procedures,
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etc. (see section D.2 in Exhibit D). That finding is not novel for researchers who study
the varied dimensions o f organizational relatedness, and supports the claim that the
product market and the organizational dimensions o f the construct should not be
confounded and their association taken for granted (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Datta,
1991).
The second limitation is in the generalizability o f the results to different industry
contexts. Some o f the observations from both the fieldwork and the statistical analysis o f
the survey data might be specific to the commercial banking industry, or at least to the
service sector. For example, the primary role o f information system conversion might be
a consequence o f the specific type of information-based products provided by the
banking industry. Similarly, the strong predisposition to codify the integration procedures
could be caused by an industry-based cultural bias favoring detailed codification (i.e..
bureaucratization) o f internal procedures. If this were the case, however, the hypothesis
o f positive performance implications of the degree o f codification might be harder, not
easier, to support in the industry context studied. Those issues can be resolved only
through replications o f the study in different industries; o f particular interest would be the
study o f the theoretical framework in contexts characterized by high technological
change (electronics or telecommunications, for example), or by different patterns o f
customer demand (e.g. consumer vs. industrial products). The fundamental patterns
found in the study have been observed, however, in a number of case studies in very
different contexts such as white goods (Electrolux), industrial products (Cooper
Industries), and retailing (The Limited).
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More worrisome than the generalizability problems are operational issues related
to measuring the performance o f the post-acquisition integration process and the limited
number o f degrees o f freedom available for the analysis o f short-term firm performance.
Subjective performance assessment generally does not allow a good quality o f inter-firm
comparison, as what is considered satisfactory by a certain acquirer (e.g., a relatively
inexperienced one) might not be by another. The ideal solution would be to gather either
accounting or process performance data from the acquired entity standpoint but such data
are usually very difficult to obtain because acquirers themselves do not collect them.
However, the acquisition performance measures used, based on the acquirer’s accounting
data, are highly generalizable and “perform” very well in spite o f the fact that the average
acquisition is only a small fraction o f the acquirer’s assets.
Finally, the limited number o f observations at the firm level o f analysis was due
to participant attrition between the first and the second rounds o f the survey. Also, three
o f the respondent banks were privately held and only part o f their financial data was
obtainable. Other problems include missing data, particularly on the asset size of the
completed acquisitions. That limitation works against the hypothesis-testing effort,
however, as the low number o f observations implies that the standard deviation of the
estimated coefficient is typically overestimated with respect to the theoretical population.
As both the stability and the magnitude o f the coefficients are reduced, assessments of
their statistical significance are overly conservative. In other words, for variables that are
associated significantly with firm performance, the magnitude o f the effect is likely to be
maintained even with larger sample sizes. In contrast, it is not possible to determine
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whether non-significant impacts occurred because o f either the small sample size or an
effective lack o f explanatory power.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
The objective o f the study was to build on evolutionary economics and
organizational learning theories to explore the effect o f both tacit and codified knowledge
accumulation mechanisms on the development o f an administrative capability specialized
in the management o f post-acquisition integration processes. To assess the extent to
which that objective was reached, it is useful to compare the types o f results expected
from the application o f varied theoretical discourses with the outcomes o f the set of
statistical analyses reported here.
Figure 8.1 shows the extent to which the theoretical framework advanced in
chapter 4 is supported empirically. The thickness o f the arrows indicates the strength of
the impacts. Table 8.1, then, summarizes the theoretical arguments made for the
hypotheses tested and the extent to which they are supported empirically at the
acquisition and the firm levels o f analysis.
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Table 8.1 - Expected Performance Impacts and Empirical Results
V A R IA BLES

R esource-B ased
Resource reiatedness
Resource quality
Post-Acq. Decisions
Integration

Replacement o f
TMT
Knowledge-Based
Knowledge
Codification
Tacit Experience
Accumulation
(local)
Codification x
Integration

THEORY

Hp.

Exp.
Sign

Integration
Process
Perf.

Firm
Perf.

Related diversification
Resource deployment

H9
H10

+
-

Ns
-

Ns

Inertia and complexity
Cost efficiencies and
revenue enhancements
Structural inertia
Agency theory

HI la
HI lb

+

+

+

H l2 a
H12b

•

-

+

Learning and cognition

H13

+

Ns

Ns

Tacit learning

H14

+

+

+

Learning and cognition
w/ structural
complexity

H I5

+

+

+

-

The study findings provide confirmation o f the descriptive power o f some
theories, as well as some surprises.
1) Both the strengths and the limitations o f knowledge accumulation and codification
mechanisms in their ability to explain acquisition and firm performance were
explored. Acquisition experience accumulates tacitly, affording significant gains in
organizational performance after acquisitions, but only if the past experiences are
localized into well-known domains and are therefore highly homogeneous. The
codification o f such experiences into specialized support tools can, in turn, materially
affect the performance of acquisition processes and the long-term performance o f the
acquiring firm, but only if those tools are employed in acquisitions characterized by
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high degrees of integration. Otherwise, the disadvantages o f excessive
bureaucratization might overcome the benefits o f developing an integration
capability.
2) A relatively surprising result is the difference in explanatory behavior shown by the
structural inertia hypotheses in determining the performance effects of the two post
acquisition decisions. The results for level o f integration are associated positively
with the performance o f the acquisition process, implying that, in the study context,
the potential for exploitation o f economies o f scale and scope overcomes the
necessary disruptions during the integration process. In contrast, the aggressive
replacement o f key resources within the acquired organization, particularly if
embedded in human capital, negatively affects acquisition performance, lending
credit to the concerns raised in the literature about the organizational and human
resources impacts o f acquisition processes. That finding supports some recent
empirical results obtained by strategy scholars (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Shanley,
1994).
3) Finally, the lack o f support for the relatedness hypothesis (H9) is also somewhat
surprising; despite the limited scope determined by the research design, the
juxtaposition of purely horizontal with market extension acquisitions should have
shown significant performance implications. Acquirers in the banking industry
affirm that in-market acquisitions allow the extraction of cost efficiencies o f up to
70% o f the target’s pre-acquisition cost structure, versus a 20% to 30% range in the
case o f market extensions. Closer examination of the hypothesis suggests several
explanations for the “nonresult.” First, the benefits o f relatedness are relatively
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transparent to the seller and might be priced out during negotiations (Singh &
Montgomery, 1987; Bamey, 1988). Second, most o f the organizational costs incurred
to extract the benefits from highly related acquisitions are hidden within the ordinary
cost structure o f the acquiring firm, and therefore might not be given full account by
acquirers. In addition, however relevant, relatedness provides only the potential for
value creation; if the capability to realize such potential is not adequately developed,
knowledge-based and process-based explanations might become more powerful
primitives o f performance than resource-based ones.
Overall, the data show that the combination o f knowledge accumulation processes, both
tacit and explicit, with the opportune set o f integration decisions can explain a significant
portion o f the variability in the performance o f both single acquisition processes and the
entire acquiring firm.12
The study was an empirical exploration o f the explanatory power o f routinization
and codification mechanisms at the process level o f analysis. The findings provide only a
preliminary indication o f the importance o f these knowledge-based explanations for our
understanding o f how organizations evolve and succeed. The many possible expansions
o f such line o f research include:
•

Replicating the study in different industry contexts. The banking industry might be a
good approximation o f the service sector, but is structurally different from sectors
characterized by fast technological evolution, heavy commitments in production
capacity, or fluctuating consumer behavior.

12 See Tables 6.10 through 6.14
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•

Exploring the role of the relatedness hypothesis by extending the analysis to product
diversification and, eventually, unrelated acquisitions. It would also be important to
produce a more finely grained measurement o f relatedness based on internal resource
and organizational characteristics. Finally, the relatedness question should be
extended to cultural issues with the study o f cross-border acquisitions.

•

Testing the descriptive power o f evolutionary economics and organizational learning
theories in empirical contexts different from acquisition processes. Other areas in
which application o f similar knowledge-based arguments might provide significant
contributions include the performance o f joint-ventures and strategic alliances,
internal reorganization and restructuring processes, and new product development
processes.
If confirmed in other settings, the evidence uncovered in the study could help the

field o f strategic management to understand better how organizational learning and
decision-making processes interact to create sustainable rents through superior
manipulation o f internal resources. With the capability-based view of competitive
advantage, strategic management researchers might undertake a set of new challenges.
For instance, they could study the circumstances under which a certain decision or
implementation process is profitably routinizable and codifiable, and research how firms
can exploit the advantages o f such cognitive simplifications. Retaining and focusing the
power o f deliberate analysis for only the contexts in which it is advisable to invest
managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997) and cognitive power (Gavetti & Levinthal, 1997)
appears to be a highly promising and relatively unexplored area o f investigation in the
quest for the roots o f firms’ competitive advantage.
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9. EXH IBITS

9.1

EXHIBIT A - ACQUISITION HISTORY PROFILE
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BANK ACQUISITIONS HISTORY PROFILE OF
Acquired Bank

State

Year

Coordinator*4

Price

Assets"

In/Out" 1 Bank11” 1 Change” " lntegrw

Tot S‘u

HRS"

Ul

11 Coordinator: Last name o f Ihc person who coordinated the post-acquisition process
14 Price paid. S in Million.
15 Total asset* purchased. $ in Million at the time o f the agreement to purchase
16 In/Out. Whether the acquisition is considered In the Market (enter IN) or Out o f the Market (enter OUT)
17 Bank. Type o f bank acquired: enter "-2” if Bankrupt, "-I” if a poor performer, “0” if average, “+1” if good performer, “+2” if outstanding
11 Change. The extent to which the executive leadership o f the acquired benk has been changed after the acquisition: enter “0” if no substantial c h an g e , "I” if some
changes, “2” if many changes, ‘'3 ” if virtually all the top management team was changed.
19 Integration. The extent to which the systems, procedures and products were aligned or centralized: enter "0” if few or no features were integrated, "I” if selected
systems, procedures and problems were integrated, “2” if many but not all systems, procedures and products were integrated, “3” if all systems, procedures agtd products
were completely integrated.
The last 3 columns ask you to evaluate the performance o f the post-acquisition integration proces, compared with the average o f all the other completed acquisitions:
enter "-2" i f M any Problem, " - I" i f Some Problem, "0 " i f Average, "+ l" ifO K , " +2” i f Great.
20 Tot S. Overall performance o f the acquisition compared to the others made. The extent to which the objectives o f the acquisition have been achieved.
21 H R S. Performance o f the “affiliation" process. How human resources o f the acquired bank reacted and cooperated during the transition phase.
22 OP S. Performance o f Ihc DP systems conversion (if done) Consider the timeliness, the training provided, the troubleshooting and the normalization period.

DPS"

9.2

EXHIBIT B - ACQUIRING BANK QUESTIONNAIRE

I. INFORMA TION ON THE ACQUIRING INSTITUTION
Thisfirst section requires you to provide some basic information about your bank, as o f today.

Geographic Coverage.
Total number o f branches
Number o f counties with at least one branch
Number o f regions in which the bank is organized
Number o f states with at least one branch
Number o f branches outside the original state

#
#
#
#
#

Operational Sites. In how many sites are the following activities carried forward ?
Check processing
Data processing
Phone center

T oday ?

In 1990 ?

#_________
#_________
#______

#________
#________
#

Loan Portfolio. Please, assess the relative “weight” of the following types of loans, according
their dollar size and their earning capacity ( enter percent, adding up to 100%).
S ize

%
%
%
%
100 %

Commercial/corporate lending
Consumer/retail lending
Mortgage/real estate
Other
TOTAL

E a r n in g s

%
%
%
%
100 %

M&A Importance. How is M&A activity currently reported in the corporate communication
documents (annual reports etc.) of your bank ? (check one)
□
The most important operating element for the realization of strategic objectives.
□
Among the top three elements for the realization of the strategic objectives
□
An important but not prioritary element
□
An activity being considered only on an opportunistic basis
□
Reported as an extraordinary event, with limited or no strategic emphasis
M&A Structure.
Which of the following structures are currently in place in order to deal with acquisition
processes (check as many as applicable).
□
M&A Department
□
Corporate Development (M&A, planning etc.)
□
Finanical/administrative function (specialized group led by CFO or Controller)
□
No structure, acquisitions are handled on a case-by-case basis
□
Other (explain)____________________________________________ ________
IS8
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2. INFORMATION ON THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

Support Documents and Models. For each o f the following document, manual or quantitative
model, please check whether it is currently being used by your institution. If yes, please assess
the year in which it was created and how frequently it has been significantly updated since then.
Documents/Manuals
No
Yes
W hen ?
Never Rarely Frequently Always
Due Diligence check-list
□
□
19_____
Q
a
Due Diligence manual
□
□
19______
a
Systems conversion manual
□
□
19______
Affiliation/integration manual23 □
□
19______
a
□
Systems training manual24
□
□
19______
a
Products training manual25
□
□
19______
a
a
Other______________________ □
□
19______
Quantitative M odels (computer-based)
Financial evaluation
□
□
19______
Q
Staffing models
□
□
19______
a
Product mapping26
□
□
19______
a
□
Training/Self-training packages □
□
19______
Project management27
□
□
19______
Other
□
□
19

□

□
□
□
□
□
□

□

□
□
□
□
□
□

a
□
□

□
□
□
□
□

a
□
□
□
a
□

□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□

□

□
□
□

At what level of detail are financial projections made, staffing needs assessed and product
portfolio analyzed ? (check onefor each column)
Projections
Staffing Portfolio
At the aggregate level (the whole bank)
□
□
□
At a large group level (lines of business, functions)
□
□
□
At a small group level (loan types, departments)
□
□
□
At the individual level (single product, branch)
□
□
□
According to past acquisition experience...
Out of every 10 situations in which a contact or discussion is initiated,
how many result in a nonbinding bid ?
#
Out of every 10 nonbinding bids, how many result in a Due Diligence phase ? #
Out of every 10 due diligence phases, how many result in a closed transaction ? #

Bidding. Please divide the acquisitions completed to this date in the following categories.
How Many ?
Private, one-to-one negotiation
__________
Semi-private negotiation, 2 or 3 competing bidders
__________
Auction process run by an investment bank or the seller itself
__________
Auction process run by a regulatory agency (FDIC, RTC, etc.)
__________
TOTAL (as in the acquisition history profile)_________________________
23 Manual describing all the procedures necessary to accomplish the desired level o f integration between
the two organizations. It usually covers issues such as human resources, accounting, audit, CRA etc..

24 Manual describing how to train the D.P. users at the acquired company. A “train-the-trainer” tool
25 Manual describing how to train the sales-force at the acquired company (platform people, product
specialists etc.)
2 Allows thorough comparison o f the features o f the acquired bank’s products with those o f the acquirer.
27 Assigns tasks, requirements and deadlines, allowing careful planning and control o f complex projects.
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Action Planning Is a formal “process management” document with detailed tasks,
responsibilities and deadlines usually produced ?
□
Yes
□ No
If yes, when is the action plan usually finalized, with respect to the time of the announcement ?
#
weeks
□ ...before... or
□ ... after...
the announcement.
To what extent does the acquired bank have any say in the formation of the action plan ?
None
Critical

□

□

□

□

□

Consider now a “typical”type o f bank recently acquired by your institution....
Who does what ?. For each of the acquisition process phases, please assess the type of
responsibility, if any, held by each of the following individuals or functions. Enter
“L”, as in Leader, the one who coordinates and bears the main responsibility for the
decisions/ourcomes
“A”, as in Approver, the one who ratifies the Leader’s actions and bears the ultimate
responsibility
“D”, as in Doer, the one who actually executes the actions required by the process
“H” as in Helper, the one who lends the necessary support or advice to the Doer
Selec
tion

Negotia
tion

Due
Dilig.

Planning

Transiti
on

Board of Directors
C.E.O.
C.F.O. (or controller)
Corporate Development Exec.
Staff of M&A specialists
Lines of Business Executives
Staff Functions (HR, D.P., legal etc.)
Sponsor/Champion of transaction
Heads of Task Forces (if formed)
Steering Committee (formed ad hoc)
Regional Leader (CEO, controller)
Regional Representatives
How many people in total ? approx
How many members of the transition team were also in the due diligence team ?
How many members of the transition team had been in previous transition teams ?

#
#

Process Times. Please provide your best estimate o f the times required for the following
processes as o f the first acquisition experiences had, as o f the most recent ones, and what your
objectives are for the future transactions.

Past
Due Diligence (# o f business days)______________________ #_____
Planning for transition (# o f weeks)______________________ #_____
Evaluation/selection o f human resources (# o f weeks)______ #_____
From announcement to start o f systems conversion (weeks)#
Systems conversion (start to conversion day, # o f weeks)
#_____
From conversion day to complete normalization (weeks)___ #____

Present

Future

#______
#______
#______
#______
#______
#______

#______
#______
#______
#______
#______
#______
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POST-ACQUISITION INTEGRATION STRATEGY.

Following you willfind the description o f several approaches which, according to our previous
research, represent viable alternatives as general guidelinesfor post-acquisition management
processes. Please select which one is the best description o f the approach which your bank
wouldfollow in a “typical ” acquisition, as o f today, as o f 5, and as o f 10 years ago (enter the
relevant number).
# ____ 1985
# ___ Today
# ____ 1990
Scenarios:
1 The acquired bank maintains the organizational structure, systems, processes and
leadership as it was before the acquisition. The acquiring bank limits its intervention to
the coordination of high level strategies, and to periodical monitoring of performance.
2 The systems and processes o f the acquired bank are restructured in order to ensure its
long-term viability, but they are not necessarily integrated with the equivalent elements
of the acquiring unit. The process is carried forward by the old management under the
general supervision of the acquirer.
3 Most support functions (like systems, HR, accounting, legal etc.) are integrated or
centralized with those of the acquiring bank. The leadership o f the acquired bank is
usually unchanged and will preserve substantial autonomy on business generation,
pricing, product portfolios and so on.
4 The acquired bank is entirely integrated within the structure o f the acquiring bank. The
top management is substantially renewed and the organizational structure is significantly
altered to accommodate the acquiring bank’s requirements. No attempt is usually made
to screen and eventually keep the best practices in the acquired organization.
3 The complete integration of the two organizations is achieved through a careful selection
of at least some of the comparable resources (products, practices, HR etc.). For example,
a thorough re-hiring process will include employees from both banks in overlapping
geographical areas. The top management team is carefully evaluated and top performers
are retained, motivated and eventually promoted to new positions within the acquiring
organization.
Strategic Priorities. What do you care most when you manage acquisitions ? Please rank the
following objectives in order of importance. Assign a numberfrom I to 5, where I is the top
priority.
Rank#
Enhance revenue generation of acquired unit_____________________________ _____
Cut fixed costs and obtain quick efficiency gains
_____
Select and retain the highest possible quality of people
_____
Gain access to business intelligence (new clients, products, systems)
_____
Improve policies and procedures to enhance long-term efficiency
_____
Implementation Priorities. Similarly, rank the following criteria in order of importance for the
successful execution of the acquisition plans. Assign a numberfrom 1 to 6.
Rank#
Ensure consensus with the top management of the acquired bank
_____
Closely monitor and minimize the error rates (misposted transactions etc.)
_____
Ensure consensus among all the employees of the acquired bank
_____
Minimize changes and disruptions during the transition phase
_____
Minimize the process times (to convert systems, select HR etc.)
_____
Closely monitor the quality of training programs
_____
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3. INFORMA TION ON THE PERFORMANCE OF ACQUISITIONS
How many years after the integration of the acquired bank is financial
performance formally monitored ? (enter “0 " ifnot monitored)
# ____
Is there a formal process for the comparison of projections with actual performance ? (Y/N)____
Performance Evolution. This is perhaps the most important question in the entire survey. It is
criticalfor us to understand the evolution o f the performance levels at your institution. Please
make your very best effort to answer thoroughly and carefully.
For each of the following performance measures of the post-acquisition process, please assess
whether it is usually monitored. Also, enter your best estimate of the levels of each variable
(even if not consistently monitored) after the first acquisition experiences, after the most recent
ones, and what your target levels are for the future transactions. Enter “NI” if you have No Idea
of these quantities.
Monitored ?
Financial Performance
Yes
No
Past Present Future
Shareholders’ Dilution after 2 years
□
%
%
□
%
% of fixed costs cut after 2 years28
□
%
%
%
□
Variation of ROA 2 years after the acquisition
□
□
%
%
%
Actual vs. Budget difference of ROA (2 years after)
%
□
□
%
%
Process Cost Measuresr2’
Systems conversion cost (S in ‘000)
□
□ _____ $____ $___
$
Training costs ($ i n ‘000)
□
□
$____ $___
$
Total integration process cost (including all other items) □
□
$____ $___
$_
Process Quality Measures
Unexpected write-offs (% of loans in excess of plans) □
□
%
% _____%
Deposit run-offs (% of closings/month in excess of avg.) □
□
%
%
%
% of misposted transactions 1 month after conversion □
□
%
%
%
# of troubleshooting calls/week 1 mo. after conversion □
□
#
#
#
# of client complaints/week 1 month after conversion □
□
#
#

Areas o f Improvement. Following is a list of the most common problems experienced during
bank acquisition processes. Please assess the degree of improvement in your institution’s
acquisition process, necessary to reach the best possible acquisition performance.
The need for improvement in our acquisition process is None Minimal Fair Major Critical
Preventing deposits run-offs
□
□
□
□
□
Assessing portfolio quality to prevent unexpected write-offs □
□
□
□
□
Generating new business for the acquired entity
□
□
□
□
□
Minimizing mistakes while converting D.P. systems
□
□
□
□
□
Increasing gains from cuts to fixed costs
□
□
□
□
□
Improving existing procedures (operations, control etc.)
□
□
□
□
□
Improving customer satisfaction
□
□
□
□
□
Improving precision in evaluating the quality of HR
□
□
□
□
□
Shortening times of transition phase
□
□
□
□
□
Minimizing costs of the transition phase
□
□
□
□
□
Retaining high quality managers and employees
□
□
□
□
□
Ensuring cooperation from the target
□
□
□
□
□
Importing superior practices/products from acquired unit
□
□
□
□
□
28 Consider an in-market acquisition with average geographical overlap.
29 Consider the average size o f the banks purchased by your institution
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9.3

EXHIBIT C - PHASE 2 QUESTIONNAIRE - GENERAL PART

A. INFORMA TION ON THE ACQUIRED INSTITUTION

The purpose ofthis section is to gather information on some o f the most important
characteristics that the acquired unit had at the time o f the acquisition.
Object. Which o f the following more accurately describes the object o f the transaction ?
□
□
□
□
□

Merge the assets o f two similar entities, defined as “merger o f equals”
Purchase o f control o f a multi-bank holding company
Purchase o f control o f a commercial bank
Purchase o f control o f an S&L or a credit union
Purchase o f selected assets (branches, deposits etc.)

Location. Where is the acquired unit headquartered ? (check one o f the following)
□
□
□
□
□

In the same county where the acquiring institution is headquartered
In a county where the acquiring institution had a local presence
In the same state, but in a county where the acquiring institution had no presence
In a different state, where the acquiring institution had already a presence
In a different state, where the acquiring institution had no presence

Operating Effectiveness. Please assess the effectiveness level o f the following operating
functions, relative to those o f the Acquiring Unit, as o f the time before the acquisition (check the
most appropriate box).
Much
Worse
□
□
□
□
□

Operating Functions
Credit underwriting policies
Operations (back-office)
Administration (accounting, audit)
Marketing & Advertising
Customer service (i.e. tellers, phone)

Much
Worse Similar Better Better
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□

□

Quality o f Resources. Similarly, assess the quality level o f the: following resources.
Much
Much
Resources
Worse Worse Similar Better Better
Commercial/corporate loan portfolio
□
□
□
□
Consumer/retail loan portfolio
□
□
Facilities/location
Information systems/D.P.
Human resources
Reputation/image

□
□
□
□

□
□
□
a

□
□
□
□
□
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□
□
a
□
□

a
□
□
□
□
□

Ownership Structure.
Were the shares of the acquired institution publicly traded ?
If no, was it family-owned or controlled ?
If yes, was the ownership of the acquired institution widely diffused?
Was the top management of the acquired institution a significant shareholder ?
Had the acquired unit ever purchased or merged into other banks before ?
If yes, approximately how many acquisitions had it completed ?

Yes
No
□
□
□ □
□
□
□ □
□ □
# _______

Similarity. What was the degree of similarity between the acquired and the acquiring unit before
the acquisition, according to the following elements ?
No
Almost
Similarity
the Same
Products/services offered
a
□
□
□
□
Geographic markets served (branch overlap)
□
□
□
□
□
Customer segments served
□
□
□
□
□
Underwriting policies
a
□
□
□
□
Operating procedures (back-office)
□
□
□
□
□
D.P. systems (technology, telecom etc.)
□
□
□
□
□
Human resources practices (compensation etc.)
□
□
□
□
□
Management style
□
□
□
□
□
Key Figures. Please provide the following information about the acquired unit, as of the time
before the agreement to purchase (S in Million, please consult your projectfile).
Book Value
Market Value (if listed)
Price paid:
$______ in cash + $______ in stock and other =
Net Interest Income (last 12 monthsbefore acquisition)30
Non-interest Income (same as above)
Non-interest expense (same as above)
Earnings before taxes and extraordinary items (same as above)
Number of Full Time Equivalents
Total number of branches purchased

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
#
#

Loan Portfolio. Please, assess the relative “weight” of the following types of loans, according to
their dollar size and their earning capacity ( enter percent, adding up to 100%).
Size
Earnings
Commercial/corporate lending
Consumer/retail lending
Mortgage/real estate
Other
TOTAL

%
%
%
%
100%

%
%
%
%
100%

30 If income statement numbers are not available for the last 12 months before acquisition, use last quarter
or last year (please state which one you use). Make sure that they all have the same time basis.
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B. INFORMA TION ON THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

Idea Generation. Which of the following sources introduced the idea of purchasing the acquired
institution ? (check as many as applicable)
INTERNAL
EXTERNAL
Holding Company Level
Consultants
Board of Directors
Investment bank
□
□
Chief Executive Officer
□
Legal advisors
□
Other Senior Executives
□
Auditing/accounting firm
□
Strategic Planning Group.
a
Management consultant
□
M&A Group
a
Other
Local/Regional Bank Level
Acquired company itself
□
Chief Executive Officer
□
Government agency
□
Other Senior Executives
□
Public knowledge
□
Staff functions
□
Other
□
Acquisition Motives. Check the degree of relevance of the following acquisition motives for the
transaction considered, (check the most appropriate box)
M ajor
Irrelevant
Motive
Increase market presence in an attractive area
□
□
□
□
□
Reduce costs or risks o f entering a new market
□
□
□
□
□
Achieve economies of scale in operations capacity
□
□
□
□
□
Access market experience in a certain type of products
□
□
□
□
□
Enhance revenue generation (cross-selling etc.)
□
□
□
□
□
Utilize the acquiring unit's personnel, skills or
technology to improve operations of the acquired unit
□
□
□
Q
□
Utilize the acquired unit's personnel, skills or
technology to improve operations of the acquiring unit
□
□
□
□
□
Protect existing customer base or market position from
potential erosion due to competitors’ aggressive actions □
□
□
□
□
Take advantage of opportunities offered by government
agencies to reduce costs or risks of acquisition activities □
□
□
□
□
Restructure or divest poor-performing elements of the
otherwise undervalued acquired unit
□
□
□
Q
□
Previous Relationship. Which of the following describes the relationship between the two
institutions before the acquisition ? (check as many as applicable)
□
No relationship
□
Minority participation
□
Seats on the board of directors
□
Cooperation agreement (on specific products, markets etc.)
□
Correspondent bank
□
Shared operations (check processing, D.P. services, etc.)
□
Personal relationships among top executives
□
Other (specify)
_________________________________
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Bidding. Which of the following more accurately describes the negotiation environment ?
□
Private negotiation with the acquired unit, no other bidders
□
Multiple bidder situation, but no formal auction.
□
Auction process run by the Acquired Unit, or its agent (investment bank etc.)
□
Auction process run by a government agency (FDIC, RTC etc.)
□
Other (specify)
________________________________________
Negotiation
Which of the following was the key counterpart during the negotiation process ? (check I)
□ Key shareholders)
□ Board
□ CEO
□ Top management team
How many weeks did the negotiation process last ? (approx.)

#__

Milestones. Please, provide the time o f the following events in terms o f number o f weeks from
the public annoxmcement o f the transaction.
How many weeks after the public announcement....
did the due diligence process start ?_________________________________ #________
did the due diligence process end ?__________________________________ #________
was the definitive agreement to purchase signed ?_____________________ #________
was the acquisition officially approved by regulators ?_________________ #________
did the systems conversion process start, if it did ?
#________
were systems completely converted, if they were ?
#________
did the identity o f the acquired unit change, if it did ?
#________
was the post-conversion/integration emergency period over ?___________ #________

C. DUE DILIGENCE

Disclosure. To what degree was a complete disclosure of data possible due to confidentiality
issues or legal impediments on the part of the seller ?
No Problem
Very Difficult

□

□

□

□

□

Output. Which of the following best describes the type of output originated by the Due Diligence
process ? (check as many as applicable)
□
Verbal discussion of all the findings among the members of the Due Diligence team and
with the top management of the Acquiring Unit
□
Written reports submitted by all the key areas summarizing the findings
□
Cost and revenue projections computed by all the key areas
□
Mapping of the DP systems, including plans for conversion
□
Mapping of products/markets, including suggestions for keep/change decisions
□
Evaluation of HR quality, with preliminary staffing plan of each branch
□
Complete business plan for the transition phase
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Price Variation. What is the percent change applied to the offered purchasing price as a
consequence of the completion o f the Due Diligence process ? (specify + or -)
Expectations about transition period as of the end o f Due Diligence.
How many weeks after the announcement was final closing expected to happen ?
Were any expectation formed as to the systems conversion date ?
□ Yes
If yes, how many weeks after the announcement was the planned conversion date ?
Was an approximate forecast of the integration costs made ?
□ Yes
If yes, how much was the overall post-acquisition integration expected to cost ? ($ .000)

%

#__
□ No
#__
□ No
$___

D. AFTER THE DUE DILIGENCE PHASE
Leadership Change. Was the person in charge of the following functions at the acquired unit
still in place after the acquisition ? If not, was (s)he laid o ff? Was (s)he replaced with an officer
from acquiring unit, from the acquired unit, with someone newly hired, or was the position
simply canceled ?
Same Person ?
Laid off ?
Replaced with someone from....
Chief Executive Officer
Chief Operating Officer
Chief Financial Officer
Head of Retail Banking
Chief Credit Officer
Head of Operations
Head of D.PVTechnology
Head of Corp. Development
Head of Human Resources

Y es

No

Y es

No

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

a
□
□
□
□
□

B uyer

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

a

S e lle r N ew

•

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

No one

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

Alignment of Products and Procedures. To what extent have the following elements of the
acquired organization been aligned (i.e. changed towards similarity) with those of the acquiring
unit?
Products/Procedures
Not at all
Completely
Features o f deposits products
Features o f commercial loan products
Features o f consumer/retail loan products
Lending policies and procedures
Human resources policies (compensation etc.)
Operating procedures (servicing, execution)
Accounting/Audit systems
D.P./telecom systems

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
a
□
□
□
□
□

Consolidation o f Functions. To what extent have the following functions/departments of the
acquired organization been consolidated within those of the acquiring unit ?
Functions/Departments
Not at all
Completely
Credit lending department
□
Operations department (back-office)
□ □ □ □
a
D.P./technology department
□ □ □ □
a
Marketing/Customer support
□
□ □ □ a
Human resources
□
□
□
□
□
Accounting/audit
a
□
□
a
□
Legal department
□ □ □ □ □
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I f all (or nearly all) the answers to the previou s tw o questions have been “N ot a t a ll”, please
turn to the next section to assess the A cquisition Performance. Otherwise proceed with the
follow ing question.
Business Plan.
In case it was not done before, was a business plan produced in this phase ?
□ Yes
□ No
If yes, at what level o f detail were financial projections made, staffing needs assessed and
product portfolio analyzed ? (check one for each column)
At the aggregate level (the whole bank)
At a large group level (lines o f business, functions)
At a small group level (loan types, departments)
At the individual level (single product, branch)

Projections

Staffing

Portfolio

□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□

A fter the Transition Phase. Were any o f the following initiatives taken in order to summarize
the lessons learned during the acquisition process ? (check as many as applicable)
A formal brainstorming session on lessons learned was held
□
Each o f the business lines and support functions submitted a written report
□
Each o f the business lines and support functions verbally reported to top-executive
□
A detailed document was written with input from all the relevant players
□
Models and manuals were created and, if existing, significantly updated
□
□
Other (exp lain)_________________________________________________________

None of the above

Q

Adoption/Transfer Back. To what extent have any o f the following elements o f the acquired
institution been transferred and/or adopted within the acquiring institution ?

Products on the deposits side
Products on the commercial loans side
Products on the consumer loans side
Lending policies, evaluation practices
Operating procedures (back-office)
D.P./telecom systems or procedures
Managerial talent (people transferred to acquirer)

Never
Happened
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□

a
□
□

a

□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□

a
□
□
□

Very
Frequently
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

E. ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE

Thefollowing question is probably the single most important item of the questionnaire.
This information is generally not availablefrom call reports, and we must rely on your
willingness to cooperate to the success o f this research effort.
By all means, do consult the acquisitionfile with the projections made in the business plan or
during the pre-closing phase. For the actuals, please make an effort to collect them. If
impossible, please provide your best estimate and put an "E " after the number.
If you have an assistant gathering the numbers, please check their quality and their consistency
with the projections. Thank you very muchfo r your time and effort on this one.
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P rojected vs. Actual. Please provide the following information about the projections and the

actual figures as of one and two years after the acquisition (S in million, except %.).
Projections
Year I
Year 2

Total Assets_______________ _______
Total Deposits_____________________
Total Loans
_______
Non-perf. Loans31
_______
Book Value________________ _______
Net Interest Income
_______
Charge-offs
_______
Non-interest Income
_______
Employment Expenses_______ _______
Other non-interest Expenses
_______
Net Earnings
_______
# of Full-time Equivalents
_______
# of Branches

A ctu al

_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
______

Year I

Year 2

_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______
_______

_______
______
_______
_______
______
_______
_______
______
______
______
______
______

Process Costs. What was the final cost of the following items of the post-acquisition process, and
how much did they differ from the expectations/business plan ?. (S in thousands, except where %>)
Actual
(+ or -) % Diff.
Branch conversion/closing/upgrading
$ _______
%
Systems conversion (excI. systems training)
$ _______
%
Human resources (excl. training)
$ _______
%
Training costs (incl. systems)
$ _______
%
Marketing initiatives
$ _______
%
Other costs (specify)___________________________ $ _______
%
TOTAL

$ _______

%

External Support. Please assess whether any of the following types of advisors or contractors
have been used during the various phases of the process, and their approximate cost.
Yes
□
□
□
□
□

Investment banking (selection, negotiation etc.)
General consulting (management, marketing etc.)
Accounting/auditing
Systems/technology specialists (conversion)
Training specialists

No
□
□
□
□
□

(S
$

s

$
$
$

Press. What was the general reaction o f the local press to the human resources practices
adopted during the post-acquisition integration phase, if any ?
No
Very
Reaction
Negative
Enthusiastic

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

31 90 days, even if accruing
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Unexpected Problems. Here are listed some of the most typical areas in which problems are
experienced during the transition phase. Please assess the relevance of each of them to the
acquisition considered, with respect to the pre-acquisition expectations.
More/
Less/
Compared to expectations....
In Line
Higher
Lower
Quality of loan portfolio was
□
□
□
□
a
New business generation was
□
□
□
□
a
□
Deposits run-offs were
□
□
□
□
Quality of facilities was
□
□
□
□
□
Quality of D.P. systems was
□
□
□
□
□
□
Gains from cuts to fixed costs were
□
□
□
a
Improvements in procedures were
□
□
□
□
□
Improvements in control systems were
□
□
□
□
□
□
Improvements in customer satisfaction were
□
□
□
□
Quality of human resources was
a
a
□
□
□
Willingness to cooperate was
□
□
□
a
□
a
Retained managers leaving were
□
□
□
□
Retained employees leaving were
□
□
a
□
□
Your View. Please assess your level of agreement with the following statements, keeping as a
benchmark all the acquisitions made by your bank until today.
Strongly
Strongly
Compared with the other acquisitions....
Disagree
Agree
The unit selected was the best possible target
Q
□
□
□
□
Negotiated price/terms were the best possible
□
□
□
□
□
Negotiations were smooth and relaxed
□
□
□
□
□
Due diligence was as accurate as possible
□
□
□
□
□
Consensus among the two management teams was high □
□
□
□
□
Middle management was extremely cooperative
□
□
□
□
□
The systems conversion was flawless
□
□
□
□
□
Human resources were effectively integrated
□
□
□
□
□
The impact on customers was positive
□
□
□
□
□
Performance improvements were satisfactory
□
□
□
□
□
Best resources/practices were transferred to acquirer
□
□
□
□
□
Overall, this acquisition was a success
Q
□
□
□
□
COMMENTS. Please feel free to add any issue regarding activities and consequences of the
acquisition process, that you deem important and that has not been addressed.
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9.4

EXHIBIT D - CONSTRUCT VALIDITY
Exhibit D provides the details for the analysis o f construct validity o f the Phase 1

measures performed with the use o f multiple indicators measured with the Phase 2
survey. See Chapter 5 for a description of the research design and Section 5.4 for a
summary of the analyses presented below.

D .l

Resource Q uality
The General Part questionnaire o f the Phase 2 survey contains 11 indicators o f the

quality of the target’s resources and practices, assessed in comparison with the quality of
the corresponding features o f the acquiring firm (see page 1 of the questionnaire in
Exhibit C). A factor analysis of these indicators (principal components method, no
rotation) results in the identification of two factors (Eigenvalues > 1). The first factor
loads on the relative quality o f all the features o f the acquired firm, and the other
distinguishes the quality o f the loan portfolio and the related underwriting practices from
the quality of all the other organizational features probed. The factor loadings, the
Eigenvalues, and the percentage o f variance related to each factor are reported in the
table below.
Furthermore, Table D.l reports the bivariate correlations among the Phase 1 and
the Phase 2 measures o f resource quality. While the Phase 1 proxy o f resource quality
(target’s pre-acquisition profitability) correlates significantly with only 8 o f the 11 Phase
2 indicators, the remaining three (quality o f the marketing function, o f customer service,
and o f the location o f facilities) are also weakly correlated with the rest o f the measures.
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These correlational patterns ensure a good centrality o f the Phase 1 scale with respect
the assessment o f the overall quality construct.

FACTOR LOADINGS -RESOURCE QUALITYFactors
Phase 2 M easures

Consumer loan portfolio
Commercial loan portfolio
Credit underwr. Policies
Administration / audit
Human resources
Information systems
Marketing & advertising
Location / facilities
Operations (back-office)
Reputation / image
Customer service
Eigenvalues
% o f Variance

Quality

Loan portfolio

.373

.689

.656

.461

.613

.498

.788

-.063

.694

-.040

.671

-.427

.711

-.178

.608

-.181

.736

-.332

.663

.215

.531

-.306

4.637

1.438

42.1%

13.1%
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Table D.l - CORRELATION MATRIX -RESOURCE QUALITY (Phase I and 2)-

Std
1.00
.7181

2.717

.6006

.302
**

.252
*

2.491

.8463

.295
**

.284
**

.465
***

2.537

.8176

.110

.282
♦♦

.502
***

.422
***

2.815

.7542

.139

.248
*

.287
**

.470
***

2.38

.79

.263
*

.394
***

.344
**
.306
**

.015

.190

.121

2.17

.70

.530
***

.606
***

.349
**

.277
**

.275
+*

.242
*

.369
***

2.491

.6181

.302
**

.321
**

.347
**

.678
***

.421
***

.401
***

.098

.354
***

2.667

.6729

.390
***

.421
+**

.263
*

.400
*+*

.471
***

.378
***

.5510

.180

.347
**
.541
***

.345
**

.325
**

.395
***

.304
**
.116

.404
***

2.870

.367
***
.199

.207

.357
***

.187

.7194 .363
.430
.480 .463
2r537
Administration/
***
***
***
***
Audit
Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level

.326
**

.149

.541
***

.606

.416
***

3

4
5
6

Information
systems
Marketing &
advertising
Location / facilities

Consumer loan
portfolio
Commercial loan
8
portfolio
Operations (back9
office)
10 Reputation / image
7

11
12

Customer service

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

.424
*++

.369
***
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Avg
.0755
2.111

1
2

VARIABLES
Quality Phase 1
Credit underwr.
policies
Human resources

D.2

Resource Relatedness
As mentioned in Section 5.3, the degree o f variation in the resource relatedness

construct has been kept low by design in order to allow for a better study o f the creation
o f integration capabilities in relatively homogeneous acquisition contexts. The
dimension chosen in response to the prevailing criterion used by the banking industry is
not, however, a good representation o f the complex construct of organizational
relatedness. Both the factor and the correlation analyses (see Table D.2) show that the
distinction between "in-market” and “out-market” acquisitions relates to the
characteristics o f the market served by the two firms. Yet, this relationship does not
imply that the two firms are also similar in terms o f internal features, such as systems,
procedures, and management style. In a way, this result speaks to the significance o f the
distinction advanced by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) between product market and
organizational relatedness. However, the following factor analysis o f the eight Phase 2
indicators does show that all of these variables, including geographic overlap and
similarity o f customer segments served, load on the same main factor, which can be
interpreted as the "relatedness” construct. The same analysis, then, highlights the
difference o f the two external resources (geographic location of the two branch networks
and the similarity in customer segments served) with respect to the other internal
measures o f resource relatedness.
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FACTOR LOADINGS -RESOURCE RELATEDNESSFactors

Geographic markets
Customer segments
D.P. systems (technology)
Human resources practices
Operating procedures
Underwriting policies
Products / services offered
Management style
Eigenvalues
% o f Variance

Relatedness

External vs.
Internal factors

.365

.727

.682

.507

.773

vO

Phase 2 M easures

.639

-.279

.692

-.493

.625

.046

.798

.089

.592

.172

3.459

1.289

43.2%

16.1%
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Table D.2 - CORRELATION MATRIX - RESOURCE RELATEDNESS-

5
6
7
8
9

Avg
.470
3.000
2.491

Std
.500
1.079
1.069

2.179

1.295

.707
*+*

Human resources
practices
Operating
procedures
Underwriting
policies
Products / services
offered
Management style

2.800

.7552

.049

2.750

.9195

2.400

I

2

4

5

6

7

8

00

.191
-.136

3

.469
***
.291
**

.109
.422
***

-.008

-.233
*

.220

.710
***

.084

.430
***

.8735

-.001

.263
**

.400
***

.245
*

.264
+*

.372
*+*

3.056

.8107

.099

.593
***

.594
***

.309
**

.395
+**

.467
***

.356

2.339

.7453

-.118

.407
***

.305
**

.124

.348
***

.206

.363
***

Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) evel

VO

.371
***
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4

VARIABLES
Relatedness Ph. 1
Customer segments
D.P. systems
(technology)
Geographic markets

*

1
2
3

D.3

Level of Integration
The level o f integration construct has been measured in the second part o f the

survey with two different questions probing for an assessment o f the degree to which the
key features and procedures o f the two firms have been aligned and centralized. The 15
items, which generally show a strong correlation with the Phase I measure (see Table
D.3), consistently load on one main factor (Eigenvalue = 9.27). They can also be further
broken down between the alignment and the centralization part o f the definition o f the
level o f integration (see Definition 3 in Chapter 4). The third factor is more difficult to
interpret, but is o f nominal importance, as the Eigenvalue is barely above 1 and the
variance covered is minimal (6.7%). In terms o f correlational evidence, 2 o f the 8
alignment measures, those referring to HR policies and to the lending procedures, do not
correlate with the Phase 1 measure, while all 7 centralization measures show strong
correlational ties (see Table D.3).

FACTOR LOADINGS - LEVEL OF INTEGRATION Phase 2 M easures
Alignment audit/ accounting
Alignment consumer loans
Alignment D.P. systems
Alignment HR policies
Alignment oper. procedures
Alignment comm, loans
Alignment deposit products
Alignment lending procedure
Centralization audit function
Centralization lending dept
Centralization D.P. dept
Centralization HR function
Centralization legal dept
Centralization marketing dept
Centralization operations
Eigenvalues
% o f Variance

Factor 3

.778
.889
.895
.556
.928
.885
.783
.596
.829
.649
.833
.807
.680
.767
.807

Alignment vs.
centralization
.384
.234
.352
.795
.290
.164
-.134
.725
-.344
-.419
-.430
-.410
-.100
-.432
-.443

9.271
61.8%

2.651
17.7%

1.006
6.7%

Integration
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.163
-.267
.131
-.078
.072
-.010
-.512
-.002
.307
.265
-.257
.310
.423
-.202
-.266

Table D.3 - CORRELATION MATRIX
INTEGRATION (Ph. I) vs. ALIGNMENT and CENTRALIZATION (Ph. 2)

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
13
16

V ariab les

A vg

S id

Phase 1. Level
of integration
Alignment
HR policies
Align, oper.
procedures
Align loans
commercial
Align deposit
products
Alignment
lending proced.
Align audit/
accounting
Align loans
consumer
Alignment
D.P. systems
Centralization
audit function
Centralization
lending dept
Centralization
D.P. dept
Centralization
HR function
Centralization
legal dept
Centralization
Marketing dept
Centralization
Operations

2.469

.8921

4.481

1.094

4.333

1.213

4.333

1.000

.379

4.111

1.423

4.518

1.004

.414
**♦
.169

4.509

.9927

.342
**

.936
*♦*
.821
**♦

4.222

1.192

4.222

1.327

.416
♦♦♦
.441

.755
♦♦♦
.795

4.667

.9316

.498
***

.086

.457
«**

.155

.528
***
.511

.051

1.554

4.648

1.067
1.059

2

.368

.772
*♦*
.711
.547

.178

♦**

4.67
4.259
4.481

.9500
1.216
1.128

3

4

5

.948
**♦
.820

.833

.784
***
.867
♦♦♦
.926
♦**
.902
♦**

.729
♦**
.819
***
.907
***
.854
**♦

.501
***

.442
♦**
.571

.455
***

.108

.557

***

♦**

.597

.343
*♦
.595

***

.584

6

7

8

.764
***
.881
*♦«
.258

.863

9

10

II

12

13

14

IS

.067
♦*

3.963

4.463

1

.543
***

.515

♦♦♦

.539
♦♦♦

.266
*
.245
*
.114

.567
♦**
.369

.614
***
.886
***
.686

***

.838
***
.768
***
.846
***

00

.408
***

.397
*+*

.254

.352
***

.534
***

.471

***

.695
***

.499
***
.566

.068

.246

.419

*

*»*

.231

.368

.530

.389
***
.489

***

***

*

.487
***
.924

»»*

.848

***

***

***

***

.490

.377

.367

.466

.505

.621

.710

***

.441

***

***

.549

.677

.640
***

.584
♦♦♦

***

*

**»

.644

.579

.356
***

.431
.633

*»

*»

***

***

.735

.305

.455

.688

.537

***

***

***

.734
***

*** .770
***

.454

.634

.494

.658

.581

.770

***

***

***

.532

.829

***

*+»

***

**

.553

.753

.158

***

***

.317
**

***

***

***

.639

.663
***

•**
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1

D.4

Replacement of the Top Management Team
The correspondence between the Phase 1 and the Phase 2 measure o f the

replacement construct has to be assessed in a slightly different way, as the latter survey
prompts for a list of binary measures related to the effective retention o f 9 top
management positions. The first index o f the Phase 2 decisions was constructed by
summing up the dummy variables, as this is the straightforward sense o f the question
asked in the Phase 1 survey (“the extent to which the executive leadership o f the acquired
bank has been replaced after the acquisition”). The results, however, are consistent with
those described for the other constructs. As shown in the table below, all the measures
load on the main factor, which represents 64.5% o f the variance, and, once extracted,
shows a significant correlation with the Phase 1 scale. The factor analysis also identifies
a second factor that (weakly) discriminates between the top two functions and the other
ones, in terms o f their specific replacement patterns.

FACTOR LOADINGS -REPLACEMENTFactors
Position

Replacement

Top two positions

C hief Executive Officer
C hief Operating Officer
Head o f Retail Banking
C hief Credit Officer
C hief Financial Officer
Corporate Development
D.P. / Technology
Human Resources
Head o f Operations (back-office)

.738
.720
.816
.702
.901
.841
.856
.833
.800

.562
.582
.159
.065
-.056
-.327
-.228
-.325
-.272

Eigenvalues
% o f Variance

5.809

1.026

64.5%

11.4%

179

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table D.4 - CORRELATION MATRIX -REPLACEMENTS1
2

VARIABLES
Replacement - PHASE 1
Chief Credit Officer

Avg
1.75
.28

Std
1.30
.46

3

Chief Executive Officer

.44

.50

-.597

.520
***

4

Chief Financial Officer

.30

.47

-.551
***

.586
***

.766
***

5

Chief Operating Officer

.39

.49

-.664
***

.549
***

.875
***

.786
***

6

Corporate Development

.14

.36

-.370
+*

.694
***

.465
***

.816
***

.397
**

7

D.P. / Technology

.24

.43

-.608
***

.477
***

.633

***

.810
*+*

.623
+**

.679
***

8

Human Resources

.28

.45

-.514
+**

.655
***

.594
**+

.822
***

.594
***

.815
+*♦

.733
***

9

Operations

.33

.48

-.605
***

.494
***

.616
***

.734
***

.632
***

.612
***

.883
*♦#

*.655
**

10

Head o f Retail Banking

.45

.50

-.528
***

.641
***

.742
**♦

.758
***

.671
*+*

*.600
**

.659
***

.694
***

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level

.589
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-.408
***

D.5

Post-acquisition Integration Performance
The performance measures gathered with the Acquisition History Profile have

been analyzed using two sets o f assessments generated by the Phase 2 survey. The first
set calls for a judgment on the performance o f the various parts o f the integration process,
as compared with initial expectations, while the second benchmarks similar types o f
assessments with all the acquisitions experienced by the same acquirer. Bivariate
correlations between the three Phase 1 measures and all the Phase 2 indicators are
presented in Table D.5 and D.6.
The two measures o f performance, which refer to specific sub-processes (i.e. the
integration o f the workforce and the conversion o f the information systems), have been
contrasted with a subset o f these Phase 2 indicators that point towards similar constructs.
Eight o f them have been identified for the human resources integration, while five were
identified for the systems conversion process. The results o f the factor analyses support
the representativeness o f the Phase 1 scale. The HR affiliation process items load on
three factors.

FACTOR LOADINGS -PERFORMANCE HR AFFILIATIONPhase 2 Variables
HR effectively integrated
HR quality
Target’s will to cooperate
Consensus among TMT
Cooperation o f middle managers
Smooth negotiation
Retention employees
Retention managers

Eigenvalues
% o f Variance

Affiliation
.548
.684
.705
.849
.829
.731
.004
.028

Factors
Retention
-.122
.014
.048
.087
-.009
.913
.909

Only HR
.569
.513
.203
-.380
-.172
-.472
-.018
.144

3.208

1.697

1.046

40.1%

21.2%

13.1%

-.111
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The first one points towards the overall performance construct, the second one singles out
the issue o f retention o f employees and managers, while the third one, which has a less
clear interpretation, appears to emphasize the “core” HR affiliation issues with respect to
conflict and retention issues.
The five Phase 2 items dealing with value creation mechanisms based on the
pursuit o f cost efficiencies load on two factors. The first one speaks directly to the
performance issue, while the second one discriminates the benefits to be derived from the
conversion o f the information systems from the more general improvements in internal
procedures and in the control systems. The Phase 1 performance assessment o f the
smoothness o f the systems conversion process correlates in a significant way with the
Phase 2 assessments regarding the degree to which improvements in operating
procedures (Pearson’s index = .403) and in information systems (P = .373) and in
customer satisfaction (.445) were better than expected. It also correlates well with
respect to the comparisons with the performance o f all the other completed transactions
not just in terms o f systems conversions process (Pearson’s correlation = .405) but also in
terms o f HR affiliation (.413), customer impact (.453) and overall performance
improvements.

FACTOR LOADINGS - PERFORMANCE-COST EFFICIENCIES Phase 2 Variables
Smooth systems conversion
DP system quality
Cost efficiency
Procedures improvements
Improvement control Systems

Eigenvalues
% o f Variance

Factors
Cost efficiencies
D.P.
.511
.257
.527
.869
.818

conv. only
.493
.806
-.366
-.023
-.302

2.029

1.118

40.6%

22.4%
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Tabic D.5 - C O RRELA TIO N MATRIX
-POST-ACQIHSITION PERFORM A NCE - Benchm ark: pre-acquisition expectations
2
3
VARIABLES
Avg
Std
1
4
Overall
.6531 1.217
integration
process (Ph. 1)
2
.5714 1.118 .639
HR affiliation
»**
( P h .1)
.586
3
D.P. systems
.7273 1.020 .715
•*«
conv. (Ph. 1)
.280 .222
4
Target willing
3.075 1.071 .194
*
to cooperate
.048
.225
.058
5
Gains from cost
3.000 .6262 .229
efficiency
6
3.000 .9100 -.398 -.297 -.238
Deposit run
*•
*•*
.078
offs
-.050
7
Quality o f D.P.
2.961 .4411 .114
.115
.038
systems
.184
8
.272
.275
Quality o f
3.000 .3885 .164
•
•*
facilities
.439 .385
9
.548
Quality o f
2.852 .7113 .420
»*•
««
♦♦♦
human res.
.331
.313
.138
10
New business
2.813 .8704 .527
♦*
••
***
generation
.020
.205
.303
II
Quality o f loan
2.660 .8975 .317
♦♦
*♦
portfolio
.147
.376 .403
12 Improvement in 3.019 .4996 .447
*•*
procedures
.030
13 Retention o f
2.926 .8208 -.001 -.033 .016
employees
-.119 .023
.078
2.889 .8165 .029
14 Retention o f
managers
.259
.445
.258
15 Improvement
2.943 .7183 .320
♦*
**♦
customer satisf.
.212
.284
.373
3.038 .4369 .449
16 Improvement
«
•*
*«•
control systems
Pearson’s correlation. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level

5

7

6

8

9

10

II

12

13

14

15

1

.270
.000

.144

.079

-.053

.256

.043

-.233

.104

.068

.212

-.595

.031

.223

.442

-.303

.034

.219

.068

.368

-.293

.180

.098

.383

.271

.050

.263

.118

.084

.125

.126
.356

.162
.353

.027
.029

.169

.030

.165
.310
•*

«*•
»•

«♦

.075
.301

-.025

.345

-.443

••

*«

.248
»*

-.191

•

•

.118
.010
.004

183

.059
.068
.337

•*

•«*

*•»

*»*

.264
•

*♦»
«*

•««

.114
.017

-.091
-.184
.497

*»*

.613
***

.635
.201
.114

-.238
*

.118

.135
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Table D.6 - CORRELATION MATRIX
-POST-ACQIJISITION PERFORMANCE - Benchmark: past experiences

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14

VARIABLES
Overall integralion
process (Phase 1)
Human resources
affiliation (Phase 1)
D.P. systems
conversion (Ph. 1)
Acquired firm was
best possible target
Consensus among
TMTs
Cooperation of
middle management
Impact on customers
Accuracy of due
diligence
Effectiveness of HR
integration
Transfer of best
resource/practices
Smoothness of
negotiations
Performance
improvements
Best possible price
and terms
Flawless systems
conversion

Avg
.6531

Std
1.217

1

.5714

1.118

.7273

1.020

.639
♦ ♦♦
.715

2

3

4

7

8

.272
**
.320

.339
**
.550

.328

*»

***

**

.162

.426

.264

***

*

6

5

9

10

II

12

13

.586

***

3.641
3.358

1.058
1.002

.625
***
.267

.232

.400
**♦

.434

.145

.232

♦ ♦♦

3.207

.9478

3.377

.9452

3.774
3.396

.9332
.9269

3.040

1.049

3.519

1.019

3.528

.9924

.270
+
.285
*
.336
♦♦
.396

.414

.075

.152

.278

.453

.196

*

**♦

.375

.204

•**

**

2.960

1.126
1.124

.337

.413

.240

-.031

.193
.058

.257

.325

♦

♦♦

.555

.374
♦ **
.347
♦*

*♦*

3.577

**♦

.503
.370
**

.231

.690

***

.281
♦♦
.459
.325
***
**
.344 ] .279
**
**
.026
.141

.319
**

.220

.738
♦♦♦

.549

.306

.470

.281

*♦

***

**

M*

M

.551
♦ ♦♦
.396

.459

.347

.351

.603

.505

.583

M*

**

♦ ♦♦

***

.652

.330

.532

**♦

.374
***
.314

.194

*♦

**

***

.270

.571

**

*

**•

.405
*♦*

.322

.124
■n / * \ I

184

.256

.116
.398

.336

**♦

**

.345

.378

.520

.572

**

»**

***

***

.667
**•

.454
***

.282
**

.547
0*0

.256
*
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